How Russia interprets 1917

Nikita Petrov (left) during the “Europe with a View to the Future” forum held at the European Solidarity Centre in Gdańsk, May 25 – 27th 2017. Photo: D. Linkowski/Archiwum ECS

So, what can be done? After all, it is not only about 1917, it is also about the mass repressions that occurred in the 1930s and the Sovietisation of Central and Eastern Europe. Russian academics that serve, and have served the state, do not have honest answers. What we see now is an attempt to find some kind of new ideology.

Great Russian Revolution

Everything used to be very simple. In Soviet times, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would publish an abstract for each anniversary: for the centenary of the birth of Lenin or for the 50th anniversary of the revolution, for example. These abstracts, or bullet points, were what we call the ideological programme. There is no such powerful ideological decision-making centre in Russia today. However, there is state propaganda. As we analyse what Russian state propaganda does, we can understand some contours, some hints of the fact that new ideas in relation to the year 1917 have appeared in Russia.

What is interesting is that the two events of 1917 have been combined in today’s Russian historical discourse: the February Revolution and the October coup. This is now officially called the Great Russian Revolution of 1917. The word “great” emphasises the importance of these events, their significance for subsequent history and the word “revolution” emphasises certain breaks with what existed before 1917. Yet in Soviet times the events of 1917 were discussed in the global historical context. It has always been said that the “Great October Revolution” changed the fate of humanity and the mood of Soviet Messianism that was laid in the basis of the directives for the Sovietisation of neighbouring countries (where the capabilities of the Soviet Union could reach). Today, of course, the concept of revolution is a negative one. The Kremlin sees revolution as a destructive act. This is emphasised in all sorts of statements that can be heard in the media.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that there is no shortage of activities devoted to the subject of the revolution in Russia. If we look at programmes and the research of various universities we will see a lot of academic conferences. Interestingly, during these events you would be able to hear the narrative about history, the narrative about 1917, but there is no clear and precise concept of how to treat it today. The state, however, sends a clear signal: revolution is bad. In this case, the state’s signal is much more utilitarian and aimed at current events. When we look at recent publications and at the movies made about the revolution, we see that the issue of foreign intervention is overemphasised. The influence of the British forces, the Free Masons, and the German General staff are all present. The narrative is attached to some conspiratorial explanation of malicious forces trying to destroy the great and glorious, and strong, Russian Empire.

Of course, the subject of foreign money is surprisingly relevant now. If you analyse the official speeches of Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov (the Russian foreign minister) you will hear that there should be no interference in the affairs of other countries. The question of revolution, particularly the “colour revolutions”, is something that fills the Kremlin with fear and paranoia. And this is how attitudes towards 1917 are now being shaped. I would not be surprised if we hear at least one narrative on 1917 that labels it a “coloured revolution”, carried out with foreign aid in order to destroy the wonderful country of Russia.

20th century baggage

When we speak of an historical analysis of the causes that led to the 1917 revolution, the seriousness of the domestic issues that existed in tsarist Russia are largely ignored. The problem with the national liberation movement, which naturally entailed the changes that had taken place after the year 1917, is also ignored. In addition, the fact that Russia, by entering the First World War, signed its own death sentence is often disregarded. Therefore, Russians have a very underdeveloped attitude towards the two revolutions that took place a century ago. Moreover, the attitude towards Lenin is also undeveloped. On the one hand, it is clear that Lenin and his ideas have all but disappeared from the Russian public space. On the other hand, Lenin remains a symbol. There is Lenin as a body and there is Lenin as a sacred object (which is located in a mausoleum on the Red Square). I am confident (even if a decision is made about whether Lenin will be buried or not) he would be buried under the dressing of Orthodox-Imperial values because it is a part of the Kremlin’s rhetoric.

The rhetoric of returning to and protecting traditional values is very reactionary. It drags all the baggage of the 20th century, a lot of it is Russian baggage (including the imperial heritage), into the 21st century. This imperial view of Russia is surprising to many. However many argue that Russia has always been like this. It was, it is and it will continue be imperial, xenophobic and nationally oriented. Although in this case, the nation refers to the community of peoples living on the territory of Russia. This is very dangerous, because Russia is a multi-ethnic state. To underline the issue of Russianness and its special Orthodox values is perilous. Nevertheless, Russia now stands precisely on this path.

Lastly, when we talk about Russian policy today, it should be noted that it has become both imperial and hostile in its rhetoric. This is an interesting phenomenon – as some sort of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist foreign policy is being returned and intended to divide the international community. The second is an attempt, in some way, to create spheres of influence, with even some talk of a “Yalta 2.0” to decide the fate of third countries behind their backs. This is the policy that failed. It is a consequence of the fact that the attempt to replay the historical process of the 20th century is not appropriate for Russia’s present day foreign and domestic policy.

Dead-end system

Returning back to the academic discussion that exists in Russia, the October coup can be also called a counterrevolution and some historians do argue this. After all, the question is not about what is allowed and what is not allowed, it is more about what is allowed in the mainstream. And the mainstream is actually where the state sends its signals through state propaganda. As mentioned earlier, the notion of revolution is generally considered bad in the eyes of the state. In this way, the state has been quite consistently returning to this point, and moreover it rather firmly stands on this imperial-state path.

There was a good discussion on how the Russians privatised the revolution and transferred everything into a new state and imperial phase. In fact, this has been happening since the late 1920s, such as the 1950s when there was a new understanding of national-Soviet statehood. It was not about Russians anymore – even though Stalin often promoted the word “Russian” – but it was understood as the “nation” of the Commonwealth of Soviet Nations. Those nations which sought to withdraw from the Soviet Union were considered to be in error. It was called “bourgeois nationalism”. A healthy form of nationalism in the Soviet sense was when everyone understands that we are special, that we are Soviet. This is Messianism. This is what Soviet citizens were taught.

Some have argued even further that what is taking place in Russian society is a certain type of fascistisation. I would argue that it is not fascism, but that our society does bear some features of Nazism. After all, fascism implies certain forms of organisation of society while Nazism means basically one thing: blood and soil. For the Kremlin today, these concepts are not spoken directly, but they are implied. Not so long ago Putin said that the Russians (not just those living in Russia) are the most divided nation in the world. When I heard that, I recalled another speaker who said the same thing about Germans in 1938. Everybody knows how that ended. This understanding of the “Russian world”, of the “blood and soil”, has awakened in people. Does the current militaristic frenzy in Russia resonate with the population? Unfortunately, yes, because it is very easy to wake these low features: our-ness, us vs. them.  Unfortunately, it is impossible now to eradicate this from the consciousness, or to re-educate the population.

The social situation is largely due to the Russian system. The system wants to continue to exist and wants to develop, but the path which it has entered is absolutely at a dead end. The youth protests, which took place recently, show once again that young people understand they do not want to live in a country that is politically and economically backwards. They do not want to live in a country that has already been subjected to international isolation. Yet it is impossible to break out of this isolation without changing policy. And it is impossible to change policy without losing the face of the Kremlin elite, hence the dead-end situation.

Russian revanchism

Konstantin Zatulin, a member of the Duma who chairs the committee for Russian nationals abroad, has said that “for 20 years we’ve heard the voices”. This is an illustrative demagogic Russian expression. In fact, the Kremlin has been organising these kinds of voices for the past 25 years. In such regions as Crimea (or where other conflicts were), Kremlin forces has tried to raise public opinion in favour of Russia in opposition to the West and a western-oriented direction. The organisation of these voices is a fact known to everyone. The efforts include the propaganda machine and the “building” of relations along with visits by Russian officials, including Zatulin, who was the incendiary of the situation in Crimea. He was one of the creators of Russia’s revanchist policy.

When we talk about 2008 and Russia’s aggression against Georgia, we have to wonder whether some blame should be placed on the European Union. Is there some fault of the western world as well? I would answer yes, because when the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan was signed (which brought a ceasefire to the conflict – editor’s note) then it somehow was immediately forgotten. This is what can be called a plan of pacification by the aggressor. On the other hand, it was necessary to demand the implementation of a plan that everyone quickly forgot. Today, when we talk about the situation with Ukraine, the same thing could happen. It would be a mistake if everyone just calmed down and thought that the aggression is over and nothing else will happen.

This essay is adapted from a discussion during the “Europe with a View to the Future” forum held at the European Solidarity Centre in Gdańsk, May 25-27th 2017.

Translated by Yulia Oreshina

Nikita Petrov is a Russian historian and vice chairman of the board of Memorial’s scientific research centre.

1917, history, Nikita Petrov, Russian revolutions