Old Moldova in new Europe

Moldovan President Igor Dodon, often portrayed as a pro-Kremlin figure in the country, and his socialist party appear set to win the 2019 parliamentary election. They will most likely enter into a coalition with the declared pro-European Democratic Party led by oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, consolidating Moldova’s political scene. Photo: Kremlin.ru (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

At the same time, the state of European affairs has become so complex that it allows Plahotniuc to succeed in the difficult art of balancing between East and West; something that many of his predecessors attempted in the past.

In Moldova’s political culture, the term “pro-Moldovan” assumes a rhetorical departure from geopolitics and identity divisions. It is understood as an attempt, also rhetorical, to build a united society, one that is concentrated on its own problems and not on abstract ideals detached from everyday reality. In the 1990s this approach was pursued by the Democratic Agrarian Party and later also by the communist party which, after rejecting the Kremlin’s plan to solve the Transnistrian conflict, had to give up its pro-Russian rhetoric. Since 2009, Moldova’s ruling elite have based their political narratives on European integration. Yet events unfolding in 2018 have made continuation on this course impossible.

Winter has come

Serious cracks in relations between Chișinău and Brussels emerged following the scandal which saw the disappearance of one billion US dollars from the three largest banks in Moldova, the arrest of Vlad Filat (a former prime minister and political rival to Plahotniuc) and the creation a new, formally pro-European majority in the parliament in January 2016. Local civic activists and international observers have also openly discussed the shady methods, such as blackmail and corruption, used to build this political majority, not to mention the extreme politicisation of Moldova’s judicial system. The European Union found it difficult to accept Moldova’s introduction of a new mixed electoral system which overtly favours the two largest parties. The reform was heavily criticised by the Venice Commission, a European body which evaluates constitutionality and the rule of law in Europe. However, until the authorities crossed the line by engaging in openly anti-democratic activities, the EU was happy enough to continue co-operation and maintain financial support for Moldova.

A primary motivation for the recent turn taken by Plahotniuc and his Democratic Party is the emergence of Andrei Năstase and his supporters. It was their votes that led to the unexpected victory of Năstase, the leader of the pro-European opposition, in the elections for Chișinău mayor in June 2018. This unexpected election outcome undermined Plahotniuc’s political plans. It was believed that Silvia Radu, a formally independent candidate supported by the ruling party, would win the mayoral race. The lesson learnt from Năstase’s victory is that when it comes to the 2019 elections there will be no easy projections of the outcomes in single member districts, as had been believed.

What is more, as mayor of Chișinău, Năstase would have the chance to demonstrate his effectiveness and prove that Plahotniuc’s power system can be challenged. In the 2019 parliamentary elections this could give a real boost to the pro-European opposition. The ruling party panicked, and made a move which was highly revealing as to their commitment to democracy – they annulled the election results, and Năstase has been kept out of the mayor’s office. The Supreme Court absurdly ruled that the results were invalid, claiming that Năstase broke the rule of pre-election silence by publishing political posts on Facebook the day before the election.

The EU’s deep concern and criticism made little impact in Moldova. It was only after the announcement that the EU would stop the transfer of 100 million euros in financing that the message hit home. The reactions of the political class and the public are characteristic and say much about Moldovan society. While Prime Minister Pavel Filip expressed his anger at the EU, saying they would be responsible if there is no food for Moldovan preschool children, research showed that public support for the EU grew by several percentage points.

Strange bedfellows

It has been clear for quite some time that after the 2019 elections the Democratic Party will not be able to maintain a majority in the parliament. The elections will most likely be won by the Socialist Party which is informally led by the Moldovan president, Igor Dodon. Democrats can count on the third place at best. The second place will most likely be taken by the bloc of the pro-European opposition parties composed of Andrei Năstase’s Dignity and Truth Platform and Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity. According to opinion poll research the Democrats will garner nine to ten per cent of support at most.

That is why the election system has been adjusted and the democrats are now counting on winning in many of the single mandate districts. They are working to get local leaders on their side, rarely with the most honest of methods. Yet, even if such activities prove successful, Plahotniuc’s party will clearly need a coalition partner. Before the mayor of Chișinău elections two scenarios were under consideration: one was to force Maia Sandu, a pro-European politician who unsuccessfully ran for president in 2016, to enter the coalition through blackmail, accusing her of ceding power to pro-Russian forces if she didn’t join the coalition. The second scenario was to force a coalition with the socialists. By invalidating the mayoral elections in Chișinău, a coalition with Sandu or anyone from the pro-European opposition has become virtually impossible. The second scenario thus looks more likely, especially since it offers greater opportunities. Together, the democrats and socialists can have a massive majority in the parliament, which until recently was much more difficult to obtain, due to both image and rhetoric.

In recent years, however, the Moldovan Democratic Party has established its position on the international stage by presenting itself as a guarantee of Moldova’s pro-European orientation and a safety check on president Dodon, with his strong ties to the Kremlin. It will not be an easy task to explain an alliance with the socialists to western partners. And Dodon will have an even harder job explaining himself to the Russians and his voters, neither of whom want to see this coalition. This is even more evident when we consider that the president has built his support on anti-western, populist conservatism. It presents Europe as being dominated by a corrupt and demoralised elite which serves the interests of international bankers and destroys Christian values. This is why the democrats have adopted the “pro-Moldova” rhetoric, which is designed to allow a common narrative with the socialists to develop.

Rumours about Plahotniuc and Dodon’s co-operation did not start yesterday, however. For many observers of Moldovan politics, Dodon’s victory in the presidential election was part of Plahotniuc’s overall plan. Both politicians have often been perceived as leaders of the same political cartel who nonetheless have different political views. Together they consolidate Moldova’s political scene and share the profits. In this case, establishing a coalition of the two forces would be an act of unmasking and formalising the already existing relationship. It is also worth noting that not so long ago, Dodon said a coalition with “pro-European” parties was not an option for him, but he would consider a “pro-Moldovan” coalition.

The state and the people

The pillars on which the new narrative of the power elite will be based are becoming evident. It will be a story of a strong Moldovan state which distances itself from pro-Romanian groups and the EU. It will also be a welfare state which is close to the ordinary citizens. This first pillar was revealed in September 2018 when the police aggressively broke up a manifestation of groups supporting a union with Romania. First, the police took over the buses that were accompanying the march (coming from the Romanian city Albo-Iulia) and then skirmishes broke out between police forces and demonstration leaders. As a result, the march turned into a protest against Plahotniuc and Dodon. Until that moment the unionists enjoyed some privileges from the authorities; there were even rumours that Plahotniuc was financing some of their activities. Prior to September the oligarch was never overtly criticised in the unionist demonstrations; now he is placed in the same bag as the pro-Russian president. It is quite possible that the whole incident was carefully planned. The harsh reaction of the authorities was clearly a bid to please pro-state patriotic voters. Yet it also brought some attention to pro-Romanian groups and may help them become an alternative to Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase. Undoubtedly, an opposition that attacks the government with ethnic and geopolitical arguments is more comfortable for the Democratic Party than a democratic and anti-oligarch opposition.

The second pillar of the narrative emerged shortly after Plahotniuc announced the change in his party’s direction. Subsequently, his words were further explained by party politicians who stressed that their leader’s decision did not mean a departure from the West, that it was a relatively minor shift in focus: more emphasis on ordinary people and their needs, and less on the expectations of EU bureaucrats and their ideological commitments. More energy will be put into building roads, preschools, hospitals and social security for the poorest. But it is difficult to avoid the impression that Moldova’s Democratic Party sees European values as an obstacle to building infrastructure and providing social benefits.

Geopolitical blackmail

A change in the government’s rhetoric does not necessarily mean that Moldova is taking a pro-Russian turn, at least not in the sense often implied in Central and Eastern European geopolitical discourse. Just a few years ago Eastern European states seemed to face a stark and unconditional choice: integration with the West or exclusive co-operation with the Kremlin. Today’s world, and especially Europe, looks quite different.

Moldova’s Democratic Party started its “pro-Moldova operation” quite early – five months before parliamentary elections. Yet a lot can happen between now and February. One certainty, however, is that EU-Moldova relations will drastically cool down as EU diplomats, bureaucrats and members of the European Parliament have become frustrated with Moldova’s lack of progress. Interestingly, Plahotniuc has invested considerable energy and money in his lobbying activities in Washington DC. This suggests that he perceives the United States as a more congenial partner than the EU. The foreign policy of the latter is seen as less pragmatic and predominantly value-driven. To the US, the “pro-Moldovan” course announced in September 2018 could be interpreted as a way of sending the following signal: “Stop pressuring us with all this democracy and rule of law talk, or we will look for partners in the East.”

This move can be seen as a type of geopolitical blackmail. Instead of greater support for pro-European reforms, Moldova seeks financial support in exchange for maintaining strategic adherence to western (mostly US) interests. In the Trump era, these interests, especially in relations with Russia, are admittedly difficult to define. However, this muddiness benefits Plahotniuc even more. Should Plahotniuc indeed make an offer to the US, or other western partners, their reactions will have no effect on him entering a coalition with the socialists. This in turn would mean that the international community will have little influence on the future ruling elite in Moldova.

New opportunities

A remaining question is how Moscow would react to an alliance between “its Moldovan president” and the “pro-western” oligarch. It is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin is unaware of their mutual interdependencies. Investments in Dodon were made mostly for public relations and not strategic reasons. In terms of PR, such a move certainly pays off for the Kremlin – a Moldova governed by a coalition of democrats and socialists will be much more open to strengthening ties with Russia and stressing historical and cultural links. In strategic terms, however, this does not change the fact that Russia is content with its influences in the region as long as it has Transnistria, the unrecognised breakaway republic. The real value added for the Kremlin would be a unification of the separatist republic with Moldova, making the whole state permanently bonded to Russia. The rest is only a matter of spinning it for the international community.

The unification of Transnistria with Moldova is certainly not in the interests of Moldova’s political and business elite. Dodon is well aware that the federalisation he promotes is little more than a political trick. A coalition with the democrats will give him an excuse to drop this narrative, in the name of political concessions that go hand in hand with coalition. This also lends strength to the hope that this coalition will not turn Moldova too vehemently towards the Kremlin. Plahotniuc and Dodon can draw on the experience of Vladimir Voronin from 2003 when, after two years of political friendship with Moscow, he was almost forced to pursue unification with Transnistria and become wholly subordinate to the Kremlin. He eventually rejected the plan; it was too big of a threat to his own interests, just as much as it will be to Plahotniuc and Dodon.

In his day, Voronin was forced to pursue a policy of geopolitical balancing. The only exception is that conditions were very different than they are now: Moscow was offended by Voronin’s move, while the West kept its distance from the president, who was after all the leader of the Communist Party. Today, a Europe facing multiple crises and an America led by Trump provide much more room for geopolitical ambiguities. Moldova will not be the only state that touts anti-EU rhetoric, talks about the necessity for dialogue with Russia and at the same time presents itself as a truly European state. Its diplomats are unlikely to receive a warm welcome in Paris or Brussels, but they may feel quite comfortable in Rome or Budapest.

Indeed, Moldova will most likely join the many states of Southern and Eastern Europe who seek support from alternative sponsors, somewhat outside the axis of the geopolitical dispute and willing to support “people’s conservatism” in conflict with the liberal world. A visible sign of that direction can be seen in Moldova’s recent deportation of eight school teachers who worked in schools financed by Fethullah Gullen, a critic of Turkey’s Recep Erdoğan condemned for alleged involvement in the 2016 attempted coup. In fact, the second half of October saw Erdoğan’s long-awaited visit to this tiny yet geopolitically significant state. Dodon did not mince his words when he described Erdoğan’s leadership of Turkey as setting an example “when it comes to defending national interests”.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Piotr Oleksy is a Polish historian working at the Institute of Eastern Studies of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. He contributes to such magazines as Nowa Europa Wschodnia and Tygodnik Powszechny. He is also a member of the board of the Center for Regional and International Initiatives and an author of two books on Transnistria.

Igor Dodon, Moldova, Vladimir Plahotniuc