War was not inevitable

Photo: Dorian Jędrasiewicz

The Vice Admiral Alexander Lieven shows up briefly in your book…

He was one of my great uncles, actually not that close a relation. But my uncle, my direct uncle, remembered him. He was educated at the Royal Prussian Cadet Corps and was a page of the bed chamber of the German Empress, Queen of Prussia. He then went back to Russia and got into the navy – making for himself an extraordinary career in those days. The first German Emperor had known quite well the admiral’s great grandmother (my great-great-great grandmother) and had actually carried her coffin when she died along with the Nicholas I and the Grand Duke Michael. She had been the governess of the imperial children. My great-great-great grandmother adored Nicholas, he was her charge essentially and little pupil – she was his governess.

Did this family past have any influence on your decision to become a historian of Russian imperial history?

Not in any direct sense. We were brought up by my mother, who was Irish and French, but basically British Catholic. Her father was a British judge born in India. The family was Irish Catholic. So it was very much a British background as members of the Catholic upper middle class. In fact, growing up I was educated with remnants of the Polish aristocracy in a Roman Catholic preparatory school and boarding schools. Yes, Russia existed in all that background, not least because my father was first directly and then indirectly head of the Russian service of the BBC. A lot of our older relatives spoke Russian. But we didn’t have any Russian first cousins. And we were not Orthodox. My father’s family was Lutheran. So choosing Russia as my specialisation was definitely a choice of my own. It was not something pushed on me.

In your latest book, Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia, you describe how nationalism in Europe was growing and consolidating geopolitical blocs. But with the Russian Empire it was very challenging since it was multi-ethnic and geographically spread out. How did this development of a nascent Russian national identity play a role as the Tsarist Empire was in its last days? Was it too late?

The Russian Empire itself, like most empires, was both national – Russian – and something different. The Russia that existed in 1500 was more or less an ethnically homogeneous state. It was not a nation in the modern meaning of the word. It was more like a proto-nation. The ruling dynasty then acquired a vast amount of new territory over the next 300 years, and most of these new subjects are not ethnically Russian. Imperial Russia became an empire in the normal meaning of the word. On top of that, the ruling elites are westernised. So life becomes much more complicated, and it is not clear what kind of polity this is. It is in some sense an aristocratic federation. Many families, like mine, were not Russian. But they were accepted into the imperial elite and given many possibilities to serve at court and in the army, and they were valued by the dynasty because they brought all sorts of skills. Their support enabled the Romanov monarchy to control peripheral areas, but these outsiders were also a sort of balance against the Russian aristocracy. It made the monarchs less dependent on the Russian aristocracy and its networks. Then of course you get into the modern era, which is the 19th century, particularly the second half of the 19th century. It becomes increasingly clear, not just in Russia, that given the growth of literacy and the growth of nationalist ideas that empires have to appeal to their majority populations – to represent their interests and their identity. This process creates all sorts of tensions.

In the book you write that in the modern era, geopolitics was increasingly centred on national, ethnic identities, with the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon blocs emerging as dominant. This created a great difficulty for Russia as they saw value in the Pan-Slavic identity, but not all Slavic people wanted to be united under Russian tsarist leadership…

You have a lot of different currents flowing at this time. If you look at the late 19th and early 20th centuries, you have the emergence of what I would describe as partly ethno-linguistic, but also to some extent ideological and geopolitical blocs. The Germanic one is an obvious example of this. Previously, the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns, Austria and Prussia, had been rivals. Then comes German unification in 1871 and alliance with Austria in 1879. This swiftly led to a powerful, relatively coherent Germanic bloc in Europe. By 1900 it is clear that this is more than just a geopolitical alliance. It is not like the Franco-Russian alliance in that sense. This is an alliance between two Germanic polities. And it is aimed not only at external enemies, but to a significant extent – in the Austrian case – at Slavs within the monarchy. It is an attempt to create some sort of Germanic solidarity, which at this time runs against history. It is something new, and partly a reflection of the way in which dynasty and religion begin to matter less, and language and high culture begin to matter more. Therefore you transcend, without destroying, some of the traditional rivalry.

You can say exactly the same about the Anglo-American alliance which becomes a geopolitical bloc, firstly against the Germans and then against the Soviet Union. But it is enormously strengthened by the fact that it is an ethno-ideological bloc: defence of democracy, defence of liberty, defence of concepts which these two countries regard as part of the Anglo-American tradition. Again, this runs against history. In the 19th century, European countries which opposed Britain tended to see the United States as a natural ally. The only European country which fully supported the Union during the American Civil War is Russia. It even based its fleet in the United States in case there was war with Britain.

Then things shift at the end of the 19th century, for many reasons. One reason is that where as in the 19th century Britain and the United States had been ideological as well as geopolitical rivals (after all, American democracy was considered by the British elite as not only a threat to themselves but also as extremely aggressive and expansionist), towards the end of the 19th century Britain itself ceases to be an aristocratic oligarchy and becomes a modern democracy. Essentially you get the two countries growing towards each other. And on top of all that you have the growing influence of ideas about race which provide a sort of ideological backing to all of this – both in Germany and in the Anglophone world. And it is against that background you have to see the Russian attempt to create a pan-Slav bloc. It is not that Slavic blocs don’t have their origins before that, but one way to see the Russian attempt to lead a Slavic bloc is to see it precisely as a part of a broader current in world history.

We would like to ask your opinion on the idea that does not have full consensus among historians of the First World War. In other words, was it inevitable that war broke out in 1914? Or could it have been averted?

Specifically in 1914, there wouldn’t have been a war unless the Archduke had been assassinated…

Right, but militarisation was taking place during the period from 1908-1914…

It was very difficult to avoid conflict between Russia and Austria. It was essential to avoid it, but it was difficult.

But was it impossible?

Impossible is a big word. There were traditions of rivalry. There were some conflicting interests. There were conflicting popular currents and public opinion in Russia and Austria were pretty hostile to each other. It wouldn’t have been easy for Alexander Izolvsky and Alois Lexa Graf von Aehrenthal (Russian and Austrian foreign ministers respectively) to drive through a bargain. Had they done so, they might have been able to keep the conflict under control. The problem, as Izolvsky understood it, was that Russia couldn’t control events in the Balkans or in the Middle East and the nationalist currents were continually undermining the Ottoman and the Austrian empires. This was a process that had deep roots in contemporary culture as well as Austrian and Ottoman history. None of the great powers, least of all Russia, could stop this from happening. Therefore, Russia had to adapt to it. His argument was that the issues were too great for Russia to simply stand aside. He was mainly talking about the Bosporus Straits or control of the Balkans, and the two were obviously connected. So that was probably the most important element, certainly in terms of the Russian perception of what was happening.

The war was not inevitable. It certainly did not have to happen in 1914. But if it had not, a war might have come in 1916. But of course a war which came in 1916 would have been a different kind of war. Maybe the British wouldn’t have been involved from the start. At which point the Germans would have won it, and we would be in a different world. The Germans came very close to winning it anyway.

Would you say that Russia had suffered from a need to be perceived as a great power?

The Russian problem was that it was a great power but located on the second world periphery, which means that there was tension there. To some extent it was the same for Italy and even Austria.

Did the loss with Japan in 1906 play a significant role in the events of 1914? Did it force the Russian elite to concentrate its energy on Europe?

It did not force it, but it created many pressures to do so. Russian public opinion was never that interested in the Far East anyway. But if the policy had proved successful, it would have created circumstances which would have constrained future Russian moves. By being both unpopular and unsuccessful it certainly encouraged Russian public opinion to turn away from the Far East. It also weakened Russia and humiliated the government, which made public opinion very nervous. It made the government deeply sensitive to any further humiliation. Russia’s weakness also opened a window of opportunity to Vienna and Berlin, which were inclined to push harder as a result of this weakness. At the same time, Russia was desperate to disguise its weakness and therefore shouted louder than it was willing to act, which is dangerous.

Is this a pattern that repeats itself in Russian history? Do you see it playing out in the Soviet Union and later…?

Certainly we see it playing out now. Russia feels that it was humiliated in the 1980s and 90s and there is a desire to reassert itself as a great power. But it wasn’t just about humiliation. Most of the Russian elite – a significant part associated with Putin’s government – felt that Russia had been excluded from key fora, that its interests had been ignored after the Cold War. So you have a sense that your interests are ignored and your dignity is being jumped on, which is not a good combination.

Can we interpret this as Russia being quite unsuccessful in international affairs, particularly in wars? If we look back to 1914, Russia had one of the fastest growing and modernising armies on the continent. So what went wrong?

Well, the Russian army was extremely successful in the 18th century. But the fundamental problem in the 19th century was industrialisation. The industrial revolution started in Western Europe and Britain and then takes five generations to move east. By definition, Russia is more backwards. And nowhere does it have such an obvious effect than in the army. In that sense, Russia was relatively weaker in 1900 than it had been in 1800. But of course, by 1914 the industrial revolution is really hitting Russia and its economic development is extremely rapid. In my mind, this is one of the two key causes of the war. The great growth of Russian economic power and the restoration of Russian military power persuades the Germans that they would be able to defeat Russia in a war now, but not in ten years’ time.

You note in your book that there was this thinking that Russia’s backwardness could actually be advantageous in the case of war. It seems rather counter-intuitive.

This thinking, which was propagated by Ivan Bloch, was based on the idea that the modern international capitalist economy, with its dense webs of trade, finance and and insurance, would simply disintegrate in the face of a war. The belief was that Russia would survive longer because of its huge resources and the fact that those resources are on its own territory. They believed that the war was likely to be short, and it made a little more sense in that context.

Both sides on the Eastern Front underestimated each other. What was the moment when the whole Russian plan collapsed?

Initially, the Russian army in Galicia on the eastern front actually did pretty well. The Austrian army was looking pretty shaky in 1914. East Prussia, however, was a very difficult place to invade. And the army invaded prematurely to bail out the French.

Wouldn’t it have been wiser for the Russians to put all the weight on the front with Austria?

Of course that is what General Mikhail Alekseyev wanted. But the issue was the French, who were obsessed with the Russians drawing German troops away. It would have been too difficult if the Russians had concentrated only on Austria. It was clear to everyone that if the Germans had destroyed the French army and Russia was then on its own – it would have been defeated. So there was logic in trying to make sure the French would not be defeated. The Russian sacrifice was not completely meaningless… But with the war, there are so many “What ifs”. If the Germans had not attacked France through Belgium, the British would not have joined the war in 1914. If the Germans had concentrated its efforts on the Eastern Front, then the Russian Revolution could have come even earlier.

Speaking of “What ifs”, is it possible that if the war hadn’t happened, Russia might have gone down the road of democratisation and liberal reforms?

No. Actually I think it would have more likely moved in the direction of fascism. Empires don’t survive through liberal democracy. The basic principle of popular sovereignty based on democratic representation is not something that fits well with multi-ethnic empires in the modern era. It’s complicated and who knows how Russia would have gone. But in my opinion, if there was a sort of second world around the periphery of Europe, both in the West, South and East – none of those countries had a peaceful evolution to liberal democracy in the 20th century. Most of them in the end – well, we haven’t gotten to the end – but Iberia and Italy did not evolve peacefully to liberal democracy. Italy’s democracy was a product of the victory of the Allies in the Second World War. Spain moved towards democracy only in the mid-1970s, a time when liberal democracy reigned supreme in international relations. And by that time it was for Spain important to adapt.

So without the war, Russia might have moved towards fascism. Would the Bolsheviks not have a strong chance of seizing power, even if the war had not happened?

I think the Bolsheviks could have taken power, but they would not have been able to retain it. The conditions brought about by the war were essential for that. First, the forces of counter-revolution were weak. Second, you would have had massive intervention spearheaded by Germany in peacetime. The monarchy almost collapsed in the winter of 1905-06. Had it done so, the revolution would have spiralled to the left. You might well have got something which looked like a socialist revolutionary party coming to power. But it is a complete fantasy to think the European powers would have stood aside to watch it happen.

A final question to bring us to the contemporary era: how is the First World War commemorated in Russia today?

It was not commemorated at all during Soviet times. Given the fact that the Russians had so many other awful events to think of in the 20th century, it is somewhat understandable that the First World War faded into the background. You do not get official commemoration until recently, with Vladimir Putin. He’s built memorials. What is interesting is that the Russian state commemorates the First World War but not the revolution. Putin is inclined to avoid the revolution completely and jump straight from Alexander III to Stalin. He does not like revolutions, he does not like the state being undermined. Putin is rather someone who celebrates Russian power.

Dominic Lieven is a professor of history at Cambridge University and a fellow of the British Academy. His most recent book is Towards the flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia.

Adam Reichardt is the editor in chief of New Eastern Europe.

Andrzej Zaręba is completing his PhD in military history at the Jesuit University Ignatianum in Kraków. He is also the illustrator for New Eastern Europe.

Edmund Young was an editorial intern with New Eastern Europe at the time of the interview.

First World War, Imperial russia