Georgia’s separatist regions at a standstill

A member of the European Union Monitor Mission points towards Tskhinvali, the regional capital of South Ossetia and across the Russian-guarded administrative boundary line. Photo: International Crisis Group (CC) www.flickr.com

When your homeland is at your fingertips

Shavshvebi, a settlement for internally displaced persons from South Ossetia, is located in central Georgia just off the main road from Tbilisi to Gori. It was built in 2009 by the Georgian government with international support. It currently houses around 600 people. Forced to flee the war-torn South Ossetia in 2008, refugees found shelter in Georgia. Standing at the edge of Shavshvebi they can see the Ossetian border, the area they had to flee and the communities they left behind. Meanwhile, in the western part of Georgia, internally displaced people from Abkhazia live a one or two hour-ride away from the homes they left in 1993. The traces of bullets in the ruins of abandoned Abkhazian homes are still visible. Here, it seems like the war ended yesterday, rather than 25 years ago.

The 2008 Russian-Georgian war brought not only military but also civilian casualties. It left the local infrastructure in ruin and sparked a humanitarian crisis. The reception of large numbers of refugees was a challenge for Georgia, which was logistically unprepared for such a large-scale exodus. To address the situation, Georgia housed refugees in old and abandoned schools, hospitals and hotels that, with time, became uninhabitable. The camp in Shavshvebi, for instance, is composed of 177 two-bedroom houses and small gardens where people can plant their own vegetables and fruits, which is often their only source of sustenance. Rows of red-roofed houses are attached to the cropland line. The streets are named after the villages which the refugees left behind. Yet, people can recognise their villages even without street signs. Children have to walk four kilometres to school. Only some families can afford to pay for a minibus which transports the children to a nearby town. The only place where the local children can spend their free time, participate in after school activities and study, is Casa della Nonna. This place emphasises psychological rehabilitation for the children affected by post-war trauma. Several teachers from Tbilisi come to Shavshvebi three times a week to work with the kids.

The Shavshvebi residents are financially supported by the Georgian state. Each individual receives around 48 Georgian lari a month (about 20 US dollars). When the camp was first built, the government covered utilities like electricity and gas. As resources depleted, the residents had to start covering the costs themselves. Some of them could not afford to pay and electricity and gas was shut off. The biggest problem in the community is unemployment which affects up to 95 per cent of the residents. Household duties, breeding cows, pigs, hens and gardening have become the residents’ main occupation.

Older residents of Shavshvebi remain faithful to their Ossetian traditions. However, the youngest generation – those who were born in Georgia – feel little connection with South Ossetia. At first, it was believed that life in the camp was temporary and that they would eventually return to their homes. Now the refugees are certain that they will never see their homes again. In some way, the Shavshvebi camp is a reflection of Georgia’s misery. Born out of the war with Russia, the settlement now illustrates the impasse in the tense relations between Georgia and both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In both cases, Russia has supported the separatist enclaves financially and militarily and seems to be the only true beneficiary of the situation. Meanwhile, the affected communities on both sides of the conflict are immersed in grief, and experience economic, social and psychological trauma.

No end in sight

One could say that the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus resemble a hurricane. They begin abruptly with a destructive vortex of rotating episodes of violence and then after everything calms down, the situation stalls for many years. The lingering stabilising negotiations result in political declarations but without any effective solution. The situation teeters until a new hurricane comes along, triggering new fighting. 

The roots of the conflict between the republics and Georgia date back to the early 20th century. In 1918 Georgia proclaimed its independence which led to unrest in both regions as they refused to function as autonomous republics within independent Georgia. Over the years, the ruling elite in Tbilisi sought to suppress the separatist aspirations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The growing ethnic tensions, fuelled by an emerging national identity in the republics, led to the outbreak of two wars and their eventual separation from Georgia in the early 1990s.

South Ossetia, located in the Tskhinvali region northeast of Georgia, separated from Georgia following a violent conflict in 1991-1992. Both sides agreed to a Russian-mediated ceasefire. The Kremlin sent its soldiers to the region and offered Russian passports to ethnic Ossetians. The escalation of the conflict occurred in the evening of August 7th 2008 when Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of launching artillery attacks. A new war, known as the Five Day War (or the August War), flared up. As a result, Russian forces launched air strikes the following day on Georgia and moved troops to occupy the bulk of South Ossetia. The war ended on August 12th. According to the Kremlin, Russia intervened in the conflict to protect South Ossetia’s citizens (many of whom were Russian citizens) from Georgian forces.

Abkhazia, another de facto state in the region, separated from Georgia after the 1992-1993 war. It was followed by ethnic unrest between Georgians – the main ethnic group in the region – and the Abkhaz – the titular ethnicity. Following the war, Georgia faced an influx of close to 220,000 refugees from Abkhazia. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia attended Geneva peace conferences with Georgia which has created a platform for talks between the warring parties. However, establishing the format appears to be the only accomplishment of the negotiations. The international community largely supports Georgia’s territorial integrity but currently there are few parties seeking to overcome the long-term impasse.

Nevertheless, the initiative has been denounced by the Abkhazian side. For them, there is no alternative but Georgia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia.

In December 2009 the European Union adopted the Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP) and international engagement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia substantially decreased over the years. NREP is a twin-pillar policy: on the one hand, it assumes non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence; but on the other, it seeks to engage with both regions. It aims to create a legal and political space that would allow the EU to interact with the breakaway territories, at the same time acknowledging Georgia’s right to its territorial integrity.

In the wake of the 2008 war, Russia and a handful of other states (Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru) recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a result, both separatist regions are classified as partially recognised. In addition, on April 18th 2017, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov opened an embassy in Sukhumi (the capital city of Abkhazia). There is a popular belief, especially among Russia’s critics, that the 2008 war with Georgia was a rehearsal for the Kremlin prior to both the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent war in Donbas in eastern Ukraine.

Managing the present

The year 2017 marked the 25th anniversary of the Georgian-Abkhaz war (1992-1993), and this coming August it will be a decade since the 2008 war in South Ossetia. The political and economic conditions in the breakaway Abkhazia – but also in South Ossetia – create the potential for further crises which mainly have to do with a decline of financing from Russia. Moscow has been struggling with its own economic woes which have forced it to drastically lower financial support for the breakaway regions.

In addition, the failing Abkhaz state system has caused serious frustration among the local population. The first and the second post-war generation often have relatively poor education and, in most cases, few ideas on how the para-state should function. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are largely dependent on Russia economically, militarily and institutionally. With an underdeveloped industry, the republics rely on the Kremlin’s investments. The economy of both republics is further exacerbated due to poor development of small businesses and high unemployment.

After the August 2008 war, Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was followed by a large scale militarisation of both regions. It is estimated that there are now around 4,500-5,000 Russian soldiers stationed in each territory. In South Ossetia, Russia has one soldier for every eighth resident. Moscow established several military bases (including one in Largvisi) built in the mountainous part of the Akhalgori region of South Ossetia. Vladimir Putin has adopted a decree that allows some of the South Ossetian troops to be incorporated into the Russian army. Georgian authorities have claimed that such a move was a step towards de-facto annexation of South Ossetia.

On March 18th 2015 the Kremlin signed the Treaties on Alliance and Integration with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Then, in July 2017, following the meeting between Lavrov and his South Ossetian counterpart, Dmitry Medoyev, to discuss the treaty-related agreements, Russia sent more troops – about 700 soldiers – to its military bases in Abkhazia and Armenia. The Abkhaz troops completed tactical exercises with a Russian battalion permanently stationed on its territory.  Politically, official visits between Putin and the leaders of the de facto states have become a regular practice. In November 2017 Anatoly Bibilov, the South Ossetian president, discussed bilateral co-operation with Russia and received assurances that the country will ensure military and border security of the para-state.  

Alongside presidential elections in South Ossetia on April 9th 2017, the para-state organised a referendum on changing its name to Alania, after the medieval Caucasian kingdom. Nearly 80 per cent of voters supported the change. On December 29th 2016 Leonid Tibilov, who won the April 2017 presidential election, explained that the renaming of the breakaway territory to South Ossetia-Alania would lay the groundwork for unification with the Russian North Ossetia-Alania. Ossetians seem to support the idea.

Creeping occupation

Russia continues to erect barbed wire further into Georgian territory, drawing a new boundary at the expense of the latter. Moving the occupation line has not been a one-off act. In July 2017 Russian troops moved the South Ossetian boundary hundreds of metres into Georgia. By doing so they deprived a local resident of 20 hectares of his land. A similar case was reported in January 2017. Many people in the South Ossetian-Georgian borderland found their homes not only fenced off with barbed wire, but also no longer part of Georgian control. Some gardens were sliced in half, leaving the house and the land on different sides of the demarcation. People have been separated from their relatives and friends and some cut off from electricity or gas supplies. Local people fear both Russian re-extension of the border and an oncoming war.

Residents of the borderland still experience the consequences of the August 2008 war. Over the past number of years, Georgian citizens have been detained and accused by Ossetian forces of “illegal entry” to their lost pastures or fields. Such actions affect younger generations of Ossetians who do not know Georgians at all. They are growing up in the belief of ethnic hostility and with no memories of the good days of peaceful co-existence. Georgian officials, non-government organisations and ordinary citizens have expressed their indignation, and have protested against moving the borderline. Georgia’s President, Giorgi Margvelashvili, has called Russia’s actions a “creeping occupation”. The minister of reconciliation and civil equality, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, prefers to name it a “very open and dynamic occupation process” that has been progressing since the August 2008 war.

The European Union Monitoring Mission’s (EUMM) team, which patrols the so-called administrative boundary line with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, confirm that the line has moved forward, seizing locals’ farmland. They believe that Russia is using a 1984 Soviet military map to redraw the border. Violating another state’s territorial integrity is a well-known tactic of Russia’s aggressive policy. Moscow’s actions in the South Ossetian-Georgian borderland are yet another example of the Kremlin’s expanding presence in the Caucasus region.

At the same time, none of the breakaway territories has any intention to go back under Georgian rule. Despite ceasefire agreements in place, the Kremlin continues to support heavy militarisation of both para-states with the consent of the separatist political elite. All of this is in violation of the principles of international law. Russia’s involvement thus remains the primary obstacle in regulating the relations between the para-states and Georgia. The moderate interest of the international community in solving the conflicts, however, and the relatively weak position of Georgia further impinge the prospects for the future stabilisation of the region.

But there is light at the end of the tunnel. In 2018 Georgian authorities have launched the “Step to a Better Future” programme – a comprehensive plan aimed at facilitating trade and encouraging relations with populations of both breakaway territories. The peace initiative also simplifies the procedures for students from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to enrol in Georgian educational institutions. Most importantly, the initiative will involve changes to the Law on Occupied Territories, however, no details have been revealed yet.

Agnieszka Tomczyk is a PhD candidate in the Department of Eastern Studies at the University of Warsaw.

Abkhazia, Georgia, South Ossetia