Eurasia and geopolitical thought

Perhaps the best examples of theories that have come under such attack are the geopolitical theses of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations? (1993) and Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Criticism of both Huntington and Fukuyama focuses on the manner in which they blithely discuss whole nations and apparent civilisations in simple and reductionist terms. Within this context, it is surprising to find the Portuguese political scientist, Bruno Macaes, pen a book on a similar subject matter.

Macro vs micro analysis

One reason why accusations of orientalism or essentialism are overblown with respect to geopolitical analysis is that we can distinguish between macro and micro analysis – where the former concerns large-scale phenomena and the latter concerns local phenomena. For example, a macro analysis would concern things such as the economic output, how education is organised and the mortality rate of a nation. Micro analysis concerns how specific groups or individuals operate and function. Knowing that the economy of the United Kingdom is service-oriented (macro), tells us nothing about how a particular person lives his or her life (micro). Of course, there are instances where the macro analysis can be expressed in an example of a micro phenomenon (e.g., on average Germans work longer hours than their French counterparts). The key here is to think about what mode of analysis is appropriate to the subject at hand. Although both Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s theses were wrong, I do not believe it was inappropriate for them to have concerned themselves with macro analysis. Indeed, notions such as the future of Europe and the rise of China are appropriate insofar as we are conscious that these discussions will not allow us to know concrete things about this or that European or Chinese individual.

A second reason is that although the concept of grand strategy is in decline, it is nonetheless important and has profound implications. The problematic aspect of Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s theses was that they reduced their analysis largely to culture. In the clash of civilisations, what was implied was that the modus operandi of the Islamic World is rooted in a set of values which are incompatible with the values that underpin the West (this thus leads to conflict, aka the clash). What the end of history concept implied is that the value and governance system of liberal democracies was the pinnacle that the rest of humanity will eventually attain. Although culture is a foundational concept, with respect to conflict between parties and societal progress, what is by far the most important factor is economics. As Turkey’s former prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, argued in 1997 (he was then a professor of international relations), all of the (future) points of conflict alluded to by Huntington are locations of energy and security significance. Conflict is identified as likely because there are significant material and strategic benefits to be had and not because two sets of cultural values collide. This is a macro analysis; one that is surely justified. Speaking in terms of  grand strategy is thus appropriate as long as the priority of causation is fully fleshed out.

A third reason why accusations of orientalism or essentialism are overblown is that this is a particularly acute time for geopolitical discussions. It is no surprise that Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s texts were written in the early 1990s. The collapse of the bipolar world, as symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall, precipitated a new form of imagining. The triumphalism of the capitalist bloc has now given way to a world where Russia has re-emerged and Chinese economic power looks set to take centre stage. Indeed, in addition to considering these major developments, clear European strategy and analysis is in dire need. Typified by crisis, the European Union seems to function as an accident and emergency room for injuries which they can patch up but not pre-empt.   

Multiple modernities

Macaes’s central thesis in The Dawn of Eurasia is that the most fruitful means by which to analyse entities such as Russia, China and Europe is to think of them as parts of the same system. He writes that “We have entered the second age of globalisation … giving rise to a permanently unstable compound of heterogeneous elements”. The Eurasian age is to be analysed through the forces of culture and economics and is to be thought of as principally dominated by three models: the Euro-model (based upon the authority of law and thereby institutional integration), the Russian-model (based upon the authority of the rulers and absolute domestic autonomy) and the Chinese-model (based upon economic penetration achieved by being part of, and thereby benefiting from, the Chinese export market). These are indeed different models and Macaes is correct in identifying the interdependency of these blocs within the proposed supercontinent.

There are good economic reasons in support of Macaes’s basic thesis as well: the rise of China as chief exporter; the United States’ move towards isolationism; and the relative dominance of Asian developing economies in contrast to those of Africa and South America. This dynamic can and most certainly will change with time; however the significant economic shift is occurring primarily within the Eurasian sphere. Unlike economics, cultural factors are more nuanced. Although Europe is still the primary model of development (in economic terms), the extent to which emulating European economic achievements translates into cultural emulation is questionable. Macaes notes that there will be multiple modernities, which reflect the cultures and imaginations of particular nations. But what does this mean: Westernisation? Europeanisation? Can piecemeal modernisation occur? Can an alternative model achieve great cultural and economic success? How is success judged? Although Macaes alludes to these issues, he does not offer a sustained discussion. He neither defines what is meant by multiple modernities nor does he discuss the notion of competing universalism, which can be read in terms of the macro notions of political, legal and commercial structures.

Similarly, when discussing “The New Eurasian Supercontinent”, Macaes states that “[n]o society wants to think of itself as a copy. If granted the freedom to do so, we all desire to carve out our own paths on earth, a truth equally applicable to individuals and political societies.” This is all very well, but it reads more as a platitude than as serious insight. We can think of civilisations as growing and evolving within their own traditions or we can think of a kind of race where one civilisation passes the baton to the next (e.g. Arabic civilisation passing on empiricism to Southern European). Moreover, we can think of cases where a society entirely models itself economically on a foreign model but is culturally distinct, like Japan. The Dawn of Eurasia would have been greatly enhanced by exploration of these threads.

The new Silk Road

After the theoretical discussion the reader is invited to travel between Istanbul and Beijing. “Chinese Dreams” is perhaps the most significant chapter of the book, with two noteworthy points of discussion. The first is economic. Macaes describes how the Chinese are structuring their economy by “focusing on certain segments of a given value chain”. It is extremely interesting and consequential to know how China is, in effect, outsourcing lower value industry to peripheral nations from which they can import and focus on higher value export return industries. Such outsourcing requires deep political and economic strategic thinking. This highlights the Belt and Road corridor between the East and the West, a new silk road starting in Beijing and ending in London. This initiative is perhaps the most symbolic indicator for the Eurasian age.

The second noteworthy point is Macaes’s thoughts on the philosophical/psychological underpinning of Chinese political thought and how this compares to European thinking. He claims there is “a radical difference between the European and the Chinese schemas of action”, where, “Europeans conceive an ideal model … which they then try to execute … finding a way to bridge the distance between model and reality”, which is in comparison to the Chinese who react to changing events as they come along. The above is symptomatic of false thinking on Macaes’s part. For one, to summarise European and Chinese philosophy in this way is an anathema to all historians of philosophy. This is where Macaes veers closest to being cut down by the accusations of essentialism. Considering European philosophy, the tradition is far too varied to speak in this way. Macaes’s intuition may be salvaged if he referred to modern German philosophy and then argue that by European what we really mean is Germanic. This is viable, given the force with which German philosophy and the current economic reality is dictating Europe in terms of major policies and the political economy.

However, even with this there are significant problems. Firstly, the globalist nature of European economics is surely more to do with the legacy of the merchant empires, the British being most dominant. With respect to British philosophy, we would be far safer in characterising it as empiricist (experience first) and as such Macaes’s notion is compromised. Secondly, the idea of the Chinese as pragmatists, by highlighting  how they have gone about building political loyalties and investments, surely does not stand up to the remarkable manner in which the Chinese have planned and subsequently executed their world vision over a period of decades. There is a clear propensity to theorise and then work pragmatically to achieve a particular end. Indeed, it is remarkable just how deep and strategic the Chinese have been. Nonetheless, exploring the psycho-philosophical underpinnings of the particular nation-blocks  is vital to understanding the notion of Eurasia.

Snapshot

Macaes is at his strongest and most insightful when discussing Europe. Drawing upon his experience as minister for Europe, he shows how a curious and intelligent insider can reflect upon his or her own condition vis-à-vis the exploration of the other. Eurasia functions here as a prism and, indeed, Macaes presents quite a bleak analysis of the European project. He asserts that “automation is the genuine core of the European Union”, which can be understood in dystopian ways. He describes how in practice the EU moves from crisis to crisis. He tells us that the EU is a “precision mechanism that needs perfect environmental conditions to work well, so every significant disturbance from the outside grinds it to a halt”. This is a perfectly apt analogy and one we see confirmed time and time again (e.g. the debt and migrant crises). Prescriptively, Macaes asserts that “[t]he EU needs to become a stronger political agent … to extend its influence outside its boundaries, manage the flows across the borderlands and work for a peaceful future Eurasia”. Although this may be what the EU needs, it is precisely because European coherence is allusive and unlikely possible in anything like its current form that the project will profoundly falter.

The Dawn of Eurasia serves as a good introduction for students of politics while scholars will be interested in Macaes’s psychological insights into European political thinking. Indeed, non-European policy and strategic thinkers will benefit for precisely this reason. There is, of course, no substitute for historical and sustained reading. Indeed, a glaring problem in Macaes’s comments is the lack of any reflection upon the internal dynamics of non-European nations and blocs. Russia, China, Turkey, and so forth are themselves going through indeterminate change and although their current political structures provide a snapshot, they do not provide us with any real insight into where they may be in 20 years’ time. As such, Macaes provides us with a picture of a moving object, without discussing the limits of drawing conclusions from a still image itself. 

Emre Kazim has a PhD in Philosophy from King’s College London and is the author of the recently published book Kant on Conscience: A unified approach to moral self-consciousness.

Book review, Bruno Macaes, Eurasia