Russia is unprepared for the next world order

Photo: Valdis Kauliņš and The Rīga Conference 2017

The 21st century international environment will increasingly feature not just state actors, but also non-state actors, ranging from terrorist groups to big multinational companies. Without change, Russia will struggle in a globalised world where trade transcends sovereignty, where threats of global pandemics are on the rise, where climate change is accelerating and where the ubiquity and multiplicity of information make it virtually impossible to control.

That said, this world is still evolving. So Russia has some time to adapt, although not much. It retains considerable soft power potential. It has an educated population and could do extraordinary things, for example, with renewable energy. Imagine, too, a Russia that is well-governed, not necessarily a democracy, but more effectively governed than it is today. That Russia would have a tremendous capacity to influence neighbouring societies and countries through its sheer geographical extent. Its soft power could be enormous. But it has to change itself in order to make that soft power count.

What about its hard power?

Of course, Russia will still have nuclear weapons and be militarily powerful. It has the potential to become a multidimensional great power. But if it continues to rely on old stereotypes and traditional methods of projecting power and influence, it will find it very hard to remain any kind of great power. The example of 16th century Spain is relevant here. The Spanish Empire did not collapse overnight. It just became less and less important over a long period of time. It was the global power, yet by the end of the 18th century it was a regional backwater. This is the threat that Russia faces. In time, trends and events may overtake it and leave it behind.

Do you think now is the time Russia should be making changes…?

Now is the window of opportunity for Russia, yes.

What kind of steps should it take to prepare for this new world disorder? If you were in Vladimir Putin’s shoes, what would you do?

Of course, many in the West hope that Russia will become a liberal democracy. But this is not going to happen – at least not soon. I do not think that the Putin regime necessarily has to follow western economic and political prescriptions. Russia is a particular kind of country with a particular strategic and political culture. We need to be realistic. But I would say that the first step for the regime is to recognise that there is a problem. That Russia has to modernise and that certain issues need to be addressed, such as endemic corruption. Even if Putin cannot “solve” corruption, he can at least begin to tackle the problem seriously. He can also take steps to develop Russia’s backward infrastructure – not through grand showcase projects but by building infrastructure that helps people live better and easier lives. It is unrealistic to believe that Russia will be a western-style democracy, but it is not unrealistic to expect improved governance.

Look at China. Xi Jinping recognised that corruption could not be tolerated indefinitely, but had to be addressed as a matter of urgency. In fact, China has become more authoritarian under his leadership, but in some respects it has also become better governed. Russia needs to resolve fundamental issues of the rule of law, governance and social welfare. Ultimately, modernisation is a frame of mind. It is about understanding that you cannot simply rely on your traditional assets and habits. You have to change your mindset, allow greater space for individual initiative. The natural instinct of the Russian state is to control everything. But it needs to allow much greater autonomy and freedom to release people’s creative energies.

In a sense, Russia has painted itself into a corner.

There is what I call Russia’s modernisation dilemma, which is akin to a Catch-22 situation. On the one hand, to remain a great power in the 21st century Russia needs to dispose of different forms of influence. It cannot just rely on its traditional advantages. On the other hand, to achieve modernisation the regime would have to fundamentally change the system of political relations and governance. This will be extremely difficult and there will be costs and victims; the regime could lose legitimacy and even fall. So it is a really difficult choice. The question is will the regime muddle on and postpone a decision on modernisation until it is too late, or will it show some vision?

Is there any indication that this vision could be somewhere in the Kremlin?

You see signs of this vision in the new economic strategy. And in the new foreign policy recommendations put out by the Russian International Affairs Council, which is associated with the foreign ministry. Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, has written about how Russia needs to make some big political and economic changes. The fact that there is some debate about this is positive. But in Russia, they are famous for having great ideas, formulating the most perfect policies and then never implementing them. So we will have to see what is actually done.

March 2018 will the next presidential election in Russia. What do you expect we will see during the campaign and election? Obviously Putin is staying for at least another six years…

For Putin, it is important to achieve minimum result of 70/70 – 70 per cent turnout and 70 per cent victory in the first round. Seventy is a good figure because it shows that he is very popular – most western politicians could only dream of 70 per cent support. But it is also low enough to be more or less credible. It is not like North Korea or Central Asian states where the leader gets nearly 99 per cent of the vote. Putin wants to demonstrate that Russia has a functioning democracy, that he is very popular and that the Russian people subscribe to his vision of a strong, resurgent Russia.

I believe that Putin wants 2018 to be a popular re-affirmation of his personal legitimacy and of Putinism more generally. He will likely campaign on national consolidation and the restoration of Russian national pride, and project himself as the visionary statesman, creating a new and better Russia. There will also be a lot of talk about modernisation. Modernisation has become a dirty word in Russia, but I think it will come back into fashion. The overall message will be that under Putin’s wise leadership, Russia will become a leading player in world affairs, with a vibrant economy and socially just society.

Do you think the sanctions will play any role?

The only role that sanctions could play would be to make Putin even more popular. The European Union and the United States had no choice but to impose sanctions following the annexation of Crimea and the Russian military intervention in eastern Ukraine. But they mistakenly believed that sanctions would lead to a softening of Russian policy. This will not happen. If sanctions are still in place (and I assume they will be) they will either have zero effect or they will make Putin even more popular. But I think Putin will campaign mainly on domestic issues, presenting himself as the Russian people’s problem-solver.

Well, he has already been in power for 17 years, wasn’t that enough time to solve all the problems?

Indeed, but for much of that time he came across as highly successful. For example, between 1998 and 2008 Russians had ten years of 12 per cent annual growth in incomes. Many Russians see Putin as the guy who delivered. And although recent years have been difficult, the Kremlin has been able to shift responsibility for Russia’s difficulties onto external factors, such as the global financial crisis and western sanctions. But I think Putin realises that the Russian people can only dine out on glory for so long. They may enjoy seeing him embarrass western leaders. But ultimately that is not what puts food on the table or a roof over their heads. Putin will have to deliver more on the domestic agenda.

Tell me a bit about your latest book, which was just published…

The book is entitled A Wary Embrace and is about China-Russia relations. Back in 2008, I wrote a book on the same subject called Axis of Convenience. At that time, very few people were writing about Sino-Russian relations. Over the past decade, however, it has become a really hot topic. And some of my original ideas have been challenged, which is very healthy. A Wary Embrace returns to my original conclusions to see whether they stand the test of time. And, on the whole, I think they do.

While the China-Russia relationship has developed better than many people expected, its fundamental character has not changed. It is still an essentially pragmatic and unsentimental engagement. Beijing and Moscow agree on certain things like opposing liberal interventionism. They both worry about an excessively powerful United States. But their priorities and interests can and do differ, depending on the context.

Perhaps the main difference between them is that China ultimately sees itself as a power, if not on the same level as the US, then certainly its only true global partner and interlocutor. Russia, on the other hand, has a tripolar vision of the world, in which it is the great balancer between China and the US, and between East and West. To make good on this vision, it resorts to various bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Bilaterally, it seeks constructive engagement with key players, not just China, but also Japan, India, Germany and France. It hopes to rebuild relations with Europe and preserve some level of manageable interaction with the US. Multilaterally, Russia promotes various international institutions such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and its latest idea, a Greater Eurasia. Russia’s aim is to use this mix of bilateralism and multilateralism to establish a framework within which it stands as an independent and indispensable centre of global power.

In fact that view of being the balance contradicts your theory on Russia unable to cope in the new world disorder…

Moscow hopes for a seamless transition from the US-led liberal world order to a multipolar order in which a few great powers co-manage the world. But the problem for Russia is that the liberal order is falling apart and this new world order has yet to emerge. The transition between the old and the new will be long and difficult. And this presents Russia with significant challenges.

One interesting trend that emerged, particularly after the election of Donald Trump, was the greater call for protectionism, even anti-globalism, in the West, in a way mirroring the Russian narrative on globalisation. And this, in fact, is a point where China and Russia diverge, as both see globalisation very differently…

I have argued this consistently. China, for all that it dislikes about US assertiveness, nevertheless appreciates that the US-led liberal order has provided the ideal framework for its spectacular growth over the last 40 years. China has been transformed from a near-medieval country, like North Korea, to be the world’s second power today. Indeed, it has been the prime beneficiary of globalisation – much more so than the United States or any western country. So China would like to retain the US-led order, but with changes that reflect its enhanced influence and status, and further favour its interests.

The Russians, by contrast, see themselves as the number one casualty of globalisation. They think that the US-led order has cheated them. Without it, they believe, there would have been a much easier and effective transition from the old Soviet Union to the new Russia. So they regard themselves, rightly or wrongly, as the victims of US global leadership. A new world order is therefore a much more urgent priority for Moscow than it is for Beijing.

Bobo Lo is an associate research fellow with the Russia/NIS Center at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia.

Adam Reichardt is the editor in chief of New Eastern Europe.

Bobo Lo, China, Russia, Russia-China relations