Ukraine’s wartime education reform

photo: US Army (CC) https://www.army.mil/article/155224/us_and_ukrainian_troops_donate_school_supplies_ahead_of_knowledge_day

Specifically, it is meant to redefine the role of the teacher and the student, ensuring a departure from the old fashioned Soviet-style relations which endure in many Ukrainian schools. This, in turn, means a turn towards democratisation, inclusiveness and innovation. Changes will be introduced in stages. This year only a selected number of schools will operate under the new standards, and a pilot test will be used for introducing changes across the country.

De-Russification

Missing the fact that such a significant reform, which will be difficult to implement, is aimed at increasing the quality of education, the biggest controversy arose over the law’s seventh paragraph, titled “The Language of Education”. It stipulates that the language of instruction is the official state language – in other words, Ukrainian. At the same time, children of ethnic minorities are guaranteed the right to learn their own language. Their language can also be the language of instruction, together with Ukrainian, in selected classes or groups at the level of preschool and early childhood education (from grades one to four). Ukraine’s indigenous people, like Crimea Tatars, the Karaites and the Gagauzes, retain their right to a full education in their mother tongue.

Possibly the most important provision of the law regarding language is the one that stipulates that educational institutions (in accordance with the approved curriculum) can teach disciplines in two or more languages: Ukrainian, English and another official EU language. There are two consequences of this provision: on the one hand it maintains the possibility of instruction in a minority language, guaranteed by the law, while, on the other hand, it excludes instruction in Russian. This state of affairs shows that the main intention of lawmakers is, first and foremost, a gradual de-Russification of the education system in Ukraine.

The passing of the law caused strong reactions in neighbouring states. The governments of Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria and Romania immediately expressed their opposition to the reform. Warsaw was also vocal. However, I would first like to pay attention to Hungary and Russia, especially since their reaction received the most attention in Ukraine. The Hungarian government did not limit its criticism just to the new law; it also announced that it would block Ukraine’s integration process with the EU. This reaction did not come as a surprise if we take into account Hungarian politics. More precisely, the response issued by Budapest resembles some of its rhetoric from 2014.

At the time when Russia was annexing Crimea and stirring up the conflict in Donbas, Viktor Orbán openly demanded autonomy for the Zakarpattia region, which has a large number of Hungarian minorities. In this way, he cynically took advantage of a moment of weakness in Ukraine which was a victim of Russian aggression. Today, after the passing of the law, the Hungarian government is issuing similar demands. On October 13th 2017, near the Ukrainian embassy in Budapest, a protest was organised which was officially backed by the Hungarian government and accompanied by slogans supporting self-determination of Zakarpattia. We can thus say that Hungary and Russia appear to have been working together since the early stage of the conflict in Ukraine.

This co-operation is also visible when we examine the activities of the Russian propaganda machine. Many observers have paid close attention to various media campaigns run by the Kremlin in 2015, which were propagating fake news about the dramatic situation of Ruthenians and Hungarians in Zakarpattia. Moreover, we need to remember that the Kremlin maintains close ties with Jobbik, the far right party, and Russian loans are acquired in Hungary for the financing of the nuclear energy sector.

Double-edged sword

In the Russian media the rhetoric towards Ukraine’s new education law has been very strong. The Duma immediately expressed its support for Hungary, Romania and Poland in their objections to the law. The Duma’s deputy chair, Irina Yarovaya, called its passing a nationalistic triumph pointing that ethnic minorities are forced to learn the official state language. Leading Russian politicians called the situation in Ukraine ethnocide (especially of ethnic Russians) and accused Kyiv of instituting an apartheid regime. Considering the level of rhetoric in the Russian political debate, such language is hardly surprising. However, its growing acceptance may one day prove to be a double-edged sword. More than anything else, it facilitates an increase in extremist moods within society, which is starting to experience the negative effects of the economic crisis and the worsening financial situation of the state.

In addition, such a reaction can have its own consequences for the language situation in Russia. At the beginning of the school year in the Russian Republic of Tatarstan, there was a noted escalation of conflict regarding education in official state languages and the languages of ethnic minorities. In short, with an increase in the number of hours for teaching the Tatar language, a group of parents from Russian-speaking families refused to send their children to Tatar language classes. This caused a disruption which continues to worsen. For example, if we look at the escalation of the conflict in Tatarstan, we will see that language antagonisms are also present in Russia. Importantly, Tatarstan may be just the tip of the iceberg as language conflict is slowly emerging in other republics in Russia.

Crisis with the West

The reaction in Poland was rather moderate in contrast to Hungary and Russia. The Polish ministry of foreign affairs was more balanced in its comments on the changes, noting that the law guarantees instruction in minority languages. Comments in the Polish media were sharper in their criticism with some calling the new law “a threat” and “a blow” to the education of ethnic minorities in Ukraine. One could speculate that the moderate reaction of the Polish foreign ministry was related to the fact that the education law in Ukraine resembles that of Poland. In Poland minority schools teach in the Polish language. While the possibility of learning the language of one’s ethnic group is guaranteed, the minority language is treated as an additional one. Hence, a negative Polish reaction would incline a demand for an asymmetrical condition of education in both countries.

In this context, it is also worth looking at the reactions that came from the West. The response of many commentators only demonstrates that Ukraine is now entering a crisis phase with western states. A blog post by Nathan Stormont on the Freedom House website is a perfect illustration. Stormont expresses his concern over the changes in the education system in Ukraine which could eventually sabotage the country’s integration with the EU. He admits the level of command of Ukrainian is very low among Hungarian minorities which therefore excludes many from the education system. At the same time, he criticises the “forceful” imposition of Ukrainian as an inadequate strategy. In his view, a “carrot” strategy would be better, for example in the form of stipend systems or “community language courses”. The choice of a soft option for introducing the Ukrainian language is here presented as indeed a civilisational choice, one that confirms the European aspirations and acceptance of European democratic ideals. He concludes by saying that the decisive reaction of the authorities to require Ukrainian to be the main language of instruction is a departure from liberal democratic values and western standards.

There are a few arguments against this interpretation. The experience of Crimea and Donbas confirms that the language problem is used as an instrument in a confrontation with a weak Ukrainian state. Russia, or right now Hungary, in trying to enforce separatist tendencies, turns to demagogic arguments of weeding out the language as a kind of message that easily appeals to the nationalistically minded parts of society. In essence, the idea of the “Russian World”, which was the ideological screen used during the aggression in eastern Ukraine, was based on the argument of the defence of the Russian language. The language issue is thus a kind of a weapon in this war. As a result, a gradual introduction of instruction in the Ukrainian language can be perceived more as a defence strategy. This is in fact a delayed reaction by the Ukrainian state to the threat of separatism that comes from the east. In this regard, increased efforts to teach the language would be a kind of ideological prevention, one which could limit the popularity of Russian propaganda.

Civic desert

Using language as a weapon is very visible in Donbas. For the last two years I have been doing ethnographic research in Kramatorsk, a fairly large city in eastern Ukraine not far away from the conflict zone. There people learn about language discrimination from Russian TV. For a few months in 2014, the city was even a part of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic – fully under the influence of Russian propaganda. This brings us to another important issue. The war is an effect of an earlier lack of presence of the Ukrainian state in Donbas and not of its power or oppressive activities. We can even say that in such places as Kramatorsk, state structures have been replaced by oligarchic ones. Until 2014, and even today, a majority of the Donbas territory was a civic dessert. Thus the argument for increased soft power hits the heart of a much atomised society. Building the foundations of a civil society is a lengthy and costly process. That is why in addition to the system changes, supported by state structures, no other strategy, beyond the education reform, could bring any real results relatively quickly. And we cannot forget that Ukraine is a state at war.

These assumptions have been confirmed by my conversations with teachers and academic staff in Kramatorsk. The main issue of western commentators – namely, the introduction of Ukrainian language to schools where Russian still dominates – is not a problem for the people there. The real problem is the sad state of infrastructure, problems with financing, lack of qualified teachers and poor communications between educational boards and schools. However, changes are starting to take place. On October 25th 2017 in Kramatorsk, which now plays the role of Donetsk oblast’s centre, members of the Commission of Science and Education of Ukraine’s parliament held a meeting. It was a forum for lawmakers to meet with teachers on the ground and get their input on the upcoming changes. One could say that the first signs of civic dialogue are now visible in Donbas.

The subsequent problem is a perception of western standards of liberal democracy. In the light of the above arguments, such restrictions show an ideological conflict taking place in Europe and one which could also be seen after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. This is a conflict between political pragmatism and idealism and different expectations which are given to individual states. In the case of Ukraine’s education reform, many representatives of western states expect that Ukraine will give up political pragmatism. This is clearly stressed by Mustafa Nayyem, a former journalist, now a member of Ukraine’s parliament. Nayyem writes about the political infantilism which is expected from an attacked state, instead of pragmatic solutions which would sustain Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In essence the West’s reaction towards Ukraine is paternalistic with regards to the “new Europe”, which is expected to make an honest confession of its faith in the values of liberal democracy. The dramatism of European reactions is enforced by the situation within the EU itself, which is proof that the community is indeed in a deep identity crisis. The EU still struggles to comprehend Brexit while some member states are electing more radical or populist forces to power. And Brussels remains unable to handle separatist tendencies in Spain.

Missing pragmatism

Considering the above, we can suggest that the low level of understanding between the EU and Ukraine, which was revealed with the conflict around the education reform, is partly a result of a superiority complex exhibited by the former towards Eastern Europe. In Poland, we still remember the infamous words of Jacques Chirac who once told us: “You have lost a good opportunity to sit quietly.” As a result, instead of an insight into reality, we see an ideological “expression of concern” which is the reaction of Ukraine’s open opponents – Russia and Hungary. It is worth remembering, however, that the strategic goal, which is behind Russia’s reaction, is pushing forward the idea of Ukraine’s federalisation. The voice of many representatives of European countries unwillingly became associated with the implementation of this strategy.

The value of pragmatic dialogue with Ukraine was unexpectedly proved by the Polish government. On October 24th 2017, as a result of talks between the education ministers of both countries, a declaration “on ensuring the persons belonging to an ethnic minority the right to learn their mother tongue and in the mother tongue” was signed. Through this document, the Ukrainian government confirmed that its education law will ensure that Polish minority students have the right to learn the Polish language and in the Polish language, together with Ukrainian, within the public education system. The publication of the declaration confirms the assurance of the Ukrainian government (which was made on several occasions) that the legislation is not meant to limit the rights of minority groups. This is a proof of the value of real partnership-based dialogue, which nonetheless takes place in a very heated dispute over historical matters, instead of ideological fights or political paternalism.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Wojciech Siegień is a lecturer in the department of cultural and educational research at the Pedagogical Institute at the University of Gdańsk. His research interest includes education in the post-Soviet space.

education reform, language, Ukraine