How Russia could leave Crimea

Meeting in support of Crimea’s annexation. Photo: (CC) en.kremlin.ru

Yet, the current regime will not last forever. Once Putin’s successor comes to power, leaving Crimea – after exiting Donbas – will become a necessity due to the need for foreign investments and economic development. Since the annexation, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia fell from 53.4 billion dollars in 2013 to 37.7 billion dollars in 2016. In 2015 Russia recorded its lowest level of FDI – a mere 11.9 billion dollars. At the same time, up to 70 per cent of FDI in Russia consists of redirected domestic money, which is siphoned from the country through off-shore accounts and then reinvested back into Russia. Moreover, Russian exports have also fallen from 521.8 billion dollars in 2013 to 281.7 billion dollars in 2016. This all shows that the annexation has played a significant role in damaging the Russian economy which is now struggling with growth and development. Therefore, Russia’s withdrawal from Crimea should become necessary for European and American investors to regain trust in the country.

Viable model for modernisation?

In the 20th century, Russia’s most important achievements in the area of modernisation were thanks in part to German and American technologies acquired on the basis of the 1922 Rapallo Treaty. Supplies from the United States between 1941 and 1945, on the basis of the Lend-Lease Act, added further support for its transformation into the modern era. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union had appropriated a significant share of technology and industrial equipment (captured or stolen) during the Cold War. Soviet power was also derived as a result of totalitarian violence against millions of its citizens and high oil and gas prices between 1960 and 1980s. In the 2000s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was able to rely on petrodollars due to high energy prices and western hopes that a modern Russia would lead to a democratic one. This model, however, is a matter of the past.

In the 21st century post-Soviet era, before the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s access to western technologies and capital was already becoming limited due to grand corruption and the bad institutional environment. Starting in 2014, the country experienced a significant slowdown in foreign investments. In the communications industry, for example, Russia has been unable to develop and produce new communication satellites due to limited co-operation with the leading European manufacturers.

One has to wonder whether any Russian leadership which replaces Vladimir Putin will see the need to solve the problem of Crimea in order to restore this access. Even now, maintaining the peninsula is costing Russia billions of dollars annually. While Russian society might support the annexation, there may come a time when it realises that the cost of sustaining its presence there is too high. Moreover, from a legal point of view, the Russian constitution acknowledges the primacy of international law over Russian national law. This means it would be relatively easy to argue that the annexation of Crimea and all the laws related to the new status of the peninsula are reversible since they contradict international law.

Lastly, economic development and prosperity, within the framework of national and international law, should be in the interest of Russian society. Making a de-occupation of Crimea as peaceful as possible would therefore be politically desirable in a post-Putin era. However, the international community first needs to determine and propose a diplomatically acceptable de-occupation formula.

A trusteeship council

Should a post-Putin Russia decide that the costs of keeping Crimea are too high, there are some international models already in place that could facilitate a reverse of the annexation. The United Nations involvement in diplomatic negotiations with Russia would be a necessary condition for the country’s withdrawal. Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, of course, and thus its aggression against Ukraine has also affected its reputation on the council. For the sake of international peace and security, this reputation would first have to be restored. Moreover, UN involvement would allow the new post-Putin Russian authorities to save face and make the process less harmful for domestic politics – as a significant proportion of the Russian public is conservative and, at least currently, supports of the annexation.

The UN Trusteeship Council – which operated between 1945 and 1994 and consisted of the permanent members of the UN Security Council voting on the basis of a simple majority – could be restored to facilitate the de-occupation. The Council’s role was to grant trusteeship over a given territory to the states that have been mostly involved in a dispute. For example, between 1947 and 1960 Italy exercised trusteeship over its former colony, Italian Somalia. While the council worked as a tool of decolonisation, its immanent goals were to enable the state’s peaceful withdrawal from the territory and establish institutions of self-governance in Somalia. Thereby it created conditions for self-determination of the people living on the territory. The Trusteeship Council could be adapted for the purposes of Russia’s withdrawal from Crimea without significant changes in procedures.

However, trusteeships are always temporary. In the end, the territories under the trusteeship either gain independence or decide to become a part of another state. A good example of such a process was Cameroon under the French and British rule. The northern part of the country, under the British administration, joined Nigeria while its southern part joined Cameroon, which became an independent entity in 1960 after the French trusteeship ceased.

According to Article 77 of the UN Charter, territories may be voluntarily placed under the system of trusteeship by states responsible for their administration. That means Crimea could be placed under trusteeship by Russia which currently controls and administers the peninsula. It also means that Russia could exercise trusteeship over Crimea during the transition period. This option seems to be favourable for Russia and it requires a significant concession from Ukraine. The latter would have to agree with Russia’s trusteeship over the peninsula until the de-occupation process is completed. The Crimean people would then vote over the future status of the territory.

The tool of the Trusteeship Council would also mean that the process of Russia’s withdrawal from Crimea would be a long-term one. However, Russia may not be able to implement the trusteeship and prepare Crimea for de-occupation in an effective way. This is because of the current decay of institutions of national and local governance as well as the current economic crisis.

Interim administration mission

Between 1999 and 2008 Kosovo was administered by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since the country’s independence, the mission has continued to work in promoting stability and human rights without formal administrative powers. Although officially granting independence to Kosovo did not create any international legal precedent, the experience of the mission could be applied towards Crimea.

This tool would allow the international community to shorten the time frame of a de-occupation process and political transition by several years (as opposed to the trusteeship system which could take a decade or longer). At the same time, it would require a faster withdrawal of troops from the peninsula, which would be more costly for Moscow, especially when it comes to domestic politics. A UN interim administration mission in Crimea would also require Ukraine’s approval, but it is a politically more desirable option for Kyiv. Consequently, this option may be more preferable for the international community than the trusteeship system. It has a number of political and humanitarian advantages because it gives more power to the Crimean people regardless of their current citizenship and attitude towards the Russian occupation. This is important since some Crimeans abandoned Russian citizenship and many decided to have both Ukrainian and Russian passports. Moreover, the annexation created serious property rights disputes and other legal issues. Here, the UN interim administration may become a neutral power and moderator.

The main challenge related to the interim administration system would be Russian domestic politics. The transformation of the country in a post-Putin era is likely to be difficult, especially the economic and political reforms necessary to dismantle Russia’s system of grand corruption. The process of de-occupation may become an additional aggravator for many Russians with increasing interim political turbulence that may lead to the restoration of authoritarianism and a more aggressive foreign and military policy. Therefore, the possible implementation of a UN interim administration in Crimea would need a public awareness campaign and educational activities, both in the peninsula and in mainland Russia.

Stages of de-occupation

Russia’s withdrawal from Crimea will not be just a simple change of flags. Certainly Russia will need to do a lot of work and the international community should support it in the process. Moreover, ensuring the long-term peace in this part of Europe will require a number of steps. First, Crimea needs de-militarising. All the Russian military and security forces should be removed from the peninsula which would be a difficult – but also the most important – step for the international community and a post-Putin Russia. Currently, the purpose of these forces is to control the peninsula and exert military pressure over NATO members in the Black Sea region. Without de-militarisation, regaining trust between Russia and Ukraine and between Russian and the West will be impossible.

Second, the peninsula would have to come under the control of an external police mission, such as a UN civilian police mission or an OSCE mission. This is a necessary element to ensure public order during the withdrawal. A police mission will also play a role in overseeing the process of de-militarisation. In the case of trusteeship, the mission may be introduced at the final stages of Russia’s control over the area, following the withdrawal of Russia’s last police force.

Moreover, during the occupation some assets belonging to Ukrainian companies and Ukrainians who became internally displaced were seized by Russian authorities and they will have to be returned. At the same time, the affected parties should refrain from asking for any additional compensation from Russian as a post-Putin Russia will be economically weak and will need to introduce painful institutional reforms in a relatively short period of time and relying on limited sources. Opening of the border between Crimea and Ukraine will be another crucial step forward. When Russia’s withdrawal begins, the border between the peninsula and mainland Ukraine will be opened for the free movement of people and trade, which means lifting Ukraine’s economic blockade of Crimea.

Regardless of which model becomes the benchmark for Russia’s withdrawal, Russian and Ukrainian citizens should have equal civil status on the peninsula before the de-occupation is complete and the future of Crimea’s status is determined. The process will also have to include restoring local governance and republican institutions. Without an effective system of local governance neither a democratic transition nor peace will be possible. It will also be crucial for economic recovery.

Finally, the international community will have to organise a referendum on the status of the peninsula, which will be possible after Russia’s withdrawal or at the final stages of the process. Otherwise it will be hard to reach a unanimous recognition of the referendum’s result due to the international community’s lack of trust in Russian authorities (as in 2014, for instance, Russia violated its international obligations).

Difficult transition

At the same time, those Russians who moved to Crimea and became permanent residents after February 27th 2014 – the date when Russia’s aggression formally began – should not be allowed to vote in the referendum. As controversial as it may sound, their current residency on the peninsula is a direct consequence of the annexation which was a violation of international law. However they should retain their property rights in Crimea in case of bona fide purchases, and after the referendum they should have all the political, economic and civic rights without any restrictions, should they decide to stay in Crimea.

Nevertheless, the referendum may result in Crimea becoming either an autonomous republic within Ukraine or an independent entity altogether. Becoming part of Russia should not be an option as the peninsula is not a state – a subject – of international law; therefore, there would be only two possible options: to remain or to leave Ukraine. This means that Ukraine will have to be ready to give up Crimea, both politically and legally.

Completing all the above steps will be necessary regardless of the transition scenario chosen. This is because a number of issues are intertwined: the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russian domestic political and economic turbulence as well as the challenges for European and global security. The UN also needs to regain its status as guarantor of peace and stability in the world. In order to achieve this, Russia’s withdrawal from Crimea is essential, although it will not be easy and will definitely take time.

Yet, the prerequisite for any transition of power in Crimea is regime change in Russia. The country’s ruling elite is incapable of holding onto power for decades. Russia’s inherent institutional, economic and technological weaknesses will make it compliant in foreign affairs because the current hard-line policy hinders further development. At the same time, in the face of growing poverty and a decline of quality of life, Russian society is likely to choose its own prosperity over a chimera of empire greatness.

The two options presented above – the Trusteeship Council and the UN interim administration mission – undoubtedly do not exhaust the list of scenarios that could be applied to undoing the annexation. However, they have one clear advantage: they leave enough room for diplomatic compromise. They also allow Ukraine to save its limited resources and focus on reforms before Crimea’s status is fully defined. Once Ukraine develops an attractive economic and political model, a successful reintegration of Crimea could become more likely. Nevertheless, to ensure successful conflict resolution and restore peace in the area, the UN should be the one tasked with overseeing the process.  

Pavel Luzin is a political scientist and a senior lecturer at the Faculty of History and Political Science at Perm University.

annexation, Crimea, Russia, Ukraine