Pragmatic co-operation amid eroding security

Photo: (CC) en.kremlin.ru

On the one hand, Minsk has to co-ordinate its foreign and security policy with Moscow, according to its obligations within the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Minsk also has to take into account its critical economic dependence on Russia, which accounts for about half of Belarusian foreign trade. Russian political culture is also much more congenial to the authoritarian Belarusian President, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who feels no sympathy to the revolutionary change of government in Ukraine.

On the other hand, Minsk has a vital interest in Ukraine preserving its sovereignty because of the possibility of something similar happening in Belarus. If Moscow succeeds in Ukraine, the temptation to forcefully “re-integrate” Belarus might prove irresistible to Vladimir Putin. Belarus also has a huge trade surplus with Ukraine, its second largest trading partner. A political and economic collapse in Ukraine would put Belarusian statehood at risk. Finally, Belarus and Ukraine have a centuries-old tradition of co-operation and peaceful co-existence. Taking into account the different factors that push them together and pull them apart, it is clear that achieving satisfactory and stable bilateral relations is a fine balancing act. The vigilance and goodwill of both parties is indispensable.

An ally of my enemy is my friend?

Minsk, officially an ally of Moscow, is obliged to fulfil commitments on the co-ordination of foreign policy. At the United Nations General Assembly, Belarus votes with Russia against resolutions supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and refuses to condemn human rights violations in the annexed Crimea. And yet Minsk has still not officially recognised the Russian annexation of Crimea, and has continued to develop economic co-operation with Kyiv since the conflict broke out in 2014. This was especially important in the first months of the conflict, when Moscow banned exports of fuel needed for the Ukrainian armed forces.

In the very beginning of Russia’s aggression, there were cautions in Ukraine that Russian troops might attack Kyiv from Belarusian territory – only 200 kilometres separate the Belarusian border from the Ukrainian capital. It was important for the then-acting president of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, to hear from Lukashenka that his country would never threaten Ukraine militarily. It remains highly doubtful Lukashenka could actually prevent Russian troops invading from Belarus, in the event that Putin called for such a move. But at the very least the Belarusian leader made his position on this matter clear, which matters to both Kyiv and Moscow.

The meeting between Turchynov and Lukashenka on March 29th 2014 also indicated that Belarus recognised the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian authorities – a welcome olive branch amid Moscow’s statements about a “coup d’état” and a reluctance to make contact with the post-revolutionary government in Kyiv. A few days later, speaking to Russian media, Lukashenka clearly confirmed his position on the “absolute legitimacy” of the acting Ukrainian government.

Not only did Belarus refuse to support Russian economic sanctions against Ukraine, it also helped Kyiv overcome the most painful restrictions through re-export schemes involving Belarusian companies and joint ventures. Despite the official suspension of military co-operation, continued economic co-operation effectively meant that Belarus was securing the demands of Ukraine’s military by supplying fuel and other resources. “If something is needed from Belarus, just say, and we’ll do in a day everything that you ask for” – this is what Lukashenka said to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at their meeting in Kyiv on December 21st 2014.

While Russia was implementing draconian measures in response to the creation of the EU-Ukraine free trade area, Minsk and Kyiv adapted to this new reality and were able to find ways to continue their economic co-operation. And this is not only a question of familial loyalty; Belarus makes big gains from that transaction. The Belarusian economy has traditionally been dependent on exports to Russia, and as Russia’s economy stagnates, Belarus needs to develop trade links with other markets. Expanding trade with Ukraine allows it to patch up the holes in its own economy.

Quasi-neutrality

Being an ally of Russia and a CSTO member, Belarus is not neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and for this reason Minsk was not considered an appropriate venue for peace talks. But after a series of fruitless international meetings in Geneva (April 2014), Bénouville, France (June 2014), Kyiv and Donetsk (June-July 2014), it was the Belarusian capital where the negotiating parties finally managed to sign the peace agreements that would help to significantly reduce the intensity of the conflict. The first Minsk Protocol, and follow-up memorandum proposing a set of measures to restore peace in Donbas, were signed on the 5th and 19th of September 2014 respectively, following the meetings of the Trilateral Contact Group that consisted of the representatives of the OSCE, Ukraine, Russia and the Russian-backed separatists.

On February 12th 2015, the “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements” was signed in the Belarusian capital, following 16 hours of tough negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France (the Normandy format established specifically for aiding Russia-Ukraine diplomacy). Agreements were supported by the declaration of Russian, Ukrainian and French Presidents and the German Chancellor; and a few days later endorsed by Resolution 2202 of the UN Security Council. Much criticised, the Minsk II agreement is still considered the primary basis of a future peaceful settlement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Minsk also remains the traditional host of the meetings of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine.

Along with contributing to the peace process, Minsk managed to win important geopolitical dividends for itself as a result of its new status as a negotiation platform. It has enabled the regime to break out of its diplomatic isolation from the West. EU sanctions previously imposed in response to political repression have been lifted and discussions have begun on building up EU-Belarus economic co-operation.

For our freedom and your interests

Kyiv is also building relations with Belarus on a pragmatic basis. The Revolution of Dignity was not only about the European choice of Ukraine, but also democracy and human rights, and many Belarusian opposition activists and volunteers supported the revolution and struggle against Russian aggression. They hoped the new Ukrainian authorities would in turn support Belarusian democratic movements but were disappointed when it became clear that Kyiv was going to keep good relations with Lukashenka’s regime.

Ukraine pragmatically chose to concentrate on its own survival. Kyiv can hardly be suspected of being naïve about Lukashenka’s true motives, not to mention the actual limitations of his country’s independence, neutrality and security assurances. And it goes without saying that Lukashenka does not agree with Ukraine’s pro-western trajectory. Yet both capitals perceive the threat of the Kremlin seeking to restore Moscow’s control within the former Soviet borders, and both feel the need to work together to survive. Though Kyiv is well aware of the limits of the solidarity shown by Belarus, it is still preferable to outright animosity, which would be the result if Minsk were to take its allegiance to Russia to its logical end.

Lukashenka probably anticipates that Belarus would be next if Ukraine fell, and he does not wish to become the leader of a Russian province. At the same time, many politicians and experts, in Kyiv and across the EU, believe that, at present, there is no real alternative to Lukashenka. An anti-regime protest movement in the vein of the EuroMaidan might be exploited by Russia as a pretext for military intervention in Belarus. Given Russia’s dominance of the Belarusian media and cultural space, the strong pro-Russian sympathies in society and the penetration of the security and defence sectors with agents under Russian tutelage, such a scenario is certainly possible. Lukashenka has skilfully exploited these fears and insists he is the only guarantor of Belarus’s independence and neutrality.

Uncertain perspectives

Purely pragmatic co-operation between Minsk and Kyiv will not guarantee a bright future for further bilateral relations, given their different geopolitical trajectories and aspirations. Minsk claims neutrality, yet Belarusian law enforcement authorities enforce much harsher sentences on those who fight on the Ukrainian side in Donbas than those who join the illegal Russian-backed separatist forces. Take the detention of the 19-year-old Ukrainian citizen Pavlo Gryb in the Belarusian city of Gomel, who was further transferred to the Russian FSB office in Krasnodar. Or the notorious Russian-led aggressive Zapad-2017 military exercises held on Belarusian territory. The true loyalties at play here are no secret.

So far, Lukashenka has been able to co-operate with Kyiv in spheres of mutual interests. But in the long run he is likely to face increasing pressures from Moscow for full loyalty that will be hard to withstand. Russia has already initiated plans to limit duty-free deliveries of petroleum products and gas to Belarus. This will likely put a stop to their re-export to Ukraine and cut Belarus’s foreign currency reserves to boot. On October 25th 2018, Belarus’s second city, Gomel, hosted the first Forum of Regions of Belarus and Ukraine aimed at intensifying trade, economic and cultural collaboration between the regions of the two countries. But willingness to co-operate is not the only factor that will determine the future of Belarus-Ukraine relations.

Belarus’s economic over-dependence on Russia and Lukashenka’s reluctance to implement necessary political and economic reforms narrows room for geopolitical manoeuvring. Some experts have noted that Russia’s new ambassador to Minsk, Mikhail Babich, who is also the special representative of the Russian president on the development of trade and economic relations with Belarus, is going to strongly influence the domestic and foreign policy in Belarus and foster integration processes within the Russia-Belarus Union State.

The coming year will demonstrate the ability of the new Belarusian government, headed by Syarhey Rumas as prime minister, to implement meaningful reforms and withstand pressure from Moscow. It would also be welcome to see more initiative from Kyiv in shaping a new strategy for relations with Belarus, designed not only for tactical benefits but also for a long-term partnership.

Maksym Khylko is the chairman of the board at the East European Security Research Initiative Foundation and a senior research fellow at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.

belarus, Ukraine, Ukrainian-Belarusian relations