To challenge Putin’s regime

Vladimir Putin is certain to be re-elected as Russia’s president on March 18th. The question to ask then is: Will he now search for a successor? Photo: en.kremlin.ru (CC)

The early years

Vladimir Putin is formally back in the Kremlin for a fourth term. In fact, during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev between 2008 and 2012 he did not go anywhere and remained the de facto leader of Russia. Since Putin’s first presidential inauguration in May 2000, his regime underwent several important changes, and more than once shifted the narrative of its own legitimacy. From 2000 to 2003, it was a regime of economic modernisation and stabilisation of the country after the chaotic 1990s, with only a relatively “soft” style of authoritarianism.

The cabinet of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov carried out major economic and financial reforms. He simplified the tax code, made the rouble convertible and added transparency to a significant part of the state budget. Relations with the West were not as warm as under the first post-Soviet Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, but there was still a significant level of trust and more economic ties. An oil and gas boom also helped. It led to a rapid rise in budget revenue and made Russia an attractive option for foreign investors. Putin publicly appeared as a young, sporty and forward thinking leader. Pop stars composed songs about him – “I want someone like Putin – to love me!” went one of them.

The year 2003 was one of change and political milestones. After Saddam Hussein was overthrown by the forces of the international coalition in the spring, relations with the US began to seriously cool down. In October, the owner of Yukos oil company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was arrested. Elections to the State Duma in December made the democratic opposition disappear entirely from parliament. These three events set up the main trends of Putin’s policies today: anti-western foreign policy and increased anti-western sentiment at home; subjugation of the big business and putting the most important sectors of the economy under the control of the new elite – ex-KGB officers and/or the president’s closest friends. Violations of the rule of law and massive falsifications became the norm for political life at both the national and regional levels.

2004 saw the first serious attempt by the Kremlin to intervene in the democratic process in Ukraine on the side of the pro-Russian presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine was one of the milestone events for Putin and had, to my mind, a significant impact on his domestic and foreign policy. In the eyes of the Russian president, the so-called “first Maidan” was neither a people’s revolution nor a manifestation of people’s aspiration for democracy and dignity – it was for him an example of western interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, a kind of “regime change” aiming to tear Ukraine away from Russia. I dare say that events of November 2004 – January 2005 played a crucial role not only for Ukraine but also for Russia. Previously an optimist and moderniser, Putin emerged as a commandant of the besieged “Fortress Russia” for the first time.

The formal transfer of presidential powers to Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 revealed another important feature of the Putin regime: formalism, adherence to the letter of the law (but not to its spirit), and a certain responsiveness to the mood of society. Russians were not ready to have a president for life, like in Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan. Putin pretended that he was not holding on to power – only to triumphantly return to the Kremlin later.

Betrayal

The war with Georgia and the de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 led to a brief but quite painless pause in relations with the West. This reassured Putin that nothing improves domestic popularity more effectively than the notion of “small victorious war”. However, suddenly a serious failure occurred. As prime minister, Putin allowed President Medvedev to make one independent decision in foreign affairs. This was to give the green light to the international coalition’s operation against the Muammar Qaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011. This resulted in the death of Qaddafi and disintegration of Libya. It was the Libyan war, along with massive political protests in Moscow in the winter of 2011-2012, that led Putin not only to return to the Kremlin, but also to transform the regime once again. The demonstrators, who were mostly educated and active citizens, became a symbol of political betrayal and insecurity for Putin. From his point of view, it was he who was the father of their prosperity, borne of the oil boom, gave them opportunity to get rich (or at the very least affluent), buy gadgets and cars, go on vacations abroad and purchase property. And, in his view, these intellectuals – the so called “creative class”, the “start-uppers” and hipsters – paid him back with ingratitude and insulting slogans. Moreover, they were supported by the West, primarily the US, represented by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Washington’s ambassador in Moscow, Michael McFaul.

Putin started his third presidential term in 2012 with a new image: the leader of the “real Russians” – not too educated, living mostly in small towns. They do not speak English, do not know or like western lifestyle; but they respect Stalin and the Soviet Union and count on the state to support them. For them, Putin is not so much an elected president as he is the leader who simply must be re-appointed to the same position. However, Putin’s ratings continued to fall as the paralysis of his status quo policies and economic morass became increasingly evident even to his supporters.

Then in 2014 with the successful people’s uprising against Yanukovych’s regime in Kyiv and the vacuum of power in Ukraine, Putin achieved another major triumph, and at the same time, in my opinion, made a crucial mistake – annexed Crimea and engaged in a war with Ukraine. The international sanctions that followed did not help the Russian economy, which had not completely recovered after the 2008-2009 economic crisis. The corrupt way of governing, based on the principle of “impunity in exchange for loyalty,” became increasingly difficult to apply due to a sharp reduction in government revenue. Opportunities for bureaucrats, and those close to power, to steal from the budget continue to shrink. Putin had nothing left to offer but transformation of the country into a quasi-military camp on a constant alert against external and (inevitably) internal enemies.

He starts his fourth term in office at a time with low GDP growth (1.5 per cent); 20-25 per cent of state budget gobbled up by the military, police and special services; and 70 per cent of the economy (directly or indirectly) under the control of inefficient and corrupt state owned enterprises (SOEs). At the same time, the Kremlin does have one thing going for it: relatively high oil prices (at least for the time being) that help to ease the simmering social tension.

Navalny’s limitations

I am certain that Vladimir Putin will finally leave his post in 2024 – or even earlier. For all its tragic political history Russia is not Turkmenistan or North Korea. Its people will not agree to have a president for life. It may happen that, after a two-three years’ unofficial “casting” for successors, Putin will leave the Kremlin even earlier – for example in 2022 when he turns 70 (maximum retirement age for senior officials). His successor will undoubtedly have to be loyal and reliable, but at the same time very different from Putin – like Putin was different from Yeltsin. Whether Putin will leave politics altogether is another question. Most likely he will try to stay on in a position specially created for him. Russian and western experts like to compare his future position to the role of Deng Xiaoping in China or that of Singapore’s “father of the nation” Lee Kwan Yu. In my view, these Asian countries’ experience cannot be fully reproduced in Russia. There is not the same level of respect for the wisdom and merits of the older generation in Russia as it is in the Confucian Asian cultures. Putin cannot fail to take this into account. Moreover, the generation of young officials and security services’ apparatchiks raised by Putin will stay loyal to him only if he has real leverage over them. This is a problem the Russian president should already be taking seriously.

His task is temporarily eased by yet another factor. In Russia (at least for now) there is no opposition that is capable of immediately challenging him. Alexei Navalny remains the only politician who repeatedly creates problems for Putin’s regime. For the first time in the history of post-Soviet Russia, Navalny has been able to mobilise young people aged 15-25 and get them interested in politics. And it is not just the skilful use of social media or creation of a popular YouTube channel. Navalny has captured the frustration that is felt by the youth around corruption and injustice, and all the same faces of the regime that always appear on the television channels their parents watch (and they do not). The year 2017 saw Navalny’s breakthrough onto the national political scene. It was the year when the generation gap in Russia became obvious – and potentially dangerous for Putin and his inner circle.

The Kremlin peddles “stability” and “greatness” as its highest achievements. For many who survived the painful economic and political crisis of the 1980s and 90s, these are attractive slogans. Yet for the active and politicised youth who have lived their whole lives under Putin, stability looks more like stagnation, a dead end for their lives and careers. For many of them, Putin’s “Russian greatness” rhetoric is just a cover up for corruption and theft.

However, the activities of Navalny on the eve of the election illustrated certain limitations he cannot yet overcome. First is the fear of change that afflicts the political choice of most voters. Putin has successfully created a false dilemma: choose Putin or choose chaos. Second, Russians are scared. Everyone – from ministers and oligarchs to the chief of the police station and the school teacher – is afraid of the regime’s wrath. Some people fear losing their jobs, while others fear losing their wealth or freedom. And some fear losing their position and prestige, like the former minister of economic development, Alexei Ulyukayev. It only shows that despite all its failures, the regime can still frighten people into passivity.

Third, Navalny’s exclusive focus on exposing corruption and populist promises of rapid change to the economy is not enough to attract a mass of new potential supporters. The public are waiting for clear explanations why they should give up this relative stability for the sake of uncertainty. Voters, especially those who live in large cities, have something to lose today in comparison with the late 1980s and early 1990s, the time of perestroika and anti-Communist revolution. This requires a well-developed, but at the same time simple and understandable, programme that offers solutions to problems in various areas of national life. Looking at Putin, who easily juggles facts and figures and is always ready to answer any question (truthfully or not is another matter), the public expects the same from those who dare to challenge him. Fourthly, the opposition refuses to actively criticise the Kremlin’s foreign policy. It believes this is dangerous because most Russians support the annexation of Crimea and are anti-American. Following a deeply ingrained Soviet habit much of Russian society (even the youth) does not see a connection between their taxes, education, health and Russia’s foreign and security policy. In addition, no more than 30 per cent of Russians travel abroad at least once a year. They do not know the outside world and because of that it remains incomprehensible and scary.

Strategic mistake

The Levada Center – Russia’s best independent pollster – conducted a survey on the topic of Russia’s friends and enemies in December 2017. Sixty-six percent of respondents believe Russia has enemies and 21 per cent believe it does not. The main enemy, naturally, is the United States (named by 68 per cent). The US is followed by Ukraine (29 per cent) and the European Union (14 per cent). The Baltic countries, Poland, Germany and NATO are considered enemies by 10 per cent or less. No wonder – they are simply “American puppets” in the eyes of the respondents. In their view, such a great power as Russia can only have great and strong enemies. It is easy to imagine that citizens like these, who are underprivileged and dependent on the state, are seeking self-respect. However, the sociologists stay positive. These are not the worst results. In 2014, a record 84 per cent of Russians believed the country was surrounded by enemies. This is a long-term trend and, in my view, it is one of the main obstacles for creating a viable political.

“Our target audience is not interested in foreign policy,” said one of Alexei Navalny’s teammates at the Free Russia Forum in Vilnius at the end of last year. This is a strategic mistake. It means the opposition has no way of opposing the iron logic of the Putin administration, which basically says: “Yes, we are not angels, but we will defend you. Think whether others will do the same”.

It is difficult to find the same level of agreement in Russian society on topics other than foreign policy. You can expose the corruption of governors and heads of SOEs as much as you like, you can protest construction of the so-called “elite” housing in public spaces, demand transparency and accountability from officials; but as soon as the critics of the Kremlin refuse to discuss Russia’s relations with the outside world, they immediately become ordinary soldiers of Putin. The Kremlin has made isolationism and fear of the world at large its insurance policy against political change. Putin’s propaganda is thus left unchallenged. Until the opposition learns this, they will remain hostage to someone else’s rhetoric.

The Kremlin counts exactly on this approach. They hope that with time people will simply get tired of Navalny’s investigations (corruption in Russia is taken for granted) and lose interest in him. The opposition, on the other hand, counts on the fact that sooner or later people will be bored by Putin. The public and the ruling class have not made their choice yet. Many factors will influence it, but above all it will be the state of the economy and Russia’s relationship with the broader international community.

 However, as one former high-ranking Kremlin insider once told me, “the elite will oppose Putin only when it will be more dangerous to go out into the Moscow streets than to challenge the president in his study”. Putin’s fourth term will be a time of simmering political crisis that will eventually burst into the open. The regime that exhausted its authority will inevitably face the discontent of the active minority. It will try to intimidate or bribe it. It may also launch new military adventures to distract attention from domestic problems – although this seems not very likely due to the precarious state of the economy and volatility in the society. To prevent this, new political leaders will have to expose Putin’s myths and offer the public an attractive and realistic picture of the future.

Translated by Natalia Smolentceva

Konstantin Eggert is a programme host and political commentator with the independent TV channel Dozhd (Rain) and a columnist with Deutsche Welle.

elections, opposition, Russia, Vladimir Putin