There is no question – we are able to defend ourselves

Today we see Russia’s assertiveness, provocations and military bluster. Their armed forces are modernised and are adjusted to the modalities of contemporary warfare. But we are stronger too. We have secured our place in NATO and have proved that collective defence is still valid. The enhanced forward presence (a NATO programme which rotates multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – editor’s note) is an indicator of NATO’s credibility. At the same time, we continue to develop our own defence capabilities. Our strategy has become more straightforward and is known to Russia – we will fight for our security and independence, at any cost.

Therefore, I would say that the defence situation in the Baltics has been adjusted to the contemporary political situation and indeed has become more complicated. Of course, there is a degree of risk due to the unsafe and provocative military activity which we experience from Russia’s side. I think that the degree of deterrence, which we were able to reach thanks to NATO and our own capabilities, however, allows us to be more secure.  

How would you respond to those who, perhaps justifiably in some cases, insist that the local defence planners are money-hungry and the warnings of the security situation in the Baltic region are often exaggerated?

I would invite them to visit Latvia to see what we have been experiencing since we restored our independence in 1990. It is always easy to comment without having a clear understanding of the actual situation on the ground.

I have no doubt that the warnings are appropriate. We had a bad experience when our concerns were not taken into account after the conflict in Georgia in 2008. It should have been a wake-up call to the international community and not the second wake-up call in 2014 in Ukraine. Latvia has always been very cautious about Russia’s military activity and statements on bilateral and international levels. On the other hand, without appropriate financial resources and public support we would never be able to achieve the level of national capability development that we have today. Our planners have done a wonderful job which requires a high level of accountability towards the general population because it is with their consent that we will be able to allocate two per cent of Latvia’s GDP to national defence in 2018.

There has been much fuss made about the joint Russian and Belarusian war games at the end of September 2017, but they have not evidently lived up to the hype. Do you believe it is better to keep the Baltic societies “on edge” so they can defend themselves accordingly, if the enemy dares to invade?

Indeed, the massive media coverage produced a great deal of interest among the general population but the exercise itself was not meant to attract this much attention. They displayed similar capabilities during the 2009 and 2013 exercises. Yet, the reaction to previous exercises was calmer even though Russia had simulated a nuclear attack on Warsaw during the 2009 scenario. It seems to me that the change in the security situation of the region has made people particularly sensitive to defence issues. It is not our goal, however, to keep societies “on edge”. Our goal would be to have a resilient society able to withstand hybrid as well as traditional military aggression. Resilience of our population is necessary in order to take away any possible means of how to influence our population through information or cyber domains.

Our next step in this direction is to introduce state defence studies in public schools, starting in 2018. We hope that in long term it will bring up a responsible generation who will not take our independence for granted and will be prepared to actively engage in state defence. Our mental steadfastness will contribute to our military posture and therefore ensure more stable regional security dynamics. This requires continuous and deliberated work rather than continuous hype in the media.

Yet you have to agree that there are many people in the Baltics, including Latvians, who are getting tired of the never-ending story about the Russian threat.  What is the rational stance that Latvian authorities should assume in disseminating defence-related information? How to balance the information that it works efficiently?

There will always be those who will stand with us, those who will stand against us and those who are neutral. Our line should be consistent and should not be exaggerated. Due to various factors, which are beyond our control, we cannot persuade those who stand against our position, but we can disseminate information which is based on the reality we face. In contrast to Russia, Latvia does not need a foreign enemy to legitimise its policies or decisions. Latvia does not invent threats. Therefore, our rational stance would be to make such defence-related decisions about which there would be no problem or hesitation to talk about in public.

Do you believe Russia poses a real danger to Latvia and the entire Baltics?

We believe in what we see – a lack of transparency, harsh rhetoric and propaganda, large-scale military exercises on our borders and no respect for international rules and norms. We do not know Russia’s intentions or long-term interests in the region. We can only guess based on the evidence available to us. Due to our negative experience, we have to be prepared for the worst. I would say that Russia poses a threat not only to the Baltic states, but to the international community as a whole. We cannot continue to disregard its malicious activity in information cyberspace and other domains. Nevertheless, we are interested in a transparent and law-abiding Russia, which would allow both of our countries to prosper in pragmatic, cultural and economic relations. This is not possible at the moment, however, due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine since 2014.

Is Latvia more vulnerable than its other Baltic neighbours, Lithuania and Estonia?

We definitely do not feel more vulnerable, mainly because the defence co-operation among the Baltic states is strong and we are in the same boat when it comes to our common security. Since I took office as defence minister, my confidence in our defence capabilities has only grown. When I see and work with people who are committed to our national security there can be no other thoughts – we will be defended. Of course, there are vulnerabilities, but we share these vulnerabilities with Lithuania and Estonia.

However, Latvia is known for its large ethnic Russian communities, especially in Riga and Daugavpils. Do you believe the Kremlin is planning to exploit those communities?

Latvia is a multinational and multicultural country and our society consists of various nationalities. It is a normal process for the globalised times in which we live. Indeed, there are Russians in Latvia but we have to understand that these are Latvian Russians who belong to our country, serve in our national armed forces and national guard. They are Latvian citizens who have either inherited this status or chose to be a part of Latvia. A more important question to ask is how to make sure that future generations do not only think about their own individual welfare, but also about Latvia’s welfare. The Kremlin, on the other hand, can play any card against us, and the use of particular people and organisations in order to spread Russia’s narrative might be one of them. Actually, they are already using this strategy. The question is how self-content we are with our way of life in order to block their messages. I think that we are on the right track.

When compared to the other Baltic states, where do you believe Latvia’s defence capabilities have an edge?

In Latvia we know what kind of capabilities we need to cover our weak points, that would be appropriate for our geography, critical infrastructure etc. Despite our close geographical proximity, these criteria are different from the other Baltic states. Estonia, for example, has a larger shoreline and lots of small islands. Lithuania, on the other hand, has a prolonged border with Belarus and Russia. All these factors must be taken into account while planning certain defence capabilities and defence plans. More importantly, we need to make sure that there is no competition in these matters because we cannot allow comparing whose defence capabilities are better. Defence capabilities should be appropriate and well-coordinated among all the Baltic states and our NATO allies. We should focus on enhancing our defence co-operation by supplementing each of our own capabilities.

How would you characterize Latvia’s weak points?

Our defence is proportional to our national defence budget and at the same time it is limited by it. Our commitment is two per cent of GDP, which we will start allocating next year for defence. Therefore, we are as defence-minded as France or the United Kingdom, which allocate corresponding resources to their defence. We might speak about certain capabilities, which none of the Baltic states can afford and where we need assistance of our allies. These capabilities include gaps in the air and on the sea. NATO’s enhanced forward presence is on the ground but all three Baltic states are vulnerable when it comes to the air and sea.

Russia has not conducted a military attack since the annexation of Crimea and its incursions into Ukraine over three years ago. How would you interpret this signal? Could it mean that Russia is not interested in a full-scale war?

Imagine you had asked this question at the end of 2013. At that moment Russia had been peaceful for more than five years. I think the question is not about Russia’s “behaviour” but the continuity of the Kremlin’s strategic thinking. There are no indicators that would allow us to think Russia has become less aggressive. It is quite the opposite if, for instance, we look at its campaign in Syria. Moreover, Russia has become more vocal and more confident when it comes to protecting their so-called “national interests”. It would be correct to say that Russia has become even better prepared to wage a full-scale war anywhere in the world. Therefore, I am sure that we have to remain vigilant, unless Russia agrees to “play by the rules” and be more transparent in their military practices.

What does Russian military activity look like near the Latvian border?

Russia has been decisively strengthening its military capabilities and military presence in its Western Military District since 2008. We saw not only an improvement of its military capabilities through modernisation and the introduction of new military equipment, like the Helicopter Base in Ostrov, but also a purely numerical expansion of its armed forces, which is many times greater than the number of NATO forces in the region. Therefore, we view Russia’s argument that their reinforcement is a response to NATO activities as groundless.

Moreover, we invited Russia to sign a bilateral agreement on confidence and security, building measures in order to create verifiable transparency between our two countries on a legal and long-term basis. Russia refused to sign the agreement, which we understood as a certain indicator of Russia’s intention to remain secretive.

It is estimated that Russia can activate its military or a full-range offensive against NATO within 24-28 hours upon a political decision in Moscow. Would Latvia be able to properly defend itself through the crucial hours until NATO’s help arrives?

I have full confidence in our military – we have willing and skilled soldiers, appropriate defence plans and military capabilities to defend our country. However, we do not want war. Therefore, our strategy is deterrence, which is based on collective defence and national capabilities. The NATO battle group is already stationed in Latvia with the goal to deter. We are on the same page as our NATO allies, they share our threat perception. Therefore, there is no question about whether we will be able to defend ourselves or not. We will.

How has the Warsaw agreement strengthened the alliance’s military presence in Latvia?

The 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw was a historic milestone for us and produced concrete decisions to station the enhanced forward presence battle group in the Baltic states and Poland. Around 4,000 NATO troops from more than 20 member states have committed to station their troops and military equipment in the region. It is the biggest demonstration of collective defence, solidarity and unity since the end of the Cold War and there are no doubts that this decision comes at the right time and place. On the ground, co-operation among the EFP nations in Latvia has proven to be a great success – we are slowly building a bridge of two cultures across the Atlantic Ocean – between Latvia and Canada, which is the framework nation of the NATO battle group in Latvia.

Beyond the current deterrence measures that you mentioned, what else should be done to boost the region’s security?

Deterrence is achieved through collective defence and the strengthening of our own national forces and defence capabilities. During the last four years we were able to achieve significant results which makes our military highly capable and committed to fight for our country. NATO’s approach to Russia is deterrence and strategic dialogue. We see that Russia does not positively view NATO’s activity in the region, which is the first sign that deterrence actually works. We see, however, potential additions on how to strengthen deterrence in the region – namely, the EFP battle group that would be enabled in the air and at sea. Another important aspect is strategic communication and our ability to communicate decisively and coordinated in order to refute possible provocations in a timely manner.

Has your ministry researched what part of the Latvian population would actively engage in a guerrilla against an aggressor?

Researching public sentiments towards defence related questions is one of our priorities which would allow us to better understand how well our policies work. Latvia’s defence, however, is primarily ensured by a professional army and national guard, but citizens should be ready to resist in any way possible.

Do you support the idea of mandatory conscription in Latvia?

Since the restoration of independence, we were able to develop professional armed forces and capable national guard. Introducing conscription would mean taking away resources which sustain our forces. Financially, it is impossible at the moment. We need to find other ways to ensure a larger participation in our armed forces and national reserve based on values and patriotism.

How do the Latvian government and your ministry fight Russian propaganda? Certainly it is a challenge considering the large number of Russian-speaking Latvians…

In an era where there is an overabundance of information and the notion of post-truth, we try to shed light on what the truth is in one situation or another. Sometimes it is challenging, but sometimes it is easy. When propaganda concerns the situation in Latvia – whether it is a narrative of the rise of fascism or the violation of human rights of our Russian population – it is relatively easy. We invite people to come and see the real situation in Latvia with their own eyes. They would be surprised to see that Latvia is way better than it is portrayed in Russia.

The difficultly lies in the type of propaganda that is low profile and has a prolonged influence on the minds of our population. When a person starts to accept and believe a narrative he or she is provided, then it is difficult to take such a person out of this bubble. People are usually biased against information which does not support their existing views or beliefs. Therefore, it is more complicated to provide people with reliable information or proof that their existing bubble is based on misinterpretation and deception in order to legitimise certain political processes or foreign policy interests.

Raimonds Bergmanis has been serving as the minister of defence of Latvia since 2015. 

Linas Jegelevicius is a Lithuanian journalist and editor in chief of The Baltic Times.

Baltic, defence, Latvia, security