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Oppositionists or dissidents?

An interview with Alyaksandr Klaskouski, a Belarusian journalist and political analyst. Interviewer: Zbigniew Rokita

ZBIGNIEW ROKITA: I have a feeling that the Belarusian opposition has never been as weak as it is right now…

ALYAKSANDR KLASKOUSKI: I agree. In the 1990s the opposition was capable of bringing 30,000-40,000 people to the streets. At that time they could also influence the masses and cause some fear among the authorities. Today things are different. There are maybe a few dozens of people that come to protests; this is thousands times less than two decades ago. The opposition has almost no influence on Belarusian politics, let alone economics.

September 1, 2018 - Alyaksandr Klaskouski Zbigniew Rokita - InterviewsIssue 5 2018Magazine

Photo: Waldemar Dowejko / Courtesy of Belsat TV

How do you explain this weakness?

First of all, when there is a brutal authoritarian regime, there is no strong opposition. Alyaksandr Lukashenka has created a situation where you can no longer challenge his regime by peaceful means. Secondly, for a long time Lukashenka was actually popular. It was not caused by his charisma or demagogy. His popularity was a result of an increase in the living standards, which, in turn, were possible thanks to the subsidies that Belarus received from Russia. Simple people loved their “father” – batka as they say here. He was offering them comfort and continued to increase wages. Think about it, before the 2001 elections the average monthly salary was 100 dollars, in 2006 it was 250 dollars, and in 2010 it was 500 dollars. For Belarusian standards that was a very good dynamic.

But over ten years ago economic indicators were no longer so favourable…

Yes, growth almost stopped then. The boom period lasted until around 2006 or 2007. Until then the “Belarusian model” was flourishing. Later Russia cut its subsidies and the economy started to backslide. Today the average wage is lower than it was in 2010. Recently, gas prices have again increased which has caused a certain revival of the Belarusian economy. However, independent experts say this revival is not a result of structural reforms or privatisation, but periodical fluctuations in prices of natural resources. Belarus has two large refineries. We get cheap oil from Russia and then sell it to Poland, the United Kingdom or distribute oil products in the Netherlands. It is very profitable for us.

And yet the state of the Belarusian economy is to Lukashenka’s, and not the opposition’s, advantage.

Many people say: “Why do we need to protest in the streets if we have enough food, and a revolution will make matters worse?” And here we get to the next cause of the opposition’s weakness. Today, the standard of living is not as high as it was before and society is a bit dissatisfied. But, at the same time, the opposition has lost its position and has become marginalised. Ukraine’s negative example was important here. Belarusian propaganda skilfully exploited what happened in Kyiv, sending the following message: “Ukrainians wanted a revolution and what did they get? A war with Russia, one which resulted in bloodshed, loss of territory, and lower standards of living. Do you also want a revolution? Do not listen to the opposition. We are not the richest people on earth, but Lukashenka has guaranteed our stability and security”. During the 2015 presidential elections the opposition did not even appear on the streets.

They said they were afraid it could be a pretext for Russia to enter Belarus.

That was a pretext. They were simply not able to mobilise people and by saying they were concerned with the security of the state, they were, in fact, protecting themselves. In any case, the lack of protest in 2015 showed two things: a weakness of the opposition and the lack of trust people have in them. There is also a third factor. The West has changed its attitude to Lukashenka and, in consequence, the Belarusian opposition. Lukashenka was earlier called a dictator, but since 2014 western states have decided to maintain relations with him. His distancing from Moscow made him come across as someone who can be a moderator. Consequently, when co-operation with the regime became possible, support for opposition went down. Thus, you can now tell that the opposition has no money; there were some reports of opposition parties having no money to pay for electricity in their offices.

While enumerating the causes of the weakness of the opposition, you focused on the factors that are influencing it from the outside. But the question is: is the opposition doing all it possibly can to get stronger?

The opposition has obviously made a lot of mistakes. The main cause of its weakness is the power of the regime. The opposition found itself on the margins, and those who are marginalised often make silly mistakes and start to fight among themselves. This is caused by their powerlessness. Thus, they are unable to nominate one candidate in presidential elections. We can blame the opposition for this lack of co-operation, but I think its leaders are simply aware that nobody has a chance to win. They have started to treat elections as an opportunity to improve their image. However, experiences of other countries show that a divided opposition can get united when a regime starts to collapse. That is why I do not want to be too harsh on the opposition.

During the 2015 elections part of the opposition wanted to boycott it. And yet elections are seemingly the only time it can increase its activity. Is the opposition slowly giving up?

I criticised this strategy because it is a road to nowhere. Putting your bets on a lower turnout won’t work when the regime rigs the vote. Lack of representatives on the opposition side in electoral commissions also makes no sense. In this way, the regime has no competition and it is guaranteed an easier victory. Such ideas demobilise voters. I remember in 2015, on the day of elections, when Anatoly Lebedko (head of the United Civic Party of Belarus – editor’s note) was saying: “Do not vote! It makes no sense to play a game that you will lose anyway.” But what will happen when this same man will at one point want to mobilise his supporters? Nobody will believe him. Such ideas have contributed to the de-politisation of Belarusian society. They have lost interest in politics.

Given that the impact of the Belarusian opposition is so limited, what do its representatives do on a daily basis?

I sometimes laugh when some of them become bloggers, social media commentators or YouTubers. They are no longer people who are leading the nation forward.

A virtual migration?

Well, some are also trying to do something offline. Mikola Statkevich, for example, continues to call his supporters to march on the streets. The authorities will for sure arrest and fine them. The right strategy is to demonstrate to the world and say there are Belarusians who have not given in and who want to defend the right to gather publicly.

Does he mobilise a lot of people to the streets?

No, not many. And these things only deepen the sense of fatalism. Belarusians are seeing that time and again a small group of people marches on the streets, they get caught, they get punished and so on and so forth. Belarusians are rational people. They think: “Why should we be going to demonstrations, to pay fines; lose our jobs or get kicked out of university? Why should we do that if it does not change anything? It will be better if I sit quietly and wait for a more favourable moment.” Slogans about a small group of fanatics, who are the nation’s conscience that defend its dignity, may sound beautiful, but they do not bring us any closer to reforming the state. A different example is the campaign of the moderate opposition, which is called “Tell the truth”; it hopes to make change in a peaceful manner. They promote the idea of going to different parts of the country and talking with people who are there and offering them assistance, for example legal assistance.

There are also attempts to use current topics. Kuropaty (the site of murder of Stalin’s victims – editor’s note) is one of them, especially because a restaurant was opened there recently. But again, a protest organised there was attended by 10-15 people. Of course, this topic generates emotions, but more in the foreign press than the Belarusian press. However, last year during the protests of the so-called parasites, the opposition found, for a short moment, some common language with society. The protests were a reaction to the state’s law that would fine the unemployed. Suddenly, hundreds of thousands of Belarusians received letters asking them to pay large sums of money. The opposition used that moment and gathered thousands of people. It has its strengths: structure, megaphones, and experience.

So what slogans should the opposition use to get through to people? Evidently, the greatest social discontent comes at times of economic downturns, and yet the opposition repeats, like a mantra, slogans about western values.

It is true that speaking about bread and butter issues is more effective than speaking about democracy. Many Belarusians admit that the opposition has good people, but they are completely disconnected from reality.

In the West there is a conviction that Belarusian politics is divided into the regime and pro-western opposition. But does the opposition really lean towards liberal democracy and European values? 

The postulate of democratic reforms unites all opposition forces. As a rule, the whole opposition is against Russian domination, while the West is seen as a guarantee of security from Russia. A similar mechanism operates within society: those who are against Lukashenka are pro-western. There are probably no people who are against Lukashenka and pro-Russia at the same time.

Does the regime today give pretext to massive demonstrations?

There is no critical situation for the authorities. The state of the economy is not bad enough for people to make a revolution.

What percentage of the public supports the opposition?

Two years ago the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (NISEPI) was shut down, so we no longer have independent sociological research to tell us about political moods. But I think the percentage of the public that supports the opposition has not changed and it oscillates between 20 to 25 per cent.

OK, but let us be more precise: one-quarter of Belarusians support specific opposition parties, or are they rather against the current regime?

Rather the latter. Some Belarusians complain about the authorities, but see no viable alternative in the opposition. The last NISEPI poll showed that support for opposition leaders was in the statistical margin of error.

But is the regime and the opposition the sole problem? Isn’t Belarusian society quite passive and not too willingly to engage in politics also a problem here? Especially when you compare it to Ukraine …

Let me repeat: our society is rational. You cannot expect mass heroism from us. You think that in the West if the authorities were beating people for demonstrating on the streets, there would be huge crowds of protestors? On top of that, there are certain national features: Belarusians are more of a Northern nation, while Ukrainians are more Southern. We also have different traditions.

What is the opposition risking today?

After the 2010 elections protesters could be sentenced to a few years in prison. Now after the 2017 protests, cases were initiated, people were intimidated and then released, quietly. In fact, the parasite law was withdrawn. In recent years, leaders of the opposition have been fined and the amounts they have to pay are very large – some may be paying them off for the rest of their lives. It also happens at court cases where an activist asks the judge: “Please put me in jail for 15 days, instead of fining me.” The activists are not wealthy people.

And who is Lukashenka’s greatest threat? Society? Political rivals within the government? Or the opposition?

Society. Or let me put it this way: the economy. The alternative to the money which is coming from Russia in smaller amounts is painful reforms which would make us less dependent on Russia. However, Lukashenka fears the reforms, knowing they could lead to a temporary destabilisation, just like what happened in Poland after 1989. He knows that when the economy gets weaker, people will protest on the streets, and the opposition will support them and Moscow might interfere.

In that case, is the opposition actually helping Lukashenka? Maybe he has the capacity to destroy it, but won’t do so because preserving the status quo will allow him to pretend there is pluralism in Belarus and that society is able channel anti-regime sentiments.  

Yes. He does not want to eliminate the opposition. What helps him greatly is a weak opposition, which is a decoration for the regime. He can brag to the West and use it to scare the public.

Today, we called the opponents of the regime “oppositionists”. But maybe a better term is “dissidents”?

They like to make the impression they are politicians, and indeed dissidents would be a better term. But let us give them justice: among the opposition there are opportunists and careerists for sure, but there are also people who are driven by conviction and ideals. Should they disappear, society would be doomed to total fatalism. It is not their fault that such are the times. History shows that such people have always been few and far between, but if not for those who go against the current, the world would have not progressed.

 Translated by Iwona Reichardt and Zbigniew Rokita

 Alyaksandr Klaskouski is a Belarusian journalist and essayist. He is a director of analytical projects for the BelaPAN news agency.

Zbigniew Rokita is a Polish journalist specialising in Eastern Europe. He is the author of a recent book titled Królowie strzelców. Piłka w cieniu imperium – a report of Eastern Europe of the last century shown through the prism of sport and politics.

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