Visas for Georgians are not enough

Giorgi Margvelashvili, President of Georgia, on the left, and Johannes Hahn. Photo courtesy of European Commission

Lack of clarity

Even though some processes underway – such as the merger of the main TV stations with media holdings connected to Ivanishvili and the constitutional reform which subordinates the institution of the president to the parliament – invoke justified fears of excessive concentration of power, Georgia remains an exception in the context of the South Caucasus. It is the only country from the region that has managed to sign an Association Agreement with the EU as well as an agreement about the creation of a free trade zone and visa liberalisation with countries of the Schengen zone. The situation is in stark contrast to Armenia (which resigned from the possibility of EU association in 2013 under pressure from the Kremlin) and Azerbaijan (which has been trying to balance between Russia and the West in order to avoid any deeper integration with either side of the geopolitical gamble).

The positive character of Georgia-EU relations does not mean, however, that there are no clashes in the relationship. The issue that has been the biggest obstacle in Georgia’s way to the EU and NATO structures has been the disparity of interests among the decision-makers in Tbilisi and some of Europe’s leading capitals. During the whole period, the West has not been able to develop a common position on the issue of Georgia’s prospects of membership in the EU and NATO. The NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 can be seen as a symbol of this struggle. It was in Bucharest when the deeply divided states of NATO took the Membership Action Plan off the table. It has not been offered since. This example, although related to the issue of NATO membership, mirrors the current problem in Georgian-EU relations.

It is symptomatic that the liberalisation of the visa regime for Georgians only took place in March this year, nearly one and a half years after Tbilisi met all the necessary conditions. The delay was due to internal political reasons within the EU, unrelated to Georgian preparations. It also seems likely that the future of the Eastern Partnership will be viewed differently in Brussels than Tbilisi. In mid-July during a conference in Batumi on the Eastern Partnership, Georgia’s ambassador to the EU, Natalie Sabanadze, clearly noted the existence of disparate perceptions. According to her, and contrary to what is claimed in Brussels, participation in the Eastern Partnership and association with the EU is a geopolitical choice from the Georgian perspective. The Georgian ambassador stressed that even if EU decision-makers declare that the co-operation with Tbilisi is not directed against the interests of the Russian Federation, it will be perceived as such by the Kremlin.

The Georgian diplomat further noted that it is good to have a clear goal to pursue and in the current situation the rule “more for more”, which allowed the EU to gain real influence on its partners, is increasingly disappearing. Against this background, the ambassador stressed that if the essence of the Eastern Partnership were to be preserved, it would be necessary to present the countries which are continuing the integration efforts with a new offer in order to take it to the next level. At the moment, when Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova have de facto exploited the current reservoir of the main incentives planned by the EU, it would be hard not to agree, at least partially, with these statements. 

Exploiting the divide

The arguments put forward by Sabanadze have been mirrored in public opinion polls (from April 2016). According to data from the US National Democratic Institute, 39 per cent of Georgians claim that the change will not bring them any benefits, despite common awareness of visa regime liberalisation with Schengen zone states. At the same time, 78 per cent of respondents thought that Georgian citizens cannot afford a trip to the EU anyway. One 27-year old, named Giorgi, living permanently in Warsaw told me: “At first, there was huge joy that we got the visa free regime, and some of my friends went to the EU for the first time. However, attitudes in society are much more realistic. The vast majority cannot afford to travel. Nevertheless, of course, it is still important for us to receive something in return for our efforts.”

The data show one more trend: the main reason for joining the EU, apart from economic factors (59 per cent), are security matters (36 per cent). The results contrast with the fact that the possibility of visa free travel encourages only about one-fifth of Georgians to support further integration. Hence, it remains an open question whether soft solutions, such as lifting roaming for Eastern Partnership countries, will be sufficient in the long-term. They are undeniably important, but should they not be accompanied by actions that would offer Georgians a closer perspective of EU membership? From the Georgian point of view, the question is currently independent of the current political climate in Brussels, Berlin and Paris.

The fact that there are disparities between Georgian and European decision-makers is clear for Moscow. Recently, we have observed an increase in Russian propaganda. The Russian state appears to be trying to exploit the existing political problems between Georgia and the West (e.g., the lack of perspectives to join the EU and NATO) and promote a positive view of the Russian Federation. Georgia, like Russia, is a country strongly rooted in the tradition of the Orthodox culture, and despite the ongoing generational changes, it is the church which remains the one of main carriers of Georgian identity. The situation is clearly in contrast with the liberal, consumptionist western world. The divide is stressed by the Russian and pro-Russian media and individuals who present the image of Europe rotting and been taken over by homosexuals, deviants and Satanists. For example, the Georgian audience may hear that rape in Europe is extremely common and often occurs in broad daylight, that EU institutions ban the christening of babies and equate the Orthodox Church with terrorist organisations. Such messages are found on television, in the press and online as well as in slogans promoted by politicians, especially those who are currently outside the parliament.

Reversing course?

Georgian organisations and officials have highlighted how the Russian propaganda machine is working to counter pro-West attitudes in Georgia. It has employed Russian government-owned online media, such as Sputnik as well as other types of information platforms, which are indirectly financed by Moscow. The network of connections in the latter case is quite complicated. Its core is the flow of financial resources through a number of non-governmental organisations and private interests to secure financing of pro-Russian media. Such intermediaries include institutions such as Caucasian Cooperation, the Eurasia Institute and Eurasian Choice. Their capital allows the operation of information agencies such as Saqinform and Iverioni, the Georgia & World newspaper and the online Patriot TV. The pro-Russian narrative is aimed at building Russia’s soft power in Georgia and eventually triggering a long-term change in the geopolitical orientation of Georgians. The narrative may be falling on a fertile ground, especially if the West appears weak and divided and if it does not present a unified position on the possibility of Tbilisi’s further integration with the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures.

At the same time, it is the fear of losing Georgia’s national identity that is the main factor shifting Georgians away from the EU, next to the fear of cooling relations with Russia. As a result, over the past number of years the proportion of Georgians not supporting EU membership has doubled (currently it is at ten to 20 per cent). Moreover, the level of support for integration with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union structures after 2015 has been hovering between 20 and 30 per cent (23 per cent according to research from June 2017).

Despite the openly pro-western orientation of Georgia, in the long-term one cannot discount a rise of pro-Russian sympathies. Those responsible for the situation, however, will not be solely Russians. EU politicians will certainly shoulder some blame for it as well.

The publication of this text was co-financed with a grant by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the framework of Public Diplomacy 2017 – II component Eastern dimension of Polish foreign policy 2017 and in partnership with Eastbook.eu. The publication expresses the views of the author only and should not be identified with the official position of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Translated by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska

Mateusz Kubiak is a graduate of Eastern Studies and International Relations at the University of Warsaw. He works as an analyst in Salvor i Wspólnicy.