The redrawing of the Eastern map

Festivities during Europe Day in Tbilisi, May 2017. Photo: Adam Reichardt

Lip service vs. slow progress

Over the past five years, starting with the Vilnius Summit in 2013 and ending with the most recent developments in late 2017, a counterintuitive picture has emerged. On the one hand, one of the early celebrated Eastern Partnership countries, Moldova, which was praised for its exemplary progress in adopting EU sanctioned reforms, has been on a downward spiral since allegations of the one billion US dollar bank fraud in November 2014 – an amount which accounted for around 15 per cent of the country’s GDP and tarnished the country’s image in the western media. A group of oligarchs, who trace back to Vlad Filat, the former prime minister, were eventually arrested and charged with mass corruption. As a consequence, the EU’s positive image of Moldova suffered a serious blow and Moldova’s relations with the EU worsened. Moldova’s declared pro-EU elite, led by Vlad Plahotniuc (and formerly Filat) were accused by the Financial Times in early 2016 of “having for years paying lip service to European values whilst amassing illicit wealth and consolidating power over state institutions.”

Georgia, on the other hand, has been the one clearly pro-EU country in the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan and Armenia each balancing between Russia and the West) eager to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration with a hint of rebellion towards its powerful neighbour, Russia. Despite a modest but steady path in terms of progress towards fulfilling the conditions of the EaP, Georgia presented itself as an eager pupil – but not at all costs, which delayed the visa liberalisation and association and trade agreements. Once lagging, Georgia has now visibly won the trust of the EU and received major funding to implement much-needed reforms. Georgia has understood the value of training programmes whilst ensuring to present itself as a trustworthy and stable partner for investors in the economic sector.

While the 2013 Vilnius Summit revealed the dividing line between Russia and the EU, it also created a difficult situation where the post-Soviet states had to “freely chose” to accept the EU Association Agreement. Georgia and Moldova, both EU-friendly but socially divided, signed the agreements. This immediately led to retribution by Moscow, which levied trade embargos on agricultural goods. Prior to Vilnius, Armenia withdrew its intent to sign in fear of Kremlin counter-measures, only recently signing a watered-down agreement with the EU. The story of the developments in Ukraine, which is well known, illustrated the complexities of this EaP dividing line, which led to upheaval, instability and unprecedented Russian intervention culminating in its annexation of Crimea and support for the separatists.

Since 2013, the two competing integration projects – Russia’s Eurasian Economic (EEU) and the EU’s EaP– confirmed an ambiguous but also an ambitious trend. Whilst Brussels clarified that participation in the Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) of the Association Agreements in the EaP was purely economic assistance with the intention to create spillover in the political sector, it was never outwardly presented as a step towards EU membership. Discussions about advocating or rejecting “European integration” have been repeatedly misunderstood within these countries and instrumentalised by the Kremlin-influenced media in Europe. The downward trend, as opinion polls in both Moldova and Georgia in 2015 and 2016 show, can be attributed to two developments: the continued corruption of the political elite and the low-effect of reforms on society.

This uncertainty as to whether to support EU integration domestically reinforced the message Moscow sent to Brussels which has been clear since Vilnius: do not approximate further than Romania or the Baltic states. To be fair, Brussels has neglected to clearly articulate the economic incompatibility between its integration project and Russia’s EEU. In fact, the EEU is largely a political integration project with a rather small economic component. Following the turmoil in Ukraine, Brussels presented a revised strategy with low incentives and promises for the EaP countries during the Riga Summit in 2015, much to the disappointment of the states that were counting on Brussels to stand up to Russia. Meanwhile, the EaP Summit in late November 2017 has focused on strict deliverables for the year 2020. The main aim is to achieve a resilient economy, accountable governance structures, connectivity between infrastructure and energy, and stimulating entrepreneurship.

New strategy

Despite a dark outlook for the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s engagement has led to some significant achievements, which have directly affected the region. Moldova, Europe’s poorest state, can be seen as a good example of the EU’s impact on the broad level. Thanks to EU funding and programme support, three Moldovan villages were provided with updated drinking water infrastructure, which reached around 15,700 people. One special EU initiative aimed at improving relations between Chişinău and the breakaway territory of Transnistria helped fund the creation of new businesses, leading to 350 new jobs. Indeed, in 2016 the EU was identified as the biggest investor and trading partner in Moldova: 66 per cent of exports went to the EU market as well as 55 per cent of its total trade. Between 2015 and 2017, the EU supported educational programmes in the framework of Erasmus+. These positive cases are only a few examples of the new EU strategy that is designed to equip EaP countries with stability and resilience by combining the spread of fundamental, shared values in sectors such as healthcare, transport and employment.

Yet, despite some local successes, the EU has failed to fully address the underlying causes of instability in Moldova. First and foremost is the conflict with Transnistria, which continues to tie Moldova to the Russian politico-economic sphere of influence, despite some improvements in relations. Second, Moldova’s GDP depends on remittances coming from outside the country. In 2016 personal remittances accounted for 21.7 per cent of the country’s GDP. Moreover, the complete withdrawal of funding to Moldova, in the second half of 2017, caused a blow to the elite, which could potentially hurt any future chances of Moldova’s pro-EU developments. Reports indicate that the primary reasoning behind the funding cut was a response to the controversial electoral reform law. It remains unclear whether the EU will release additional funding this year.

Carte blanche for Georgia

Georgia, on the other hand, has now arisen to the status of peak performer in the EaP. In 2016 a share of 31 per cent of Georgia’s total trade went to the EU, which shows that despite the geographical distance it can still be quite active. In addition, various EU-funded training programmes for judges, prosecutors, prison and probation staff, police investigators, public defenders and lawyers have increased their skills and efficiency and the number of Georgian students who have studied or taught in the EU reached 1,700. More than 5,300 Georgians are involved in joint activities with their counterparts from the EU, confirming a new trend given previous fears of a downward curve.

Concretely, Georgia has allegedly adopted 7,000 European standards in health, safety and European protection, which gives Georgia support of up to 450 million euros between 2017 and 2020 and an additional macro assistance of 46 million euros – a significant sum for the small state. It is hardly surprising, then, that Georgia’s public opinion, based on the EU OPEN Survey of 1,000 face-to-face interviews in all of the EaP countries conducted between March and May 2017, shows increasing support for the EU. In the survey, 59 per cent of Georgians have a positive image of the EU. By contrast, only 43 per cent of Moldovans have a positive image of the EU – the same figure as Ukrainians, followed by Armenians (48 per cent) and Azerbaijanis (47 per cent). In Belarus a small majority (53 per cent) have a neutral image of the EU.

The above survey suggests that EU policies are viewed positively by half of the population in most EaP countries, effectively contributing to the already existing societal divisions in the region. Georgia, however, remains the exception. The existing link between the financial support received and the positive image provided is therefore unsurprising, which at least should encourage the EU to reconsider its policies. However, as long as the security issue persists at the EU borders and as long as the EU is able to win “friends” this is good news. It must be added that the EU has only multiplied its funding but not transformed its policies towards the countries, neither in Moldova nor Georgia – and it continues the standard carrot-and-stick approach.

Nevertheless, Europe’s policy in Eastern Europe remains divisive, even in EU circles. On the one hand, Javier Solana once called Europe’s neighbourhood a “ring of friends”. On the other hand, Member of the European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt, most recently named it a “ring of fire in which Vladimir Putin is attempting to redraw the map of Europe with force”. EU influence among EaP countries as a whole is limited, but nevertheless it prompts even greater Russian interest. The EaP as a battleground between the EU and Russia is likely to endure.

Nina Lutterjohann is a research associate at the University of St Andrews.

Eastern Partnership, Georgia, Moldova