Between declarations and reality

Donetsk, March 2014: A group of protesters with a banner that reads “Donbas with Russia”. Four years of hostility with more than 10,000 victims and constant Russian propaganda in the separatist-held territory suggest there are numerous barriers to reintegration. Photo: Vasyatka1 (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

On February 24th this year the “Law on the Peculiarities of State Policy to Ensure the State Sovereignty of Ukraine over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts” entered into force. This bill stipulates a number of amendments to Ukrainian law. Out of them, four possible points could be crucial. Firstly, Ukraine has finally recognised the region as a “temporarily occupied territory”. Secondly, the Russian Federation has been defined as an aggressor. Thirdly, the bill has shifted liability on the situation on the occupied territories to Moscow. Fourthly, the law has essentially expanded the use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and transformed the Antiterrorist Operation into a new format – the Operation of Joint Forces, or the OJF. All are absolutely positive moves from the four different points of view – diplomatic, military, political and socio-economical.

At the same time, a number of Ukrainian politicians refer to the bill as the law on the reintegration of Donbas. Unfortunately, numerous factors make reintegration by legal means impossible. At most, the bill might be seen as preparing the ground for launching a very long-term reintegration plan. A more reasonable title for the bill would be “the improvement of defensive measures”.

Law of the jungle

A number of factors should be taken into account when speaking about reintegration and Kyiv’s stance towards Donbas, of which there are two essential elements. The first is the presence of two army corps in the region. The second is the possibility of a conventional Russian invasion into Ukraine. As of mid-2018, the armed forces of Ukraine could, theoretically, be able to conduct military operations in and regain control of the region. However, there are at least two very strong arguments against making such a move. The first is that a Ukrainian offensive would cause many casualties and the final result is uncertain. The First Army Corps (based in the self-proclaimed “Donetsk Peoples Republic”) and the Second Army Corps (in the self-proclaimed “Luhansk Peoples Republic”) consist of very well-trained, experienced and well-equipped soldiers. Regular Russian troops are mixed with mercenaries (mostly from Russia) and locals with key command positions being held by Russia. More than four years has been more than enough time to form a capable force to fend off any attack. Defeating them would be a difficult but feasible task for the Ukrainian armed forces.

The second argument against an offensive is much stronger; it would definitely lead to a direct military invasion by the Russian army in order “to defend Russian speakers from genocide”. It is well known that for Kyiv the threat comes from a number of directions: Donbas, Kharkiv and Chernihiv, the Azov region, Crimea and Transnistria. One cannot rule out an attack originating from the Belarusian territory in the north as well. Therefore, due to the asymmetrical threats it faces, Ukraine has no chance in a clash with the Russian Federation.

Faced with this scenario, the Ukrainian military is unlikely to launch any form of military offensive. Grounds for conducting such a move are very weak. In this way, the Kremlin has put the “law of the jungle” into practise: “the one who is stronger is always right”. This is a key point when assessing the possibility of reintegration.

To avoid a Trojan horse

Another reason to view the rhetoric of reintegration with scepticism is the destructive impact a reintegrated Donbas would have on Ukraine as a whole. The prospect of installing politicians from Donbas into the Ukrainian government is highly desired by Moscow. This could help Russia exert influence over the country. If Donbas is reintegrated a number of extremely pro-Russian MPs will find themselves in the Ukrainian parliament. Simultaneously, the return of Donbas would intensify ideological and internal contradictions in Ukraine regarding European and NATO integration and policy towards Russia.

An important and underestimated issue is the public opinion in Donbas before the war. According to research by the Razumkov Centre in December 2013, almost 30 per cent of Donbas inhabitants supported the idea of federalisation and almost 20 per cent supported joining Russia. Sociologists emphasised that the main feature of public opinion in Donbas was indifference and passiveness. Due to the impossibility of conducting reliable research on public opinion in the current reality, it is difficult to know exactly what the current mood is. Four years of hostility with more than 10,000 victims (including civilians), constant Russian propaganda, intense “historical policy”, the introduction of educational programmes in the separatist-held territory and the extremely confrontational stance of these quasi-states towards the “Kyiv junta” all suggest there are numerous barriers to reintegration. Furthermore, according to data from the ministry of social policy (as of June 2018) almost 1.5 million internally displaced persons from Donbas were registered in different regions of Ukraine. Potentially, most of them favour the authorities in Kyiv, which automatically reduces the percentage of Ukraine’s supporters remaining in the region.

Another argument against the reintegration of Donbas in its current circumstances is that it would become an economic burden for Kyiv. Damaged infrastructure, social commitments and a large and a mostly archaic industry would be difficult for a weak Ukrainian economy to handle. In addition, it is not clear if the ruling forces in Ukraine are really interested in regaining control of Donbas because their electoral popularity there is very low.

Altogether, this means that reintegration of Donbas is very risky for Ukrainian statehood and the current authorities in Kyiv. It is also very likely that regaining control would be a Trojan horse for Kyiv and could be destructive for its internal and external stability. A dominant factor is the military presence of Russian units and the Kremlin’s support of the separatists. It renders current discussions about reintegration completely unproductive and detached from reality. Moreover, regaining control of Donbas, which would be under the conditions beneficial to Russia, would be the next stage of a hybrid aggression against Ukraine. Western audiences all too often forget about that.

Five pillars of reintegration

Do the above arguments mean that Kyiv should forget about regaining control of Donbas and say goodbye to its citizens living there? Of course not – that would be a huge mistake. However, the sad reality of the situation means that Ukraine’s options are limited. Therefore Ukraine has no choice but to create conducive terms for launching reintegration at the time when Russia is not be able to react and utilise its armed forces. There is no doubt that this is anything other than a long-term strategy. Such a vision should be based on at least five pillars.

Firstly, Ukraine must enhance its defensive potential to show its viability to Ukrainians living in both territories. It also means the minimisation of military escalation. Secondly, the government still has not made full use of its legal capabilities in the international courts to exert pressure on the Kremlin. These capabilities apply to various issues, like economic loss as a result of the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas and putting the spotlight on political prisoners in Russia. Moscow must feel the price of its action in Ukraine. Thirdly, all Ukrainian efforts should be concentrated on maintaining and enhancing US and EU sanctions against Russia. Intensifying informational campaigns and diplomatic activity should be regarded as key in this regard.

Fourthly, Kyiv should be more active in making use of the contradictions between Russian power structures that are more and more visible in the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine and the region. It was particularly noticeable during the so-called coup in the self-declared “Luhansk People’s Republic” late November last year when a rivalry between the Russian FSB and GRU almost led to armed clashes. This factor remains underestimated because it might be seen as an instrument of fostering weakness in Moscow’s regime and its capability to respond to Ukraine’s policy. And, finally, the fifth point refers directly to the Ukrainian elite. The reintegration of Donbas must be framed as a Ukrainian success story. Regaining the occupied territory might be conducted without any negative implications only if Ukraine put forward prospects for their future. This must be perceived by the local populace as something new and better than during the times before the war. The reforms in Ukraine must accelerate, particularly regarding the minimising of corruption, creating effective state institutions and efficient law enforcement bodies. These tasks can only be carried out in the long-term.

War of exhaustion

At least two scenarios in the fate of east Ukraine are likely to happen. The first is the military escalation scenario. Upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine – planned respectively for March and October 2019 – are a factor that could increase the risk of military escalation. The Kremlin might regard this time period as a way to interfere with the election results in order to destabilise the political and socio-economic situation in Ukraine. It is worth noting that, according to the Kremlin, in January this year the FSB detained four people who were accused of preparing terrorist acts in Russia, allegedly inspired by Kyiv. In April the Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced that Moscow expects subversive action to be conducted by Ukraine in Russia and Crimea. In particular, the Kerch Bridge, which is just newly opened and provides a ground transportation link with Russia to Crimea, was pointed out as a supposed target of the Ukrainian secret service. More than 70 Ukrainians (excluding those captured in Donbas) have been detained in Russia and accused of terrorism, spying and other forms of subversive activity. This is another clue to indicate that the Kremlin is playing a wider game. In the face of the actual (limited) capacity of Ukrainian secret service, such announcements look, to put it mildly, strange. One cannot rule out that it is a preparation for a provocation inspired by the FSB.

On the other hand, a more aggressive military approach is very risky for Moscow because the West could impose new sanctions. Full-scale aggression is also risky due to the possibility of a high number of casualties on the Russian side. At the same time there is no clear view on what might happen after armed clashes because Moscow does not possess the ability to occupy more Ukrainian territory. Due to the above, this scenario appears to be less likely. The only reason not to rule it out is the traditional unpredictability of the Russian authorities.

A much more likely scenario is the second scenario. It stipulates a war of attrition – low intensity military action in Donbas, terrorist acts in Ukraine, meddling in the political life of Ukraine including its elections, cyberattacks and a number of other elements of interference. According to this concept, Kyiv, sooner or later, will give up because of exhaustion and the Kremlin will make use of it by imposing its own approach to achieving peace in Donbas. The federalisation of Ukraine, or giving a special status for the territories, is the main goal of the Kremlin. Such “peace” would be worse than war.

Taking into account the position of the current Ukrainian authorities, this scenario cannot be implemented, at least before the next elections. Moscow counts on a new political landscape in Ukraine by the end of 2019. A stronger position of the Opposition Bloc party (with former members of Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions), the pro-Russian Za Zhyttia party in parliament and the presidency of Yulia Tymoshenko might open new prospects for Russia. Tymoshenko, whose chances of being elected look promising, was always prone to cut a deal with the Kremlin in the past and will probably continue down this path. Officially, Tymoshenko may support “finishing the war and regaining control of Donbas”, but, in reality, she might try to implement the Russian vision of solving the Donbas conflict for personal gain. It is very likely that such attempts will lead to a strong response from the Ukrainian public. This will automatically create a series of new political conflicts in the country and radicalise the internal agenda. Thus, the upcoming elections will certainly increase Moscow’s chances of achieving its goals against Kyiv.

The war between Russia and Ukraine is scheduled to last for a long time and there is no place for compromise. In fact, there might be only one winner and loser, making it a zero sum game. Any compromise, if achieved, will be done at the expense of the national interest of Ukraine. More than four years since the conflict, the axiom that characterises the Russian-Ukrainian war has not changed: the key to solving the Donbas problem is located in Moscow. Kyiv can only make efforts to reinforce itself and exhaust the Kremlin’s warlike eagerness.

Paweł Kost is an Experts Council member at Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies in Kyiv and a permanent contributor to Nowa Europa Wschodnia and Defence24.pl.

conflict, Donbas, reconciliation, Ukraine