Behind the thaw

Polish speaker of the Senate, Stanisław Karczewski, during a 2018 visit to Belarus. Belarus’s crawling opening to Europe encouraged Poland’s new government, elected in 2015, to consider a change in relations with its neighbour. Photo courtesy of the Senate of the Republic of Poland (CC)

Proponent of stability

Out of all the post-Soviet states, Belarus is undoubtedly the one most integrated with the Russian Federation. This is especially true in the area of military co-operation. As stipulated in bilateral agreements, the Belarusian army will defer to Russian command and control in an armed conflict. Despite the high level of integration, Lukashenka has shown that his country can keep some distance from Russia. In 2008 Belarus did not recognise independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the breakaway republics had declared independence from Georgia already in the 1990s but were recognised by Russia after the 2008 war – editor’s note), nor the 2014 Russian takeover of Crimea. Belarus also kept some distance from the Kremlin’s intervention in Ukraine and even supported the Kyiv authorities in some aspects by exchanging intelligence data and repairing Ukrainian military equipment in its state-owned enterprises.

Lukashenka made peace proposals to more countries than just Poland. But he never suggested that Belarus would be a true mediator, indicating that his proposal was aimed more at providing a space for talks. In 2014 and 2015 this tactic bore fruit when the newly built Palace of Independence, located on the outskirts of Minsk, was host to international negotiations and the signing of the ceasefire agreement for Donbas. The latter agreement, known as Minsk II, saw participation by Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the then-president of France, François Hollande. It was indeed a symbolic success for Belarus’s president who for years had been isolated by western states.

Lukashenka’s involvement in the peace process certainly led to an increased willingness by western states to reward Belarus, but under one condition: calm 2015 presidential and 2016 parliamentary elections. As expected, in both cases results were forged. Yet there were no repressions. Two representatives of the opposition were allowed to enter the parliament for the first time in more than a decade, and the European Union withdrew the majority of sanctions placed on Belarus after 2010. It turns out that even though Lukashenka may be “the last dictator of Europe”, he is also, at least for the moment, an advocate of stability in the region.

Carte blanche

Belarus’s crawling opening to Europe encouraged Poland’s new government, elected in 2015, to consider a change in relations with its neighbour. The now-ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS), had a carte blanche. The previous Civic Platform (PO) government had been burdened by a failed attempt at a thaw. In 2010 Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski had attempted a package of reset with Russia and an EU-sponsored offer for Lukashenka. This strategy collapsed when Lukashenka oversaw the beating of protesters in December 2010, leading to the largest repressions in the history of independent Belarus. Poland swiftly changed track and became the main promotor of sanctions.

The Law and Justice government is well-regarded by Belarusian opposition, unlike the Civic Platform. Its “Russia First” policy prior to the annexation of Crimea alienated Belarusians for whom Poland’s intentions were then just as incomprehensible as they were in Kyiv. The Belarusian opposition often associates the Polish right-wing with initiatives such as the Konstanty Kalinowski Scholarship, established in 2006 during the first PiS government and offered to Belarusian oppositionists dismissed from their national universities, and the establishment of Belarusian media outlets such as Belsat TV and Ratsyya Radio in Białystok. As a principle, the Polish right supports anti-Russia policies and promotes the independence of Eastern Partnership states.

The PiS government has not ruled out a partial reconciliation with Russia, but on the condition that Moscow makes changes in certain key areas. The warming of relations with Belarus as well as Kazakhstan – that is, the two post-Soviet states which are closest to Moscow – have thus been perceived as a test for a possible reset with the Kremlin. As it turned out, Russia showed little interest in making even symbolic gestures of friendship. Thus Polish-Russian relations will remain frosty for the foreseeable future, but this has not discouraged Poland from continuing to strengthen ties with Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Poorly prepared

The first months of Beata Szydło’s government, formed in 2015 (Szydło was the prime minister of the PiS government between 2015 and 2017 – editor’s note), were abundant with bilateral meetings. Belarus was visited by the foreign minister, Witold Waszczykowski, Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who was responsible for economic policy, as well as the deputy speaker of the lower chamber of parliament, Ryszard Terlecki, the speaker of the Polish Senate, Stanisław Karczewski, and Konstanty Radziwiłł, the health minister. In return, Warsaw hosted, among others, Uladzimir Makey, Belarus’s foreign minister and Balyaslaw Pirshtuk, vice speaker of the lower house of the Belarusian parliament. The Minsk authorities attempted to invite Poland’s President Andrzej Duda to Belarus but were unsuccessful.

Most meetings have taken place at the parliamentary level, and their frequency has been notable. It would seem that the PiS government regard the Belarusian House of Representatives as a legitimate parliament. This would be a significant break from policies implemented since 1996, when Lukashenka replaced the Supreme Council with a parliament of highly questionable legality, still unrecognised by the western states. Commenting on the change in Polish-Belarusian relations, Krzysztof Mrozek of the Stefan Batory Foundation wrote the following for Dziennik Gazeta Prawna: “Economic issues are now at the forefront of Polish-Belarusian relations. They have started to dominate contacts between the governments and somehow pushed aside certain values which were previously regarded as crucial: the rule of law, human rights and democracy. The PiS government’s position that democratic values are of secondary importance for the functioning of the Polish state translates into an increased readiness to co-operate with the Belarusian regime.”

The problem with the thaw was that it was poorly prepared at the conceptual stage. There was no proper strategy for talks with Lukashenka, who typically operates under a tit-for-tat rule. It did not take long for him to realise that Warsaw had no real conditions in place for dialogue. The Polish side evidently had not grasped the basic truth that Belarus will not even try to implement a signed agreement if it sees no interest in it. The most illustrative symbol of Poland’s poor preparation was the decision by the Polish foreign ministry to cut off financing for the Polish-sponsored Belsat TV; it was seen as a gesture towards the Lukashenka regime. The move was eventually reversed by the prime minister, thanks in part to a petition campaign by Polish journalists and Eastern policy experts (the petition letter was also signed by New Eastern Europe’s editors among others – editor’s note). However, the message that little effort is required to improve relations with Poland was not lost on Minsk.

Certain tiredness

Both countries are also improving economic relations. While this has led to an increase in trade, Polish companies are limited in operating in the Belarusian market due to the high level of state control. In Poland, no Belarusian firms have been allowed to register on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. This has resulted in certain tiredness on both sides, and the intensity of bilateral visits has slowly decreased. “We meet less often, but maintain channels of communication, which have been refreshed in the last three years,” said one of the Belarusian diplomats in a conversation with me. 

The thaw rhetoric has not as yet translated into truly meaningful activity. Belsat journalists working in Belarus continue to face repressions and there has been no progress in regards to the so-called Katyn list – a register of NKVD victims who were murdered in 1940 in the then Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR). Minsk has not yet ratified the Polish-Belarusian agreement on small border movement which was finalised eight years ago. It has opted instead for a slow but steady implementation of a visa-free regime to all citizens of western states. There is also no discussion on meeting Minsk’s expectations for Poland to buy electricity from the nearly-completed nuclear plant in Astravyets. Poland considers the plant a potential hazard, and the authorities categorically refuse to buy any energy that would be produced there.

Moreover, there still seems to be no chance of legalising the currently unrecognised Union of Poles in Belarus. In 2006 Belarusian authorities helped create a split within the organisation, which they perceived as a threat. Up to now they rather unhelpfully recognise only those members who are not recognised by Poland. Yet the warming of Polish-Belarusian relations has meant a slightly larger tolerance towards the activities of the unrecognised part of the organisation. In the very same text written for Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, Mrozek says: “Organisations such as the Polish Education Society, which are seen by the authorities as non-political, operate without many obstacles. The dilemma related to the Polish minority is whether the government should continue fighting for the recognition of the Union of Poles in Belarus or limit its efforts to focus on expanding Polish language education and promotion of Polish culture by other organisations. A scenario where the Belarusian side would transfer Polish houses to the board of the Polish Education Society is being considered by both governments.”

The first victim

Anna Maria Dyner, an analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, writing in the 2018 edition of the Belarusian Yearbook, pointed to one more factor that limits the possibility of resolving unfinished matters. “Some of them are a result of the overall political situation in Eastern and Central Europe,” she writes. “The security-related problems are connected to Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy towards Ukraine, which in turn raises questions about the security policy of Belarus, given that Belarus is a member of the Union State with Russia and in a close military, political and economic alliance with Russia. There are also doubts in regards to Belarus’s foreign policy independence, especially in the context of its relations with EU and NATO.”

Belarus is concerned above all with survival, and feels it is walking a tight rope in the current geopolitical order. It is engaged in a balancing act that will prevent it from an unbridled embrace of Poland or any other alliance with a western state. People close to the Polish authorities tell me that it is thanks to Poland’s warming of relations with Belarus that Minsk refused a permanent Russian military base on its territory. But such an interpretation sounds like a fairy tale. The truth is that Lukashenka opposed these bases before relations between Minsk and Warsaw started to improve. The Belarusian authorities have also avoided voicing outcry in reaction to increased NATO presence on the eastern flank. “We do not like it, but we want to keep tensions calm and not heat them up,” I was told by a Belarusian diplomat recently. “We know that should there be a conflict between Russia and the West, Belarus will be the first victim.”

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Michał Potocki is a Polish journalist. He is an op-ed editor with the Polish daily Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

belarus, Poland, Polish-Belarusian relations