New separatisms. Or what could happen if the West disappeared from Eastern Europe?

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

The legend and semblance of the rebel, which acts against a deeply conserved and outdated order, has now been taken up by Russia. In this role the Kremlin tries to disrupt, if not destroy (which is impossible), the systems that were established by the West. Russia can only abuse this order because it knows, all too well, that compared to the West its resources and capacities are limited. However, it has proved that revolutionary tactics suit it perfectly well. In the eyes of those who are not particularly happy with the western order, Russia plays the same role now that the West played in the past.

Apostle of freedom

While Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were hammering the Soviet Union – which was already on the edge of collapse – Russia tried to respond by taking action against the states created by the West. It managed to break Transnistria away from Moldova (together with the majority Russian-speaking population), and almost succeeded in doing the same in Gagauzia. The latter is inhabited by the Turkish-speaking population whose ethnic flag was carried – just like in Transnistria – by the Russian-speaking “Soviet people”. They could not accept the Moldovan order and saw an embodiment of nationalism in the ethnic profile of the new state.

In Lithuania, Moscow tried to repeat the same scenario with regards to the Polish-speaking minority. However, the Polish National-Territorial Region, envisioned as an autonomous region in south eastern Lithuania that self-proclaimed in 1990, did not receive the Polish government’s support. At that time Poland was governed by the first non-communist elite, representing the more liberal wing of the former democratic opposition that adhered to western ideals. Yet, in Lithuania the Polish National-Territorial Region, which never gained much popularity in Poland, is still perceived as a missed opportunity of the pro-Russian, Polish minority.

In the 1990s, the West was the apostle of freedom for many in Eastern Europe. In the name of western ideals, countries like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia proclaimed their independence. Western values were also well received in the western parts of Ukraine, which became the engine for Ukraine’s independence. They also played a role in the former Yugoslavia when the Serbs first started interfering with some of the other Yugoslav republics which ultimately led Serb war crimes. The West stood against the Serbs, supporting the Bosniaks, Croats and later the Kosovo Albanians. 

In this way, the West played the role of the revolutionary, supporting the destruction of the existing order and the establishment of new independent states in place of the former Yugoslav federal republics. In the case of Kosovo, which was not a federal republic, the West had no choice but to support the separatists. Eventually, it recognised the Republic of Kosovo even though it was based on the excuse that Kosovo was a “special case”. Such statements were made with a heavy heart and it was probably expected that the Kosovo precedent would bring many problems for western institutions in the future. The West, however, refused to recognise other breakaway territories like Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and (at the time) Adjara. 

After having recognised Kosovo’s independence, the West hardened its position. It announced that no more “Pandora’s boxes” would be opened and no borders would change. Hence, Kosovo was not to be joined by the Serbian Preševo Valley (inhabited by Albanians), southern Montenegro or north-eastern Macedonia. Northern Kosovo, which is located north of the Ibar River and mostly inhabited by Serbs, was also to stay in Kosovo, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, created under western aegis, was not under any circumstances to be separated from its Serbian part, Republika Srpska – despite the fact that it hardly made any sense to maintain the status quo against the will of the majority of the populations living there.

Against Pax Occidentalis

When Russia recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence from Georgia, and when it annexed Crimea and supported the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics in Ukraine, it had everything prepared. By doing so it has gently suggested to Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo that if the need arises, it may also support their aspirations against Pax Americana (or more broadly, Pax Occidentalis).

Admittedly, the West makes it easy for the Kremlin in places like Central Europe, which is still one of the most important geopolitical games that Russia plays. Not only does the region condition the Kremlin’s position in its relations with the West, Russia is also deeply rooted here and it knows the context very well. Russia knows how it can damage western interests, despite its limited resources. Russia also understands the West’s weaknesses. It knows when it is best to hit, like when it made an offer to Budapest to help Hungary regain control over Ukraine’s Zakarpattia region (formerly Carpathian Ruthenia) which has a significant Hungarian minority.

Russia recognises the Hungarian humiliation still felt since the 1920 Trianon Treaty that was imposed by the West and deprived Hungary a significant part of the territory (including Zakarpattia). Consequently, Hungary lost its strong position in Central Europe. Russia also knows that anyone who manages to reverse (even to a small degree) the effects of Trianon will be seen in Hungary as a saviour on a white horse. Naturally, it is also acutely aware of the separatist tendencies in Zakarpattia. They are both pro-Russian and pro-Hungarian. Thus, the proposal addressed to Hungarians to “partition” Ukraine at a time when Ukraine was struggling to keep its pro-western vector was a genius move.

However, not all of Russia’s hits are well targeted. Russia misfired when it allegedly offered Poland a chunk of western Ukraine. With this proposal, the Kremlin did not take into account the fact that in Poland nostalgia for its former territories in the East (Kresy) is much weaker than assumed. It also plays no role in Poland’s foreign policy.

But there have been successful hits. One clear example can be seen in Republika Srpska where the majority of Serbs do not want to share a state with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina is made up of two entities that do not have much in common, yet this is the system imposed on it by the West. The West, in turn, demands that before Bosnia is generously accepted to the European table, something unlikely must happen, namely unification. Russia is more realistic in this regards. It knows that unification cannot take place under the current circumstances. It also knows that even if there would be some kind of miraculous, peaceful co-existence between the two entities of the federation, it would mean stagnation and a blunt existence. Thus by supporting Bosnia’s division, Russia guarantees itself a permanent foot in the European doorway, all against the West’s well-intentioned, albeit completely unrealistic, plan.

The situation is quite similar in Northern Kosovo. Kosovo Serbs, whose territory borders Serbia proper, do not understand why they should be living in a state that is ethnically and religiously foreign (and often hostile) to them, and not within the borders of their own homeland. From their point of view, they are forced into this situation for an abstract reason. The Serbian-Kosovo border was marked along old administrative borders that did not depict any real ethnic relations in the region. Thus, in Northern Kosovo Russia is viewed again as a country that can give support and hope.

In Macedonia, Russia supports right-wing parties. The EU, which is more attractive for the country than Russia, does not fully understand the complexities of Macedonia’s identity issues. Macedonia has a tense relationship with Greece (a member of both the EU and NATO) which has blocked its access to the West for some delusional reasons related to the country’s name. What is more, Russia recognises Macedonians’ fear related to the growing number of Albanians settling there. 

Serbia, currently whipped and constantly preached to by the West, experienced a sense of humiliation. A move to join the EU is often seen there as a sad necessity. The pro-European left and liberal narrative is interpreted as being self-serving – this is not just the opinion of a paranoid political right. Russia understands Serbia and skilfully nudges the areas that divide Serbs and the West.

Double standards

Treating Eastern Europe as a problem and questioning whether it was a good idea to let the countries of the former Eastern bloc join the West only reinforces the Russian narrative. The liberal and leftist, pro-Western circles in Eastern Europe (yes, we still have them here; in fact, the highest support for populist parties in countries like Poland is at a similar level to France or the Netherlands) know very well that they need the West. It is thanks to the West that countries in this region can reach the economic and modernisation goals they desire.

However, from the point of view of Eastern Europeans it is easy to see that the West employs double standards. This is evident by the fact that far-right groups in Western Europe are devalued, while similar groups in Central and Eastern Europe are used to argue “disappointment” and emphasise the presence of widespread racism in the region. Such indictments are launched without much examination of the root causes behind the current situation; and if continued it could inevitably lead to a collapse of the European project as a whole. The latter, if it happens, will not be just the West’s fault. It will be strongly aided by the Kremlin’s narrative.

Looking at European matters from the perspective of “what can the East give to the West” is a naïveté. The East is a periphery while the West is a centre. Thus, the right approach to a partnership-based common Europe – assuming the West does not want to lose Central and Eastern Europe – should be based on supporting the periphery’s drift towards the centre. This support should especially go to sensible economic initiatives that would allow Eastern European states to pursue their own forms of development. Only by doing this will the West stop adding more fuel to local populists and the Kremlin.

Without the West?

What would the region look like if the West withdrew from the region – both militarily and politically? In lieu of the West, comes Russia. This spectre is permanently haunting the region. It may not be the most powerful one but it is a significant one nonetheless. Certainly, Russia would allow Serbia to take northern parts of Kosovo; it would aid the collapse of Bosnia and encourage Republika Srpska to join Belgrade. The remaining parts of Bosnia, Kosovo and probably Albania would turn into artificially maintained countries located on the region’s periphery, which would remain in constant peril. Russia would turn a blind eye to the pacification of Albanians by Macedonia.

Without the West, the Kremlin could even back Hungarians against Romania, which is (like Poland) a traditional supporter of the West and unfriendly towards Russia. The Hungarian minority, especially the Székelys who live in Transylvania, could start demanding autonomy. In the new geopolitical context, they could even start talking about independence and a return to Hungary. Russia would most likely support these demands. While it is unclear which side Russia would support in a dispute between Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia, it is certain that the Kremlin would exploit the Hungarian minorities in those countries in order for them to act as satellites. In this scenario Hungary and Serbia (who currently happen to be friends, Serbia’s Vucić and Hungary’s Orbán have a model-like friendship) are geopolitically doomed for conflict, if they are to be governed by nationalists. The same could be said about Poland and Ukraine.  

Should the populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) come to power at the time as the West withdraws from Eastern Europe, German irredentism could become an issue in Poland’s western parts. Such a move would probably be backed by Russia, which would, most likely, have a decent relationship with an AfD government. It is of course difficult, if not impossible, to imagine Germany claiming these territories, yet it should not be ruled out that the issue could be used to generate tension with Poland.

Eastern Europe may not always feel the most comfortable with the West. Yet without it, things would look much worse. This is the most important point to understand, but it is also important that the West, while playing its games with the East, should remember not to shoot itself (or us) in the foot.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Ziemowit Szczerek is a Polish writer and journalist. He is the author of numerous books on Eastern and Central Europe. His recent book Międzymorze (Intermarium) was published in 2017.

Balkans, Central Europe, separatism