Putin and his monsters

Photo: The Presidential Press and Information Office (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Worrying sense

The period of confrontation started with the State Duma elections in December 2011, when the Russian middle class and creative young people demanded political change after clear falsifications. Putin reacted to the protests in Moscow and other big cities with divisive rhetoric. His administration organised large rallies in order to mobilise his target audience – the byudzhetniki (pensioners, workers from state-controlled enterprises and citizens of medium-sized and small towns). At one of these giant gatherings in Moscow’s Luzhniki stadium, Putin exclaimed: “Let’s all die together near Moscow!” (Умремте ж вместе под Москвой). It was a quote from the Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov, but it became a key phrase of the presidential term. Two years later, it resulted in a hybrid war in the east of Ukraine.

The mobilisation tactics helped Putin draw the public’s attention away from the protests of 2011-2012, but it is far from convenient at the start of a new political cycle. Moreover there is a significant demand for change in domestic policy. Ordinary Russians, especially those who vote for Putin, may not agree that after the annexation of Crimea, Russia is now in the same boat as North Korea and Iran, but definitely feel that their country is not as it was six years ago. Managers from state-owned enterprises and banks experience the increasing scale of the problem as Russian money has become toxic for international markets as a result of the sanctions.

The worrying sense that no one can be safe is now growing inside Russia. And it is not only the result of state-coordinated attempts to re-establish the repertoire of the Stalin period with the search for enemies and traitors. The foreign agent law, which went into effect at the end of 2012, was targeting NGOs receiving financial support from abroad. And it has become increasingly difficult for intellectuals to make independent films or theatre productions with government funds. The clearest example is the case of one of the most prominent theatre directors in Russia, Kirill Serebrennikov. He is now under house arrest after charges of embezzlement of state money. His Gogol-centre theatre is a progressive stage in Moscow and is often visited by liberal Russians but also supported by some senior officials. After Serebrennikov’s trial, the well-known editor and publisher Irina Prokhorova expressed her concerns, which are felt by many now in Russia. “It is a clear message to all creative and intellectual people in Russia that the same can happen to anyone who does not accept the will of the ruling regime,” she said to reporters.

It is also a tough and dangerous time for those inside the system: federal ministers, regional governors and businessmen working on state contracts. Alexey Ulyukaev, a former minister of economic development, was arrested and charged with corruption in connection with oil sales. This signals rising tension inside the Russian elite, especially between the so-called siloviki (those related to the security services and military) and the semi-liberal groups of officials. The liberal governor of the Kirov region, Nikita Belyh, is in custody since the summer 2016 after being accused of receiving a “large bribe” of 400,000 euros. This case is now characterised as an FSB provocation co-ordinated by the Kremlin.

The situation after 2014 is described by Russian state propaganda as “the new normal”. Yet many groups inside Russia do not feel the same. The political elite do not want to go against Putin, but at the same time they are nervous because of the conflict with the West and the increased insecurity it is bringing about. That is why a significant demand for change, in both domestic policy and international relations, is not visible in the official agenda six months prior to the election.

Stuck between past and future

The independent Levada Center’s most recent poll (April 2017) found that nearly half of Russians (48 per cent) would vote for Putin if the elections were held then. Since people want to see a more positive approach towards domestic problems, Putin has to formulate a new agenda before the election. The RBC agency reported that the president may focus on trust, justice and respect as the main components of his campaign. Though according to the business daily Vedomosti, Putin is struggling to find an “image of the future” where he can run for the presidency.

The failure in seeking a future should not come as a surprise. During the last several years, Putin has specifically focused on Russia’s past. He masterfully made use of the fears and expectations of many Russians who are still traumatised as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The hybrid operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine were perceived by a large proportion of this audience as an attempt to restore the Soviet Union. However, the subsequent developments have shown that the Kremlin has neither the political will nor the resources to achieve this aim. Moreover Putin can no longer provide stability, even for his core audience (i.e., Russians aged 50 and older). The year 2018 will also be a challenging one for the pension system. The government will not be able to tackle the problem of its growing deficit as the federal budget will also run out of reserve fund resources. This will lead to an inevitable increase of the retirement age, which is one of the most unpopular issues among Putin’s voters hoping for state support.

The average amount of a monthly state pension in Russia is 200 US dollars. According to forecasts the real level of a pensioner’s income in 2020 will be lower than in 2014. The savings component of pensions has been frozen by a governmental decision and according to Anton Siluanov, the finance minister, it was spent to support Crimea. The problem of the collapsing pension system is highly sensitive for Russian taxpayers and in a normal situation an open discussion would be the cornerstone of the presidential campaign. Putin’s team, however, apparently does not want to risk his image as being the “guarantor of stability” by raising such a sensitive issue. That is why the decision on pensions will not be announced until after the election in the next political cycle of 2018-2024.

The large-scale crisis of the pension system illustrates the situation that Putin faces before the new election. At the same time, he has little experience of a public debate on such an unpopular agenda. Even during the pre-moderated “direct line” television show in June this year, Putin avoided a clear answer to the question about plans to increase the retirement age, leaving the audience concerned about their prospects. In previous years he also demonstrated a surprising inability to respond in a sensible way to questions from ordinary Russians. For example, he said to one man from a remote village in the Far East: “Why do you need cars if you don’t have roads?” The insensitivity to the needs of Russians makes Putin’s administration seek a more loyal and less experienced audience.

How Putin meets the digital age

Putin has already reached out to two target groups before the official start of his campaign – parents and their children (including students who will vote for the first time next year at the age of 18). On the eve of international children’s day the president met with animators, including the creators of internationally popular animation films like Smeshariki and Masha and the Bear. The meeting was organised in order to increase ratings and to start work on targeting these voters. The idea was developed by political experts inside the Putin administration but was laughed at by Twitter users.

In fact it was only the beginning of a series of meetings. In June, Putin handed Russian passports out to the most talented 14-year-old students. He then welcomed school teachers from different regions of Russia to the Kremlin. The president also declared 2018-2027 to be the decade of childhood. In July, Putin took part in a question and answer session with gifted children at the Sirius educational centre near Sochi. It was even possible to send him questions via social media, even though Putin himself is not an active internet user. The meeting was broadcasted by state-controlled television and most of the topics were far from politics.

These moves were certainly an attempt to show that Putin cares about the future of the younger generation, including education issues. But it was more important to demonstrate that the Kremlin has not lost control of the young Russians after the opposition rallies that took place in March and June this year. Many demonstrators were surprisingly young and they came to the streets after Alexei Navalny accused the prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, of massive corruption on his YouTube channel. The state’s response was brutal and unambiguous. In St Petersburg alone, more than 500 protesters, including school children, were detained and over 100 were arrested.

The live question and answer session was designed to demonstrate that beyond the “street hooligans” detained in March and June 2017, there is another type of young Russian – one that is passionate about the advantages of the digital age, but not politically opposed to the Kremlin. In fact the event revealed a growing gap between the new generation and the Russian president, who turns 65 this year. For example, Putin mentioned that he still watches films on video cassettes – a fact which made him obviously old-fashioned for the YouTube generation.

Nevertheless the internet and social media are among the top priorities for the presidential campaign. In September Putin visited the offices of Yandex, the leading Russian search engine and internet company. The official occasion was the 20th anniversary of the company, but it is crucial for the Kremlin to establish co-operation with the major players in the IT-market. Last year Yandex and Mail.Ru services, including the social network Vkontakte, moved ahead of television channels in the share of young audiences (12-44 year olds). The Kremlin even ordered a digital strategy before the election in order to engage with younger audiences on social media and encourage them to vote. At the same time, Russian media tycoon Aram Gabrelyanov closed his pro-Kremlin LifenewsTV channel and moved his new projects online.

The Kremlin administration has set 70 per cent of voters as their target to engage in the March elections and to ensure the same level of support for Putin. Co-operation with the largest social networks and service providers may help reach younger audiences and allow Putin to declare that he is the president not only of pensioners and conservative groups usually targeted by state television. It can be an effective instrument as younger Russians are mainly using Vkontakte where Russian opposition is not as active as compared to Facebook and Twitter.

Losing control

The presidential election is set for March 18th 2018 – the fourth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea. This new election cycle has already seen an increase of politically-motivated violence. Navalny, the only man who officially opposes Putin in the context of next year’s election, was attacked several times. The head of his Moscow headquarters was also vandalised. Navalny’s supporters were attacked in different regions without any legal consequences for the assailants. The car of Yulia Latynina, an opposition journalist, was set ablaze in September and she and her family fled Russia out of fear for their safety.

Putin has been quite successful in withdrawing Russia from the context of international law and institutions and he has found a lot of support amongst radical activists who are feeling even more empowered. In September the Russian film director Alexey Uchitel faced real hysteria and hatred over his film Matilda, a biopic about Nicolas II love affair. Attackers threw Molotov cocktails at the director’s building in St Petersburg while arsonists burned cars in front of the office of Uchitel’s lawyer, Konstantin Dobrynin. A note found at the scene read: “Burn for Matilda”. Major Russian cinemas cancelled screenings of the film after threats from Orthodox activists. A radical group called Christian State, Holy Russia claimed that “cinemas will burn to the ground” if they show the film. One cinema in Ekaterinburg was allegedly set on fire because of plans to screen the film.

This unprecedented situation was provoked by the Kremlin’s radicalising and manipulation of traditional values and religious beliefs since 2012. The campaign against the film was initiated by a Putin supporter, Duma member and former Crimean prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya. At first, it looked like the whim of one person, but now it has been accompanied by extremist threats and two terrorist attacks. Poklonskaya has demonstrated that neither the culture minister, Vladimir Medinsky, nor the cultural committee of the Duma may influence her. She has already been asked by journalists whether she has ambitions to run for the presidency. It has become too much even for Putin and the situation appears to be slipping out of his control. Yet, in the context of the upcoming elections it is doubtful that Putin will manage to deal with this increasing radical conservatism. That is why it will be crucial for Navalny to be registered as a candidate for the presidency, providing a sound alternative to this murky reality.

Artem Filatov is a Russian journalist and former presenter with Echo of Moscow radio in St Petersburg. He now lives in Moscow and contributes to Russian and international press.

Russia elections, Vladimir Putin