The EU should take Belarus more seriously

Photo courtesy of Balázs Jarábik.

On the other hand, civil society is both starting to perceive and utilise the government as a stakeholder. This is in contrast to the previous 20 years-long game that viewed the government as the enemy only and where that enemy had to be defeated. I believe this is a welcome change. Another valuable aspect of the conference was that it was in Lukashenka’s home country of Belarus. Because of this, its presence was literally everywhere. I was told by the organisers that the administration even paid for the branding and promotion of the conference since Lukashenka was taking part in it. This is an unregistered civic initiative, so there are a lot of interesting contexts being revealed here.

Do you think the situation in Ukraine has influenced the shift of the regime?

From the perspective of regional security, Belarus is effectively using the Ukrainian crisis to rebrand itself in its relations towards Europe. However, this has its limitations. This rebranding, while appreciated in the West, is rather cautious, and it does not expand to the internal governance system which remains regressive and repressive. Clearly, more time is needed for those reforms to begin. The Belarusian authorities realise that the Ukrainian situation is a chance to improve their own image. I don’t want to say this rebranding is only for the sake of image, because when Belarus’s number one (Russia) and number three (Ukraine) trading partners are in a war with each other, that has had very negative repercussions for the economy. And the regime always puts the economy first. The social contract is based on social and economic factors and the state managing the economy competently. So improving regional security is a real national security interest.

Increasingly there are more signs from within Belarus that security is no longer perceived through the prism of NATO being a threat. What is Belarus’s current security policy and how does it fit in between the West and Russia?

When it comes to NATO, the conference was very telling. Lukashenka was sitting on a panel with the former head of the CSTO (the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation), the deputy secretary general of NATO and the secretary general of the OSCE. After Ukraine, Belarus amended its military doctrine in order to prepare for a hybrid war. The Belarusian constitution blocks participation of their troops in foreign missions beyond UN-mandated peace keeping missions in which they do participate. And their military doctrine has been updated to mention the threat of hybrid warfare. This does not mean that it is pointing to Russia exclusively, after all they are allies and members of CSTO. From Belarus’s perspective, it is just as likely that hybrid warfare might come from the West. Belarus considered the revolution in Ukraine as part of a 15 year plot by the West.

Meanwhile, the Russia factor has been there for a while. Perhaps you recall the campaign in 2009 where the then Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, posted a video message against President Lukeshenka or that the first Russian gas war in 2014 was against Belarus. So, Minsk is holding onto its relations with Russia while, simultaneously, there is a silent, soft Belarusification that has been going on for years in terms of both language and national identity. Russia is watching it with unease. The Belarusian special forces are regularly exercising not only close to the western border but also close to the Russian border. During the Zapad-2017 military exercises, it was significant to see how differently Russia and Belarus behaved. The Belarusian side was more transparent, adhering to international criteria, while the Russians did not. This is another sign of Minsk’s changing attitude. Belarus is trying to be as neutral as possible, given its possibilities.

You were talking about a change in Belarus’s approach to Russia but would you say that Europe is also sensing a change in relations with Belarus? One of the speakers at the conference was Andrew Wilson who wrote Europe’s Last Dictatorship. Would you agree that the West is still using old labels to describe Belarus, despite the changes within the country?

Belarus is the last dictatorship in Europe because it is immortal, but you have not heard this too often for a few years now.  It is undoubtedly a strong authoritarian regime and this has not changed. There are no free, let alone fair, elections. Pressure on civil society and any form of opposition is ongoing even though it has become softer. There are more fines than jail sentences and currently no internationally-recognised political prisoners exist. Law enforcement’s arbitrary decision-making and tactic to jail businessmen is another form of pressure that everyone talks about in the country. Although local human rights defenders claim there are locally recognised political prisoners, there are no internationally recognised ones – what is essentially the Western red line. Overall, maintaining a cautious dialogue makes the West and Belarus get to know each other better, and this contributes to less rhetoric and more common work.

Is this a new opening in relations?

breakthrough. A breakthrough in relations would demand Belarus addressing free elections, human rights and other concerns such as loosening the particularly heavy law enforcement control over the judiciary or decentralise power. A couple of months ago, the Belarusian president openly admitted that these actions must be undertaken, but at the end of the transition not at the beginning. This is similar to the Spanish transition scenario. In other words, I certainly don’t think that Lukashenka will give power to one of his sons, but rather the people will decide on a political transformation à la Spain. Lukashenka will then find a position as a sort of a “monarch” to retire. At the same time, there may be democratisation and should be decentralisation of power. So, while there are changes in attitude and relationship with the West, there is no breakthrough because there are no systemic changes.

However, this should not limit the European Union to put more devotion into the relationship.  Especially when Belarus is the only neighbouring country in the East that does not have a legal framework for relations, yet also as the only one that maintains its territorial integrity. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement was suspended in 1996. Despite a lengthy dialogue, the two sides cannot agree on a new framework for relations or even technical issues such as accepting Belarusian diplomatic passports. I believe that the ball is in Europe’s court, as Belarus is adhering to the minimum agreements. However, it expects something in return for any steps. I think the EU should take Belarus a bit more seriously. If we look at the funding – 28 million euro a year goes to Belarus – you could use the word “peanuts” to describe it.

Much more can be done, but the EU seems too preoccupied with Ukraine and has little appetite to push forward with Belarus. I suspect partly because the country did not choose the path of EU integration and the Lukashenka regime is up and running.  Thus, neither the EU nor Belarus see the immediate political benefits of closer relations, and that is probably the main obstacle. The dialogue continues but common content and consensus are hard to find.  The Belarusians think “we did so much for you” while European countries such as Germany are still blocking Belarusian official passports. This is not a norm for Eastern Partnership countries, so Belarus can again claim that the EU is using double standards.

It has been over a year since the decree on short-term visa free entry for EU citizens into Belarus came into force. In your view has this policy brought real change or has it been another element in some kind of game by Lukashenka?

If something was a breakthrough, this was it. The Belarusians did something which was not reciprocated by the EU. And it wasn’t done for the EU exclusively. They did it to boost the tourism industry. It was an important step for Belarus to end its isolation. The first sign was in 2012 when they were hosting the Ice Hockey World Championships, which were very successful for the country. The second sign was the realisation in Minsk that there was no longer a regime change strategy in the West. It was largely abandoned in 2006 but its perception in Minsk has remained strong, mostly due to the justification and positioning of the siloviki. After the experience of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the EU understood it was better to start engaging with the government instead of supporting something that may not bring the change which we wanted to believe in. After the EuroMaidan and the Ukraine crisis, all of this has been put in a very different context, since Russia pulled out the gun.

Is Belarus ending its self-isolation? Is it reaching out?

The rebranding, together with the regional security issue and the Ukrainian crisis resolution, are all motivating factors in this. One can also see a reformed ministry of foreign affairs spearheading such an opening but it is also clear that this is not a priority for the law enforcement agencies. Also, the government is used to getting things it wants at home immediately, but getting investors and tourists to come may not be as simple. They may become frustrated that it takes so much time for their image to change, for tourists to come and for the business environment to improve. The government still has a very heavy presence everywhere, but there are signs of relaxation. However, how long can they maintain this?

The EU has been dealing with an authoritarian partner, but at the same time with a partner that manages its country well, especially when compared to Ukraine or Moldova. It is hard to agree on anything with the Belarusian government, but once you do agree on something, the state delivers. Compare that to the Ukrainian case where there are a lot more promises, and less delivery. Creating stability in the region is the main goal of the Eastern Partnership. So, you have a stable and authoritarian Belarus and a democratic, yet still unstable, Ukraine. The EU decides to support Ukraine with money, means and engagement. Nobody in the EU, including myself, should have any illusions that the government in Belarus is giving up control.  But the government will have a harder time justifying repressions to its own citizens, especially as there are reforms to outsource more costs directly to the citizens. The reason behind the recent changes is that the social contract, which certainly exists in Belarus, guarantees services that the citizens want, even if there is no democracy. Typically, citizens will choose social security, healthcare, and education over democracy. The fall of the Russian economy has also affected Belarus, since the markets are dependent, and Russia is no longer providing subsidies as it used to. The government has ended up giving more freedom in exchange for fewer economic benefits and has become very sensitive towards public opinion. This is what I think may continue to happen: a slow, gradual shift towards market-based thinking, rules and management. A long therapy without the shock.

Balázs Jarábik is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where his research focuses on Eastern and Central Europe with particular focus on Ukraine.

Iwona Reichardt is the deputy editor-in-chief of New Eastern Europe and Daniel Gleichgewicht is an assistant editor with New Eastern Europe.

Aleksandr Lukashenka, belarus, Belarus-EU relations