Russia’s young and restless speak up

Photo: Courtesy of Alexey Solomin

While it is true that the youth has always played an indirect role in long-term changes in the country, especially through generational changes, its representatives have rarely influenced Russian politics in such a direct manner.

Perestroika

One of the important factors that stimulated changes in the Soviet Union was the increasing generational gap between the ruling elite and society that characterised the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s. At that time the society was overall getting younger; the post-war peaceful prosperity stimulated a rise in birth rates and the population born during the boom was not killed off in war. It is also the same time when Russians started to realise that they were ruled by senile geezers whose values and ideas were behind the times. Social elevators became less effective since the model “we will live to a late age in the workplace” was implemented at all levels, from the Politburo to the administration of factories and collective farms. A “young” director in the 1980s was an experienced man nearing retirement age, who was just appointed to the highest position by the local Komsomol youth organisation. Not surprisingly, the turn of the decade saw an inter-generational conflict between the “old” (those born before the Second World War) and the “young” (the post-war generation).

At that time, regardless of their career choice and attitude towards the state, young people were, to a certain extent, dissidents in their communities. Because of conservative stagnation and the tendency to stick with what you know, even the most party loyal young leaders were marginalised and barred from decision-making. Unsurprisingly, the number of specialists who were unsatisfied with their prospects was quite high. This also explains why they so eagerly took advantage of perestroika, gaining control over administration and becoming a powerful force of political change across the country.

In addition, the so-called “non-conformists”, who distanced themselves from politics and the state, initially avoiding any organisational forms, became at that time the disseminators of the virus of personal freedom and discredited Soviet ideologies. The song “Changes” by Viktor Tsoi became the anthem of political change in the 1980s, though its initial meaning was personal freedom and opportunities for the youth. As the economic, cultural and political expectations of the diverse 18-25 year-olds converged, these young people became the drivers of change, even as the older generation clung to leadership positions.

Turbulent or not so turbulent 1990s

Today’s new generation of activists was born in the mid to late 1990s. They are children of those who were young in the 1980s. They know about perestroika and the fall of the Soviet Union only from history lessons and their parents’ stories. For them the idea of the horrible and chaotic 1990s or the wonderful and stable Soviet Union is a distant myth. These youngsters grew up with the internet and mobile phones. They witnessed their country grow rich and they believed that the oil money would still be there for them when they get older. They were ready to receive these benefits, but it has turned out that the internet is censored, mobile phones are monitored, Russia is surrounded by enemies and all the benefits are gone. They expected to live in a world with unlimited opportunities, but instead they have inherited one with little prospects.

In a way, the youth protests that took place in Russia in 2017 are a continuation of their parents’ story. The latter gained new opportunities and were to leave them to their children. Yet, in reality, they failed to preserve them: They were too busy adapting their lives to the new reality, grasping new rules and boundaries, and searching for a way of life that would be the most rewarding. They wanted freedom, even though they were not ready to abandon everything from the previous system. Thus, they dreamt of political and market liberalisation (at artificially low prices) alongside secure employment and wages. They also did not think of being involved in politics and left that sphere to its traditional participants – people over 40. The only exception was the 1996 “Vote or you’ll lose!” campaign – which did not yield a desired result. In the run-off election Boris Yeltsin ran against Gennady Zyuganov, but had to reach out to a third leader, General Alexander Lebed (who attracted voters over 40 years old), to consolidate additional support.

Orange Revolution and its discontents

Putin’s campaigns, despite their message of change and rejuvenation, were never aimed at young voters. Instead, the old attitude that youth does not think about politics prevailed. However, while indeed in the early 2000s the young people were focused on studying, finding a job and building a career, a decade later, the participants of the 2011-2012 rallies were reportedly complaining that they had missed the chance to fight for their beliefs. Thus, without their reaction, the government was able to shut down the independent NTV channel, take control of the media, intimidate oligarchs and imprison Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Even more, at the time when their Ukrainian peers took to the Maidan and fought against fraudulent elections during the Orange Revolution, Russians shrugged off those events, focusing on their jobs.

Since oil money was coming in to the country, young professionals could look at their lives through rose-coloured glasses. They had steady incomes, affordable mortgages and more opportunities to buy today and pay later. With such benefits, it was easy to dismiss what was happening in politics. It could even seem that nothing had changed: the state television was just as gleaming and bright as it was before being taken over (and it longer resembled the poor Soviet productions). Nobody seemed to count the number of political parties, even though they also started to shrink. Politics was the domain of the same old faces and rallies attended by small fringe groups of hard-core activists.

While in the 1990s these youth fringe groups included radical communists, nationalists and fascists, the 2000s were a time when a more radical liberal youth opposition started to be formed. At that time they made a small minority that was demanding greater freedom of speech, the right to fair trials and transparent elections. They were inspired by the coloured revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia and believed that in Russia democracy should also prevail over authoritarian tendencies. On the back of the Orange Revolution, liberal parties in Russia began to actively promote youth movements and create coalitions. Although the target audience was still very small, youth politics started to turn into a trend. Thus, even though no more than five per cent of young people got politically engaged, it was enough to start creating a new generation of leaders.

Kremlin officials viewed the Orange Revolution as a looming threat. To them it was quite clear that in Russia, sooner or later, young people, frustrated with limited opportunities, would too realise that they could do what the Ukrainians had done in Kyiv. Therefore, the government decided to set up a new youth policy and create mechanisms aimed at mobilising young people. As a result, all youth movements not controlled by the state were marginalised and pushed away and the pro-Kremlin wing was swiftly set up. Many projects were based at Moscow universities and some were re-branded from the NGOs that were funded by the state under the framework of youth policy projects.

Their members were attracted by promises of social benefits that were available only to real leaders as well as various bonuses offered to ordinary members. The latter included a possibility to surf the internet at an office computer, money for working on elections and campaigns, and a chance to pass an exam if the teacher was a local youth leader. The situation evolved over several years and culminated in the establishment of Rosmolodezh (shortened from “Russian youth”), which is a ministry within the Russian government dedicated to socialising new leaders and fostering successful state-minded activists.

Young innovators first

The late 2000s are commonly known as the “Medvedev Thaw” and the failed modernisation of Russia. This was a period when the focus shifted from older to younger voters, which brought an increase in youth activity over the previous years. One of the consequences of this new trend was that the regional elite and the governors and mayors who had been occupying their offices since the 1990s were finally being replaced. These changes were a logical next step for the “young leadership” policies and were aimed at replacing Soviet-style administrators with effective and modern managers.

The nomination of Dmitry Medvedev as Putin’s presidential successor in 2008 was a signal to the liberal camp that there was an opportunity for change. The global economic crisis that took place at the same time additionally contributed to the strengthening of the importance of economic modernisation in Russia and the necessity to improve institutions that restrained opportunities for economic growth. Commitment to global technological trends was expressed with the “Four I’s”: innovation, investment, institutions and infrastructure.

Innovative ideas were primarily targeted at youth organisations, which, in turn, treated the new agenda as a social elevator. Throughout the country many initiatives were set up for young innovators, creators and start-ups. They were geared at the most talented students and university graduates (aged 20-27) who were expected to become the engine and hope for the future of Russia. As their result, some young specialists received additional opportunities, which they later used in their careers. Yet, their projects did little to contribute to Russia becoming a serious global player in technology. Thus, many young people either found jobs in large corporations or went abroad, which naturally postponed another possible youth protest.

As soon as the strongest and most charismatic leaders of the new generation were socialised, no threats seemed to appear for the rest of Medvedev’s presidency. However, the attention to the social elevators for young innovators revealed a problem of the elder generation, who had been removed from the agenda and who saw their opportunities becoming few and far between.

Not much hope

By the second decade of the 21st century these young people matured. They were, on average, in their 30s and wanted to experiment as executives and entrepreneurs. However, they felt that they were stuck in middle-level management with decreasing opportunities for career advancement. Putin’s 2011 announcement that he would again run for the presidency was a breaking point and evidence that new leaders were no longer needed. It was a return to the old way of doing things, with an endless rotation of the same guys. The young were doomed to remain middle-level managers without much hope for promotion. To express their anger at this situation they came out to the streets.

The 2011 “White Protest” was a phenomenon which would later, and on a much larger scale, repeat itself in Kyiv during the EuroMaidan. In both cases, people fought for their future, opportunities and dignity. However, while the Ukrainian revolution brought a change in political power, the Russian protesters of 2011/2012 had failed, for several reasons. Most of all, there were too few of those who protested and they did not manage to include social groups other than their own. Putin played it perfectly when he got back the support of public sector employees by promising to significantly increase their wages. It is also important to note that many of the protesters had too much to lose. They had families and mortgages. Living without free elections was certainly unpleasant, but ending up in prison or a hospital, or without a job or place to live was certainly worse.

After the first clashes in December 2011 the elite chose to support the Kremlin, thus restoring the status quo. The protests faded and were followed by some spectacular repressions. Additionally, starting in 2014 there was a visible rise of a new type of patriotic youth, one that centred on more traditional values. The rise of this ultra-conservative movement, however, did not last long. The rhetoric of “rising from our knees” became dated and the Russian public became tired with the bellicose language that they were bombarded with in relation to the conflict with Ukraine. “It’s enough to blame the whole world and quarrel all the time, we just want peace” was the general message that emerged during the parliamentary campaign in 2016.

Navalny

The unprecedented low turnout at the 2016 State Duma elections (47.8 per cent compared to 60.2 per cent in 2011) and the dull composition of elected MPs (despite restoring single-member districts) plunged the country into political and economic depression. The end of 2016 was defined by discussions on the upcoming centenary commemorations of the October Revolution and the apparent degradation of the whole opposition. The latter, it was clear, lacked a strong leader as even, matter-of-factly, Navalny was never treated as a serious challenger to Putin. Thus, the first reaction to his announcement made in early 2017 that he would run for the presidency in 2018 was quite sceptical. Not only was Navalny officially barred from participating in the election and his visibility and polling numbers were low, he also lacked a party and the financial support that would allow him to successfully oppose Putin. 

Two factors have helped change this situation, however. First, Navalny himself realised that the campaign needs to be taken seriously. Especially, as he is the first politician who has showed that he wants to really win against Putin. Second, Navalny’s messages had resonated with the younger generation. His online films, which went viral on social media, portrayed a future that they want to have. Thus, first in March and later in June 2017, they took to the streets to express these feelings. They were joined by their parents, older siblings and even grandparents. These demonstrations, however, have showed that unlike in other periods, there is no generational conflict between the protesters and their parents, which is confirmed by focus group research done by Sberbank in 2016. It has been replaced by a greater inter-generational learning in which, for instance, parents and grandparents are learning more about modern technologies from their children and grandchildren.

 Navalny is not striving to become the single leader of the opposition, nor does he claim to be the main liberal or conservative. His political statements seem to go beyond one ideology and rather aim at telling a story. The liberals view it as a story about the need to restore freedom and competition; the socialists see it as a story of social injustice and the need to change the distribution of wealth; and the nationalists see it as a story about protecting the country from “the agents of the West”. It just so happened that the new majority is gathering around him and the young people are the ones who now legitimise his campaign.

In March 2018 we will know how this presidential campaign ends. However, regardless of its final outcome and the social changes that may accompany it, we can already say today that the Russian youth is changing the country now. We may not realise the scale of their impact, but should wish them luck.

Translated by Olena Roguska

Anastasia Sergeeva is a co-founder and member of the For Free Russia Association, based in Warsaw. She emigrated from Russia in 2012 and now lives in Warsaw working as a political consultant and analyst.

Alexei Navalny, protest, Russia, Youth