A Belarusian house of cards

Photo: LHOON (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Belarusian idiosyncrasies

In analyses of the Belarusian transformation – considering that the process is still underway – many political scientists use such terms as the “Belarusian transformation model” or the “Belarusian socio-political model”. This language is justified as Belarus pursues its own model of political and economic development. It may not ultimately aim at introducing a stable democracy and free market, but rather is characterised by the following elements: the implementation of a relatively stable and steered economy, concentration of political power but without one power party, passive civil society and a lack of oligarchs.

More controversy is generated by terms like the “last dictatorship in Europe” or a “sovereign democracy”, which are present in the discourse on Belarusian system transformation. These terms are used mostly by western journalists or political commentators who, through such language, indicate their negative assessment of the current regime.

All said, Belarus’s political system is probably best described as an authoritarian-Sultan hybrid. This description expresses the main characteristics of its functioning and the behaviour of the ruling elite – namely, it often changes and adjusts to geopolitical conditions. As expected, this hybrid contains features of both democracy and authoritarianism. It has a consolidated power structure with a distinct centre (the president and his circle), and a weak and fragmented counter-elite (the opposition). There is also a flexible state ideology and multi-layered identity. As mentioned earlier, the transformation has caused the social economy to remain relatively stable. Yet it has allowed modernisation to take place in a controlled way.

The current regime also points to some idiosyncrasies that have developed in Belarus as a result of the transformation. First of all, parliamentary pluralism has significantly decreased since the 1990s and now remains a pure decoration. Second, elections, which are one of the fundamental mechanisms of democracy, have become marginalised. Their importance is treated instrumentally. Thus, local elections are perceived as meaningless, both by the authorities and the opposition. Greater importance is assigned to parliamentary elections which are contested by parties that are supportive of and against the government. Without any doubt, presidential elections are seen as the most important.

Third, the works of the Belarusian parliament are deprived of politics and party struggles, something that is unmet in established democracies. In terms of its composition, the Belarusian parliament is largely made up of MPs who have no party affiliation. Also significant is the fact that those few who are elected on a party ticket (less than ten per cent) are usually members of the so-called “group interest parties” which openly support Lukashenka’s overall policies.

The power elite

In the early stages of the system transformation, the division of Belarusian political elite into the ruling-elite and counter-elite was more symbolic than a reflection of reality. In fact, both groups used similar slogans and rhetoric. Due to a lack of democratic experience, their programmes were often blurred, very general and imprecise. Differences between the two sides have become clearer since 1995. In that year a referendum was passed to amend the constitution to the president’s advantage. From that time, it has given Lukashenka the right to dissolve the parliament, which significantly increased his power. As a result, the ruling elite became integrated ideologically. In practical terms, their ideology means an attempt to stay in power.

When it comes to the structure of the ruling elite, the president and his close circle make up the core, where all the most important decisions are made. The president is not only the leader, but also the main patron and arbiter. He decides on the functioning of the different interest groups that operate in his surroundings. In this capacity, he enforces some and weakens others. Also at his will, goods are redistributed among them.

Contrary to the opinion of many experts, the Belarusian ruling class is far from a fossilised monolith. It has some features that resemble a developed system of horizontal and vertical patron-client relations which allows for the functioning of partially autonomous “clans”. These groups, in turn, fight for access to the main patron. The most important and dominating one is the so-called Shklov-Mogilev group – whose name derives from the two cities where Lukashenka started his career – that includes people who knew and worked with Lukashenka before he was president. Until recently, the siloviki, (that is, representatives of the security forces) were regarded as the most powerful of all clans around the president. However, when their influence became too strong, Lukashenka weakened their power; and besides Lukashenka seems to like “personnel reshuffling”. In this way, he balances the influence of some people and groups within the power elite.

Other influencing groups are the “technocrats”. For a large part, they are members of the government – high-level state employees and more junior younger ones, namely those who entered politics in the early 2000s. The latter started to control the financial and security forces once the power of the siloviki became weaker. Thereby they became one of the most powerful clans. Competition among the clans and interest groups within the power elite is a permanent process. The main patron – the president – makes sure no one becomes too strong. He achieves this thanks to a high turnover and reshuffling of the highest ranks of the state.

In addition, there are media and culture groups that offer services to the authorities, and a group of businessmen who have connections with them. These businessmen are not like Russian- or Ukrainian-style oligarchs who have a direct influence on politics. Belarusian oligarchs do not have their own base and their economic success is largely dependent on the authorities’ will and needs. The functioning of the ruling elite also includes pro-government political parties, which should not be regarded as independent political agents as they are usually mobilised during the parliamentary and presidential elections.

Belaya Rus

As mentioned earlier, among the characteristic features of the Belarusian transformation, which distinguishes itself from the majority of post-Soviet states (including Russia and Ukraine), is the lack of a party of power. This makes the public association, Belaya Rus, a particularly interesting case. It is the largest political grouping in Belarus with over 170,000 members. Belaya Rus was founded in 2007 and has since become the main organisation for the Belarusian nomenklatura. The leaders of the organisation are in Lukashenka’s closest circle. The group’s goal is to support the president’s policies. From the beginning of its establishment, it was beleived that Belaya Rus would undergo a quick transformation and one day turn into a party of power. This transformation has not taken place yet, probably because of the paternalistic nature of the power structure in Belarus.

Indeed in his official speeches, Lukashenka often criticises Belaya Rus, claiming that “for ideological reasons [he] will never belong to or lead any political party” and that he will be checking “anyone in the power apparatus who belongs to any kind of organisation”. Should a ruling party ever emerge in Belarus, be it from Belaya Rus or some other organisation, its leaders would certainly become a threat to the president. They could, for example, use the administrative resources and become the president’s rival, or win elections to parliament on a party ticket, something the president’s circle is trying to avoid.

Without any doubt, Belarusians are far from having an unconditional admiration of Lukashenka and his government. The general public is rather opportunistic and just trying to adjust to the here and now. This attitude comes from the fact that people do not see much opportunity to influence politics and do not see any real alternative. Lukashenka’s system is not democratic, to be sure, but it provides stability to the majority of the population and people are able to meet their basic needs.

While answering these needs, the authorities have offered the people a simple ideology. They speak to them in a language they understand, ensuring they will have stability for the future. For the majority of Belarusian citizens this is more important than the incomprehensive slogans of the opposition, which is seen as detached from reality. The power elite, as opposed to the counter-elite, know how to adjust to the changing context – even though they have mixed results.

Public dissatisfaction with the authorities, estimated to be around 20-30 per cent according to opinion polls, has not yet translated into support for the opposition. In fact, the level of support for individual opposition parties falls into the margin of error. The Belarusian ruling elite is thus very stable at this moment and it is unlikely that the opposition will one day soon destroy its foundation.

The counter-elite

The Belarusian counter-elite, usually understood as the political opposition, is weak and fragmented. It does not fit popular western understandings of Belarus, which distinguish between a “brutally non-democratic ruling elite” and a “democratic, pro-European, repressed opposition”. It is best to look at the Belarusian counter-elite as a product of a number of objective factors: the monopolisation of power, the lack of fair and honest political competition and, of course, repressions. However, we should also not forget about the subjective factors that to the same extent determine the functioning of the Belarusian opposition. Some of the most important ones are:

Internal reproduction and limited internal circulation. This means the overall structure of the Belarusian opposition, which was founded in the 1990s, has undergone almost no changes till today. The most important parties were founded in the early years of Belarus’s independence. However, they now are tarnished by their past failures and the lack of new charismatic leaders.

Generation conflict. The majority of the opposition parties are experiencing a generation conflict. Most of the activists are there from the start and are working within the party structure, which is based on outmoded, strategic methods and leads to serious conflicts with younger activists who would like to have a more active role.

Ineffective inclusion of new members. Similarly, opposition parties do not attract new members, especially younger ones. The inclusion of new activists can be quite challenging when the majority of the population remain indifferent to politics, and see no clear, viable political alternative.

Low consolidation and mobilisation potential. The truth is the opposition has spent over two decades talking about the need to consolidate and unite, claiming that only united democratic forces have a real chance in the fight for power. This approach, as logical and understandable as it may seem, has not had much success in establishing a viable alternative to Lukashenka’s regime. In fact, unity within the opposition has actually decreased since the 2006 presidential elections.

Ideological conflicts. The Belarusian counter–elite include a number of parties and organisations with different political goals and beliefs. A significant majority of them support the rule of law, democracy, human rights and civil liberties, personal freedom and European values. However, some of the organisations that are part of the opposition seem to be in favour of something that is very far away from what we regard as a western, liberal democracy.

Personal conflicts. Some of the above-mentioned problems have led to serious conflicts within the counter-elite. A lack of agreement is thus the “Achilles’ heel” of the Belarusian opposition, which is destructive. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for the personal ambitions of opposition leaders to get more attention than the work of the organisation involved.

Detachment from society. There is a noticeable disconnect between the opposition parties and the rest of society. This is problematic given that throughout most of the time of the Belarusian transformation it was the opposition parties who were original conveyers of how Belarus should be governed.

Surprisingly similar?

In analysing the rhetoric of the Belarusian opposition, it can be easily noticed it holds a grudge against the authorities for their “Soviet” way of governance and Homo Sovieticus mentality. In contrast, the counter-elite since the beginning has presented themselves as opponents of the Soviet way of life, which includes forms of collectivism, submission, opportunism, adjustability and a lack of respect for the law. Moreover, one of the main arguments the opposition makes is the personal nature of power, which is illustrated by the fact that since 1994 Belarus has been constantly governed by President Lukashenka.

However, if we take a closer look at the opposition, we see that their situation is surprisingly similar to those in power. Anatol Liabiedzka, for example, has been the leader of the United Civic Party of Belarus – one of the opposition parties – for the past 18 years. He was elected party chairman nine times in a row. Also, the chairman of the United Opposition Left – since 2009 called The Belarusian Left Party “A Just World” – has been Siarhey Kalakin since 1994 (that is as long as Lukashenka’s reign). Similarly, Zianon Pazniak has been the leader of the Belarusian Popular Front for almost three decades now (since 1989). Considering these facts, Belarusian political scientists often note that there are “micro-scale dictatorships” within the counter-elite, which are almost a mirror reflection of the power elite. As a result, many opposition parties have turned into the political property of their leaders.

This situation shapes the image of the opposition and the level of trust of its activists. Seemingly, a significant part of the Belarusian opposition has the very same Homo post-Sovieticus mentality as the power elite. The only difference is that the authorities do not hide their intentions and beliefs, often times using Soviet nostalgia as a foundation for their positions.

Decisive years to come

There seem to be no visible signs to indicate that a change in the above-described situation is to take place in the near future. Both the ruling elite and the counter-elite display features of the Homo Sovieticus fitting into the post-Soviet political culture. However, while Lukashenka’s transformation and authoritarian modernisation have gained public support, the model promoted by the counter-elite has not proved to be popular enough. It does not serve as a real alternative to the status quo.

Belarus will hold parliamentary and presidential elections in 2020 and the oncoming two years will be obviously critical for the future of the counter-elite. For the moment its groups have more opportunities and tools to promote their ideas. Therefore if opposition activists make the necessary changes to overcome the internal Homo Sovieticus disease, democratic forces will have a chance to survive.

Lastly, however, let me point out to an interesting phenomenon that is developing within the counter-elite, yet not within the framework of political parties. These are the numerous civil society groups and movements that, with time, may transform into a more attractive counter-elite. At present many of them do not want to be associated with the authorities or the opposition. They mostly operate at the local level and focus on specific issues – the environment, language and urban development. Yet their presence is becoming increasingly more visible and because of their non-political message they have proved to be quite effective. Their role could increase with time and could be partially determined by the state and behaviour of the current opposition.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Maxim Rust is a contributing editor with New Eastern Europe and a PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw.

Aleksandr Lukashenka, belarus, opposition