Russia’s Middle East crusade

Mission accomplished. Vladimir Putin’s unexpectedly visit the Khmeimim air base in Syria resembled that of a victory parade. Photo: en.kremlin.ru (CC)

Although many had warned that Syria may become a Russian Vietnam, the prophecy failed to materialise. The Russia- and Iran-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad is not only as strong as ever, but the international community has been forced to revisit their attitude towards the Syrian leader.

Robin Wright, in a piece for the New Yorker, claimed that the White House is ready to accept Assad at least until 2021, when the next presidential election will take place in Syria. His departure is no longer the necessary condition for the end of the crisis. Today, he seems to be the only alternative for Syria. Thus, on the diplomatic level, the Russian authorities have achieved their main goal.

 The homeland is waiting for you, friends

During the visit, Putin addressed Russian soldiers and military staff standing at attention at the airport upon his arrival. He announced that a large part of the contingent will return to Russia. “In two years, the Russian armed forces, together with the Syrian army, have defeated the most lethal group of international terrorists”, Putin proclaimed. He emphasised the role that the soldiers played in defending Syrian statehood and civilians and, above all, managing to defeat those who posed a “direct threat” to Russia. Putin also declared that the victims and sacrifices made in the “war on terror here, in Syria, and back in Russia” will never be forgotten. He admitted that no one is going to lay down arms and take a step back – as that is not the nature of the Russian nation. “The homeland is waiting for you, friends. Enjoy your trip! Thank you for your service”, the Russian president concluded.

The decision was immediate and soon after the first round of soldiers and staff members returned to Russia. Putin, in his own style, approached the pilots and asked if they were satisfied with the military equipment. They reassured the president that they had no reasons to complain. Then they posed together for a picture.

In the coverage of the event, the Zvezda TV channel, operated by the Russian ministry of defence, stressed that over the past two years the Russian operation had achieved the impossible. Assad’s flailing regime, which controlled a small part of Syria, regained control over the majority of the country. The report acknowledged that there is still a long way ahead for Syria to overcome the crisis, as the country is still divided between different ethnic and religious groups. However, it also made clear that Putin holds the solution: peace talks under the auspices of Iran, Russia and Turkey.

The report failed to mention, however, that this was the second time Putin announced a partial withdrawal of troops from Syria. The first declaration came in February 2016 when the coalition managed to stabilise Assad and his regime’s position. Syrian troops, with the support of Iran and Russia, regained control over Palmyra – located 215 kilometres northeast of Damascus – and eastern Aleppo, the second largest city in Syria.

The Russian ministry of defence never disclosed the official number of soldiers and staff sent to Syria. According to some estimates, there are at least 4,300 people involved in the mission there. Apart from the official contingent, there is also an unofficial one made up of private contractors. The St Petersburg-based Fontanka website estimates that this invisible contingent may include up to 1,500 soldiers. Since 2015 even twice as many could have served within its ranks. These troops have not been called back by president Putin and will most likely continue to take care of securing strategic objects – above all Syria’s gas and oil fields.

Source of Russian success

Russia has gained room for manoeuvre in large part thanks to American policy. Since the beginning of the 21st century US activity in the Middle East can be seen as a series of failures. In 2003 the US invasion plunged Iraq into a crisis from which the country has been unable to recover. After the Syrian revolution broke out in 2011, the White House and the Pentagon were uncertain about which factions of the Syrian opposition to support and how. This ambivalence continued and the moderates completely lost their ground in the conflict. Some of them were defeated and others joined fundamentalist groups such as Jabhat an-Nusra and the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which had access to better equipment and finances. Only within their ranks was a real fight against Assad’s regime plausible.

The US only began to support the Kurds and Arab militias in 2014. Thanks to US aid from the air, land and sea, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a coalition of Kurdish and Arab militias – recaptured vast territories in northern and eastern Syria from the hands of ISIS. Ar-Raqqa, the capital of the self-proclaimed caliphate, as well as the Omar oilfield and the Koniko gasfield in the Deir ez-Zor province have been among their most recent strategic gains. Nonetheless, many experts believe the US lacks a vision for a post-ISIS Syria.

President Donald Trump’s unstable sympathies and dithering declarations have not helped in terms of forming a clear strategy. On the one hand, he had ordered American bombers to conduct more aggressive strikes against ISIS. On the other hand he reportedly told Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, last November that he would withdraw support for Syrian Kurds. After this declaration, the future of the US strategy in Syria was shrouded by mystery. In the end, the Pentagon repeatedly denied the information and its spokesperson, Eric Pahon, told AFP: “We are going to maintain our commitment on the ground as long as we need to, to support our partners and prevent the return of terrorist groups.”

Pentagon representatives further announced that the mission in Syria had not been called off, but only altered in form. Heavy equipment and artillery will no longer be delivered, and what is already on the ground may be withdrawn. The international coalition would concentrate on supporting the police forces and security services. It has launched a training programme for the SDF border force, tasked with ensuring security on the frontiers of the Kurdish and Arab militia-controlled territory with Syria, Iraq and Turkey. For the moment, the border security force has 230 staff members, and with time their number should reach 30,000.

However, the distaste remains – especially the unstable decision-making process of the US can lead to further cuts at the least expected moment. This could then spark another crisis, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. After relatively stabilising the situation, a withdrawal of US support could benefit the anti-government forces trying to take control. In response, the Pentagon would again have to strengthen its contingent and thus prolong the chaos.

Failed mediation

Russia is aware of its limits, both financial and military, and for that reason is seeking allies. During its involvement, it has managed to build partnerships with Iran and Turkey, two regional powers. Peace talks in Astana were one of the first outcomes of this new alliance. The process has been ongoing since 2015, but thus far has borne little fruit. Eastern Ghouta, which is one of the de-escalation zones established as a result of the talks, is currently experiencing one of the worst humanitarian crises in the Syrian war. The situation is similar in the case of the Geneva talks under the auspices of the United Nations, which have been on the agenda since 2012. The ceasefires negotiated as a result of the talks have not been observed. Their failure, together with Russia’s resistance to western policies, contributed to the launching of a new format of negotiations.

One of the causes of the failure of both processes has been the lack of full representation of the warring sides. The representatives of the regime and the opposition did not want to sit down at the table with each other and they are still reluctant to do so. The Kurds were not even invited. This is because both Turkey and Iran are adamant against their participation. Ankara considers the biggest Kurdish political force – the Democratic Union Party (PYD) – as a faction of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been included on the list of terrorist organisations in Turkey, the EU and the US. However, omitting the Kurds may not last forever. It is hard to ignore a group which controls around one-fifth of Syria and consistently gains new territories.

Russia has been trying to break this impasse by inviting the Kurds to the talks. The Syrian National Dialogue Congress was meant to bring a new quality to the negotiations and give each side a chance to present their views. However, it turned out as always: the majority of the opposition groups boycotted the summit. One week before the meeting the Kurds refused to participate after Russia opened airspace in northern Syria for Turkish jets. They have been bombing the Afrin region since January 20th and the Kurds equally blame Russia and Turkey for the escalation. Hence, the summit turned out to be a failure and showed that Russia is incapable of moving beyond its alliances. It is regarded as a party to the conflict rather than a mediator – a role it would like to assume.

Varying interests

That is why, solving the conflict by diplomatic means may prove to be as difficult as the military solution. This is mainly because Iran and Turkey, like Russia, are militarily involved in Syria, and in the end it is Moscow that constitutes the common thread for each of these parties. Each of the states has its own interests. Iran supported the Alawite regime of Assad even before Moscow entered the game, and its main goal is to keep Assad in power. Apart from strengthening Iran’s influence in the region, the strategy aims to create a corridor which would grant Iran access to the Mediterranean Sea via Iraq.

Turkey, on the other hand, supports Assad’s opposition. Its goal, above all, is to fight the Kurds and prevent them from forming a cohesive territory in northern Syria. Turkey fears that the creation of a Kurdish region neighbouring its borders would further complicate the conflict with the Turkish Kurds, which has been taking place for over the past 30 years.

Tensions occur between the different sides and configurations. Erdoğan has made numerous critical comments about Assad and last December, during a joint conference with the Tunisian president, Beji Caid Essebsi, he used particularly harsh words: “Assad, I am saying this loud and clear, is a terrorist who spreads state terrorism.” He added that he does not see a place for Assad’s government in a post-war Syria.

Assad replied that the Turkish president has the Syrian nation’s blood on his hands. Regime representatives also stressed that Turkish forces in Syria are occupants, like the US, and will be asked to leave the country. It remains an open question whether, after crushing the opposition forces in Idlib and other parts of the country, the regime will go against the Turkish-backed militias. 

The lack of a clear stance on the Kurdish question by Assad further impinges the peace process. On the one hand, Assad invited them in the second half of 2017 to join the negotiations. On the other hand, in December he accused them of being traitors due to their co-operation with the Americans. Moreover, regime representatives stated a number of times that the Kurdish-controlled territories are in fact occupied and the Syrian army will soon claim them back. With such a high level of mutual grievances, it would be hard to expect the stabilisation of the country any time soon.

Regaining influence

Putin’s visit to Syria was only one of the many stops in the region – a sign that Russia is here to stay. Before landing at the Khmeimimair base in Syria, the Russian president went to Turkey. The fierce crisis, which erupted between the two countries back in November 2015, is a matter of the past, and ever since, Russian-Turkish relations have been improving. The crisis was a result of the Turkish army downing a Russian Su-24M fighter jet and the Russian pilot, who ejected, was killed by Turkmen fighters. In response, Turkey and Russia imposed sanctions on each other. Yet, Erdoğan and Putin put the matter behind them and embarked on greater co-operation in the region. However, what pushed Turkey even further towards Moscow was its conflict with the West following the unsuccessful coup in 2016. The increasingly authoritarian Turkish authorities responded with mass arrests of over 8,000 people and the dismissal of around 100,000 public sector employees. The purge affected not only the military, but also journalists, teachers and university professors. Since then Erdoğan has been gradually expanding his power and departing from democratic principles. Conservatism, religiosity and anti-revolutionary ideas helped him to find common ground with Putin.

Turkey – a NATO member – is also gradually building military ties with Russia from whom it buys military equipment. It was during the December visit that the two parties agreed that Turkey would buy the advanced S-400 missile defence system from Russia. After his visit to Syria, Putin met President Abdel Fattah El Sisi in Egypt, where Russians are planning to build Egypt’s first nuclear power plant. The multibillion-dollar contract would mark the beginning of reclaiming an old North African partner which, at the beginning of the 1970s, turned its back on co-operation with the Soviet Union in favour of NATO.

Return to global politics

In his new book, What is Russia up to in the Middle East? political analyst Dmitry Trenin argues that Russia wants more than just a strong position in the region. It wants to use its Middle East adventures in order to return to the first league of global players. During the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the beginning of the war in Donbas, Russia clearly ignored the voices of the West. The Middle East turned out to be the next key place where Moscow proved it was going against the current, according to Trenin, and was able to carve out its own path, despite geopolitical turbulence.

“Not only had Russia broke against the unspoken post–Cold War taboo on military operations without US consent, it also, for the first time, went beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union and inserted its military in the heart of the Middle East,” Trenin writes.

“Moreover, Russia has acted in support of a government that the United States considered illegitimate, and attacked the forces the US had armed, trained and funded. It was also the first time ever that Moscow and Washington found themselves directly participating in a war in the same country but on opposite sides. During the Cold War, whether in Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan, only one power was actually doing the fighting, while the other was active only indirectly.”

Apparently Russia has achieved its goal. It bolstered a regime with a poor reputation in the West and a weak position within Syria. If not for the support of Iran, and then Russia, Assad’s force would most likely have collapsed, or at least struggled to protect its last footholds (as the opposition does today). This does not mean, however, that Russia has achieved its goals once and for all. The crisis in Syria will certainly enter a new stage and it cannot be ruled out that Russia’s success today will translate into more problems tomorrow.

Translated by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska

Paweł Pieniążek is a Polish journalist based in Syria. He has reported on the protests in Russia, the Ukrainian EuroMaidan revolution, the war in Donbas, the refugee crisis, and the Kurds’ fight against the Islamic State. His book, Greetings from Novorossiya, was recently published in English.

middle east, Russia, syria