Security in Europe with Russia and/or from Russia?

Russian President Vladimir Putin looks on during the Zapad 2017 military exercises. Photo: (CC) kremlin.ru

The German debate around Russia largely focuses on what the West can do to end the crisis. In a recent publication titled “Central ideas on a new approach towards Russia”, two policy advisers of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Matthias Dembinski and Hans-Joachim Spanger, raised a discussion on how to resolve the ongoing crisis in relations with Russia. In reference to the policy of détente in the 1960s and 70s, the two authors call for a shift in the West’s approach. They argue that what primarily led to new divisions was the West’s value-based strategy (“liberal peace”), which aimed for the transformation and integration of Russia on the basis of (allegedly) consensual norms such as the 1990 Charter of Paris of a New Europe as well as the expansion of the European Union and NATO towards Russia’s borders.

Plural peace

Dembinski and Spanger further propose a new concept called “plural peace” (pluraler Friede) as an alternative to the “liberal peace” (liberaler Friede). According to the authors, this new concept would be based on the recognition of the “normative other” and the need for “dissociation” in areas that have led to conflict. The geopolitical rivalry between the EU and Russia on the territory of neighbouring states is seen as the main source of the current tensions. Accordingly, it is necessary to mark spheres of influence between the West and Russia. Dembinski and Spanger argue this would imply reassuring Russia that Ukraine and other regional states will not join the EU or NATO.

According to the authors such a new grand bargain following the blueprint established by the CSCE in the 1970s could lead to a new philosophy of co-operation and security and help mitigate the conflict between Russia and the West which has been building since the end of the Cold War. According to Dembinski and Spanger, a policy of military deterrence would not bring about stability, but rather accelerate a new arms race.

The above arguments should be taken seriously as they seem to offer a possible way out of the escalation cycle. The authors deserve credit for developing some new ideas on overcoming the conflict. Furthermore, they shed light on the paradigmatic perception and sensitivities of Russia’s foreign policy establishment which have to be taken into account if we are to continue any dialogue with Russia. Yet, the article invoked a number of critical responses in the recent issue of Osteuropa magazine (3-4/2017).

The proposal, however, leads the debate in the wrong direction. Following Dembinski and Spanger’s line of thought, the West has been trying to force its values upon Russia. From this point of view, the 1990 Charter of Paris, which is indispensable for security and peace in Europe and which, according to the authors, Moscow from the very beginning perceived to be more about security than about common values, seems to be some sort of misunderstanding. If this perception was to be commonly accepted, it would imply the dilution of the OSCE’s aquis whose human dimension of security represents an integral part of the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security. Yet, even more concerning is the fact that the authors seem to forget the interests of the region as a whole, in particular the states located between the EU and Russia (namely Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) as well as the Central and Eastern European EU and NATO members.

A formal guarantee by NATO and the EU that they will not accept Ukraine as a member state would not only undermine the freedom of choice of the Eastern Partnership members, but also provoke the EU’s and NATO’s eastern members. To create a buffer zone of Russian-controlled states on their eastern border would resemble a second Yalta, as desired by Putin.

Understanding the crisis

Such a shift would mean the end of German and European eastern policies based on the principle that co-operation with Russia must not be pursued over the heads of partner countries and against their interests. Any acknowledgment of Russia’s own sphere of influence would presuppose such an outcome, as Moscow would interpret it as an opportunity for free reign. The result would be a worsening of the security situation. There would be no reason to believe that by pursuing a “plural peace” Russia’s foreign policy would become more benign. Besides, since Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU are currently not on the agenda, Russia’s security interests are already taken into account. 

A coherent strategy towards Russia requires the clarification of a number of issues, including an answer to the question of the roots of the current confrontation. This situation is not the result of Russia’s defensive reaction to a western strategy of weakening and encirclement, as it is presented in Moscow and believed by some western experts. This however is not contradicted by the US having significantly taken advantage of their superiority after the end of the Cold War to pursue its interests and Moscow fearing a Ukrainian move towards EU and NATO after the events in Kyiv on February 22nd 2014.  

The current crisis with Russia results from complex causes rooted in wrong perceptions of the other side’s intentions but above all in conflicting interpretations of the following basic principles and norms: prohibition of the use of force, respect for territorial integrity, the freedom of states to choose their own security arrangements and compliance with fundamental civil and human rights standards. Accordingly, the current crisis has escalated because Moscow perceives the post-Soviet space (with the exception of the Baltic states) as a special political zone – one in which it claims privileged interests and rights.

Russia pursues such a policy because the political developments in the region have a direct influence on Russia’s own power structures. This also explains the country’s paranoid fear of colour revolutions. The Kremlin sees a functioning, democratic, politically stable and prospering Ukraine oriented towards the EU as a direct threat to its regime. This demonstrates that Russia’s external actions are strongly dependent on dominant internal factors. The Kremlin’s concern is that its citizens may find the idea of the West appealing and attractive. The survival of the regime (which is more afraid of its own people than of NATO) and its opposition to the West are two sides of the same

The Kremlin’s perception that interconnectedness with the West could threaten its domestic power is also the reason why Russia, despite Medvedev’s rhetoric of modernisation, never really accepted and acted on the German or European offer of a partnership for modernisation. One of the deep roots of the permanent crisis between Russia and the West lies in the former’s halting transformation. Moscow’s aspiration to shape the security order in Europe to the same degree as the West was never nurtured by its own political and economic attractiveness.

This is another reason for the insecurity of the Russian power elite. The Putin regime follows the idea that only a strong state can provide internal and external security. Thereby an authoritarian bureaucracy is strengthened, leading to a situation similar to one described in the 19th century by Russian historian Vassily Klyuchevsk, who pointed out “the state grew fat, but the people grew lean”. Such a development leads to severe deficits in legitimacy and an inherent instability within the country. In contrast to China, Russia has not taken advantage of the benefits of globalisation.

Clear warning signs

The West has not fully taken these internal dynamics into account when trying to understand the crisis. Despite clear signs in 2012 and 2013 (like the “Zapad” exercises or the so called “Gerasimov doctrine”) that Russia’s policies would not refrain from any revisionist reflexes, Moscow’s increasing willingness for escalation in the geopolitical battle for influence in the region between the EU and Russia was underestimated by the West. The struggle for Ukraine’s ratification of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU played well into Moscow’s zero-sum game narrative. The then EU Commission announced that participation in an EU free trade area would not be compatible with the Russian-led integration project – the Customs Union made up of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This conveyed the impression that the EU Commission and Russia were more interested in winning this struggle than avoiding it. The period leading up to the 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius was similar to that of two trains on the same track about to collide. Ukraine was essentially faced with a binary choice: the EU or Russia.

A coherent strategy, and one not based on wishful thinking but grounded in reality, must also raise the question on with whom we are dealing. Proponents of continuing  the principles of Ostpolitik sometimes tend to equate Russia with the Soviet Union. This assumption is wrong in many regards.

Russian Versailles

Contrary to Soviet policy towards Europe in the 1970s, Russia under Putin aims to revise the status quo. In some ways, the 1990s were perceived as a “Russian Versailles”, not primarily in a territorial sense but rather with regards to Russian influence in the world. From Moscow’s perspective, Russia should have influence on global issues on par with the United States. This requires recognition of Russia’s strength by the US. An obsession with this status lies in Moscow’s efforts to create a de-facto-suzerainty over “the near abroad”. The Russian interventions in Ukraine and Syria show that despite his ambitions, Putin’s foreign policies do not follow any plan of systematic expansion but rather an opportunistic rationality that takes advantage of the situation as it evolves – all in order to expand Russia’s influence, drive back that of the West and regain status. Yet, even if Putin does not shy away from improvising he is certainly not a gambler. The risks of his military interventions are calculated. Military failures and high casualties would have a negative impact on the legitimacy of his authoritarian rule – the Russian-Japanese war in 1904/05 and the First World War which ushered in the October Revolution and the ouster of the tsar as well as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 1979/80 should be perceived as warnings.

In contrast to Chinese leaders Putin is more of a tactician than a strategist. In Ukraine, particularly, it became clear that with its actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin has failed in its real goal, namely, to preserve influence over Kyiv. We can even say that Russia has never been further from reaching this goal.

What can and what should the West do in the current situation? A cold peace as the only alternative to an even harder confrontation is not acceptable. The image of a peaceful co-existence does not fit the 21st century which is characterised by globalisation, interdependence and mutual vulnerability. At the same time, however, there is no room for great visions and grand bargains. The irony of fate lies in the fact that the US president, Donald Trump, who was expected to consequently look for far reaching compromises in US-Russian relations will not achieve any breakthroughs in this regard in the near future.  Trump’s foreign policy towards Russia is restrained by American internal politics. In other words, Moscow’s involvement in the 2016 US presidential election was counterproductive. Moreover, it is now clear that the relationship between the US and Russia is characterised rather by divergences on basic questions (e.g. Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, energy, nuclear arms control, or sanctions) than by convergences.

Two-fold strategy

Therefore, the engagement of NATO – and particularly the EU – is needed now more than ever. For the EU, this offers an opportunity to take on a more prominent role, particularly at a point when Moscow will accept the fact that its anti-western orientation is a one-way street and the collaboration with China has not brought the results the Russian leadership was hoping for. In difficult times, a two-fold strategy could be successful. Today, the strategy of “As much containment and deterrence as necessary, but at the same time as much co-operation and dialogue as possible” would seem to be an adequate solution. NATO and the EU need security with and from Russia. The goal should be to get Russia’s commitment to a European security order based on the existing rules.

An easing of tensions with Russia certainly will not happen quickly. Yet the successes of the German Ostpolitik show that dialogue is possible, even during difficult times. In short, we need small steps – in this regard a reference to Ostpolitik is fitting. In terms of hard deterrence, the measures that were decided during the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, such as the rotating deployment of troops by NATO members in Poland and the Baltic states, do point in the right direction. In terms of soft policies, actions to minimise Russia’s disinformation and hybrid warfare have to be further developed.

However, security from each other is not enough. In addition to that, the willingness for dialogue and concrete offers for co-operative security should aim to reduce the uncontrolled dynamics of escalation and armament as well as avoiding wrong interpretations by Russia of the West’s intentions. Therefore, it is important to continue dialogue through the NATO-Russia Council and to make use of other mechanisms for crisis communication (e.g. contacts between SACEUR and the Russian General Staff) and conflict mitigation. We also need more dialogue about conventional and nuclear disarmament. Since Russia’s suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in 2007, with the exception of the Open Sky Treaty, no other legally-binding hard arms control measures are being implemented. This causes severe risks. In 2016 the then German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, initiated a relaunch in the field of conventional arms control with the intention to strengthen restraint, predictability, transparency and mutual confidence building and to include new military capabilities and weapon systems into agreements. It is uncertain whether this approach will succeed. Yet, to not even try would play into the hands of Moscow’s hardliners.

The risks coming from the increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear arsenals, including the suspected breach of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the dangerous tendencies of the Russian nuclear strategy which significantly lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons are immense. The INF treaty is a pillar of European security and must be preserved by all means. Therefore, the talks between the US and Russia on strategic stability should be continued and intensified. In the current crisis of trust, the OSCE as a platform of dialogue must be further strengthened and become more efficient and capable in order to prevent conflict. Germany during its time as the OSCE chair managed to make some progress in this regard even though the difficulties became gradually more visible.

A strategy of risk containment and co-operation can only be successful if it is resolute and uniform. Therefore, it is essential that NATO and the EU speak with one voice. After the annexation of Crimea, the unity of the EU and NATO left a strong impression on the Russian leadership. The same can be said about the sanctions. Yet, it is necessary to demonstrate to Moscow that the sanctions are not an end in themselves but a political instrument that creates an incentive for their suspension. Accordingly, the sanctions could be removed step-by-step, but only if there is significant progress in the implementation of the Minsk Agreement.

Top priority

The key question, still, is how security and stability between the EU and Russia should be organised in the region. Due to Russia’s zero-sum approach, the divergence of interests between the EU and Russia will continue. With the experience of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the EU understands the limits of its influence. Therefore, only a pragmatic approach can work. The model which has proven to be successful for the institutional integration of countries in Central Europe into the EU cannot be the same for the areas of the Eastern Partnership – not least because of the lack of consent within the EU.

This is another reason why the implementation of the Association Agreement and free trade agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia should take top priority. At the same time, Moscow must accept the fact that its western neighbours, as well as the successor states of the Soviet Union, are sovereign states and must be treated as such. With this in mind it is crucial to strengthen the resilience of the Eastern Partnership members against the pressure coming from Russia. The stabilisation and support of Ukraine remains a central task.

The normalisation of relations with Russia is not possible without a significant mitigation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The benchmark for such rapprochement remains the complete implementation of the Minsk Agreement, including the withdrawal of Russian troops and establishing control over the Ukrainian-Russian border. Negotiations over a potential UN peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine could have a further positive impact.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the tensions between Russia and the West will ease up in the short term. Germany and its partners require much patience since the primary determinants of Russian foreign policy are rooted in its domestic politics and are not likely to change anytime soon. The inertia of the Russian authoritarian system, which because of its internal weakness needs confrontation with the West in order to legitimise itself, is much stronger than many western observers believe. That is why a coherent strategy must also rely on long-term factors of peaceful change. This means investment in trade and economic and scientific co-operation, a liberalisation of the visa regime and the increase of people to people contacts. In this context those parts of the Russian civil society currently under pressure should not be forgotten.

Since the EU and NATO are value-based communities, and since foreign policy unlike the 19th century is not cabinet politics anymore but instead requires democratic consent, Realpolitik cannot be successfully pursued without clear principles and values. It is exactly for this reason that diplomacy must be given a chance.

Translated by Paul Toetzke

Manfred Huterer is deputy head of mission at the German embassy in Warsaw. The views expressed in this article reflect his personal opinions.

EU Russia relations, German Russian Relations, Manfred Huterer, Ostpolitik, security