Gagauzia: Geopolitics and identity

Map of Moldova with areas of the Gagauzia republic marked. As seen in the map, the autonomous republic is not contiguous. Source: TUBS (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

A Turkic ethnic group with Orthodox Christianity as their main religion, the Gagauz migrated to present-day Moldova and Ukraine in the late 18th and early 19th century. Since then the core group has lived under the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Romania, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Moldova.

National awakening

Decades of Russification and Sovietisation, a weak development of Gagauzian language and the multi-ethnic nature of Bessarabia, have left their traces on the construction of Gagauz identity. Underdeveloped during the Soviet period, Gagauz national consciousness only awakened and proclaimed itself a separate ethno-territorial entity in the late 1980s. Initially an intellectual movement, Gagauz nationalism received a strong push from the perestroika reforms. The national awakening was boosted even more by the surge of the movement in Moldova which lobbied for a unification with Romania – a prospect that would affect all national minorities in Moldova.

In August 1990, following the first democratic elections in Moldova, but before the fall of the Soviet Union, the Gagauz national movement organised a congress of local deputies and announced several key postulates: the freedom and independence of the Gagauz from the Republic of Moldova; the decision of the Gagauz to establish their own state; the desire of the Gagauz to keep their Soviet citizenship and to not accept Moldovan citizenship; and the election for a Supreme Soviet of the Gagauz Republic. In other words, the local representatives proclaimed an entity which they called the “Gagauz Republic” – independent from Moldova but subject to Soviet authority.

As stated during the congress, the Gagauz movement was not nationalistic. It was designed to enable the Gagauz people to survive and co-exist together with other ethnic groups. Interestingly enough, a similar quasi-independent Transnistrian state would be proclaimed in Tiraspol only a couple of weeks later (in September 1990). The decision on Gagauz autonomy was soon annulled by Chișinău as unconstitutional. In order to suppress the centrifugal tendency in the region, Moldovan Prime Minister Mircea Druc mobilised thousands of Moldovan nationalists and initiated, in October 1990, what became known as the “March to Gagauzia”.

A counter-mobilisation was launched in Gagauzia where local residents decided to defend themselves, mainly with steel bars and other improvised means. Supporters came in from Transnistria. Russian troops stationed nearby in Bolhrad also arrived in the region, rolling their tanks across Gagauzia several days and helped prevent bloodshed. The tensions that lasted several days threatened Moldova with another hot conflict. Although the situation did not escalate into a war, it still accelerated the autonomy processes in Gagauzia. By the end of the year, the Gagauz Republic held its own presidential election and elected Stepan Topal as its leader.

The Soviet authorities also attempted to regulate the uneasy situation in Moldova. In November 1990, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev assembled the Moldovan, Gagauzian and Transnistrian leaders and issued a decree to normalise the situation in the Moldovan SSR which virtually abolished the Gagauz Republic in exchange for some level of compromise from Moldova. Support for the USSR stayed high in Gagauzia, even during the final days of the empire. The August 1991 putsch in Moscow was welcomed by the majority of the Gagauz, who were celebrating the first anniversary of the republic and constructing the state, creating state symbols (flag, coat of arms, a national anthem), a national bank, a university, and even a self-defence battalion.

Yet the state formation – despite the existence of the Gagauz Republic from 1990 to 1994 – did not follow the path of Transnistria for several reasons. First, both the leaders and the populace in Gagauzia remained relatively fractured. Second, the 14th Army secured Russia`s direct presence and influence in Tiraspol. Third, unlike the agriculturally-based economy of Gagauzia, Transnistria, due to its industrial facilities, had always been more closely linked to Moscow and not subordinate to Chișinău.

Peaceful solution

Unlike the Transnistrian case, Gagauzia did not become a bloody battlefield; it was solved after numerous meetings between Chișinău and Comrat. As a result of a series of talks, the parliament of Moldova passed the law “On the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri)”in December 1994, granting the Gagauz territorial autonomy within Moldova and devolving control of some political, cultural and economic issues to the entity. One of the major provisions of the document – (Article 1.4) stipulates that, in the event of a change in the status of the Republic of Moldova as an independent state, the people of Gagauzia possess the right to self-determination. This provision was a reaction to the popular sentiment of a united Romanian-Moldovan state, of which the Gagauz historically had a negative collective memory.

According to the document, Gagauz, Russian and Moldovan are to be accepted as official languages, with Moldovan and Russian set for administrative purposes. Article 4 allowed Gagauzia to display its own symbols together with those of the Republic of Moldova. The Halk Topluşu (or the People`s Assembly) is designated as Gagauzia`s legislative authority. It is made up of 35 members and every settlement in Gagauzia is represented by this gathering thanks to the specific electoral system. The executive power lies with the Başkan (Governor), who is elected for four years, as are assembly members. According to the document, the Başkan must speak Gagauz and be a member of the Moldovan government. 

The statute set in motion a series of events in 1995, the most significant of which was the settling of the administrative boundaries (settlements were able to choose whether they wanted to be part of Gagauzia). In March 1995 a referendum was held in 36 settlements where Gagauz either constituted over 50 per cent of the local population or where a third of the populace initiated such a referendum. Consequently, three cities and several communes were included into the Autonomous Gagauz Territory, while the remainder rejected the proposal.

The Gagauz proudly state that their conflict was probably the only one in the post-Soviet space that was solved peacefully. What makes this accomplishment more exemplary and remarkable is that it was achieved directly by the conflicting parties and without any third-party mediation or interference. Yet Topal points out in his memoirs the positive role of Turkey`s leader, Süleyman Demirel, in the peaceful and prompt solution of the Gagauz conflict. Demirel visited Gagauzia in the summer of 1994 and embraced the Gagauz people by promising Turkish support.

At the time of its adoption, the Gagauz Autonomy Law seemed quite liberal even by European standards, and it was relevant to some European countries that had ethnic minorities. Romania, however, was critical of the document, fearing an “atomisation” of Moldova and that similar demands would emerge from Romania’s own ethnic minorities.

Geopolitical influence

Gagauzia currently has many internal problems (i.e. a lack of real protection for the Gagauz language and culture, poor infrastructure, unemployment, etc.) while its relations with the central authorities in Chişinau are often tense. Through the years since the 1994 autonomy law, boundaries between the regional and central competences have been blurry, and to date have still not been clarified. Another problem, which is currently being addressed, is the harmonisation of Gagauz laws to Moldovan legislation.

The current state of Gagauzian affairs strongly reflects its troubled past and geographical location – a border region over which various empires fought and treated as geopolitically important. Even today, Gagauzia is subject to the geopolitical influence of various power sources, which defines its current situation and identity. The Gagauz have ethnolinguistic connections with Turkey and a strong historical and contemporary affiliation with Russia. With Moldova’s desire to drift westward and the EU’s advance into the region, Gagauzia has experienced European influence. In other words, the three big powers – Turkey, Russia and the EU – are in the process of strengthening their role in Gagauzia while this influence is exerted in forms of geopolitical ideologies: pan-Turkism, the Russian world and European values.

Caught in an entangled web of influences and given the weakness of Moldova, Gagauzia is thus an active recipient of external soft power projects. Since the early 1990s, Turkey has been a major donor to the region by referring to linguistic and ethnic ties and identifying the Gagauz as a “brother nation”. For instance, TİKA (the Turkish Development Agency) conducts impressive construction and education projects. Russia, on the other hand, relies on the influence of the Russian language and shared historical legacy, especially Soviet nostalgia in Gagauzia. One should also not forget that the Gagauz Orthodox Church, just like the Moldovan, is under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. The heavy Russification that has been conducted in Gagauzia since the 1950s has not only made the Gagauz community Russophone and Russophile, but has also endangered the native language. An oral language for centuries, Gagauz first received a Cyrillic-based alphabet in 1957 and switched to the Latin script in the 1990s. The mother tongue of the Gagauz community has been overshadowed by Russian, the primary language at regional schools for decades.

Even today there are no kindergartens or schools with Gagauz as the main language of instruction. Rather it is only taught a few hours per week, like other foreign languages. Russian-language kindergartens, and the current trend of communicating with children in Russian (even within the family), raises concerns that the next generation might not be able to properly use the Gagauz language, further risking its existence and damaging the Gagauz identity. As a result, Gagauz is classified as “definitely endangered” by UNESCO and, according to some estimates, is spoken by 180,000 people (150,000 of whom reside in Moldova).

Outside international attention for decades, Gagauzia entered the headlines in 2014. After Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013, the Gagauz authorities initiated a referendum to display their preferences. The referendum on February 2nd 2014, which was organised against the backdrop of escalating violence by the Yanukovych regime against protesters at the Maidan in neighbouring Ukraine, was considered illegal by the Chişinau but supported by Moldova’s opposition parties. With a turnout of over 70 per cent, 98.4 per cent of voters decided they were in favour of joining the Russian-led Customs Union, and 97.2 per cent voted against closer EU integration. A similar figure (98 per cent) reasserted Gagauzia’s right to self-determination once the political status of the Republic of Moldova changes. Thus Article 1.4 of the law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia received a new dimension: the provision is not only aimed at Moldova`s hypothetical reunification with Romania, but at Moldova’s membership in the EU.

While the legal issues surrounding the referendum are subject to debate, Gagauzia’s message of autonomy – albeit symbolic – to Chişinau, Brussels and Moscow was crystal clear: the political entity reserves the right to display its geopolitical orientation. But it is also worth knowing that even if Moldova continues to go westward, Gagauzia will have no power to protest against it. The relatively positive outcome in the referendum was what generated interest from western political and academic circles.

After the 2014 referendum, the EU began paying more attention to the region. As a third geopolitical civilisation that joined other two (the Russian world and pan-Turkism) competing over Gagauzia, the EU launched several multi-million-euro projects specifically aimed at the region. Moreover, certain policies with regards to Gagauzia have been carried out by governments and NGOs from EU member states, especially Romania (construction), Bulgaria (passportisation) and Sweden (civil society activities).

In other words, ethnolinguistic affiliation (ethnic kinship with the Turks, Russian as a lingua franca in the region), historical narratives (allegiance towards Russia, the painful Romanian period, and Soviet nostalgia), a complex geopolitical situation (sitting at the crossroads of the EU, Russia and Turkey), incomplete national consciousness and emigration (guest workers in Russia and Turkey, as well as in the EU to some extent) further complicate the situation. All serve as factors that influence regional identity.

As once stated by a Romanian journalist, the Gagauz, like many other small nations, are forced to be friends with big neighbours and speculate on their own identity. On their own the Gagauz would usually use the Russian language, eagerly take money from Turkey, and turn to the West when it comes to respecting civil rights.

Rusif Huseynov is the co-founder of the Topchubashov Center, Azerbaijan. His main interest is in peace and conflict studies, while his focus areas mainly cover Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Gagauzia, Moldova