Not dedicated to big political visions

Let’s take the example of the refugee crisis which, quite surprisingly in my view, was presented by some Czech media outlets (including ones apparently regarded as liberal), from only a single perspective, namely, the one with an emphasis on the possible negative consequences of migrants coming to Europe.

And what was the public’s reaction to this situation? Was there any disapproval expressed by the public or intellectuals?

Yes, there was. But this is not the point here, and we are still hovering around the same issue; namely, social activists or academics who research issues, such as migrants, have problems communicating their message through the mainstream media. Although there are some mainstream media outlets that are honestly trying to show balance, these efforts are often limited to just presenting two pronounced opposite views. Any scrutiny of the validity of arguments presented by the opposing parties is typically lacking, as the message is too complicated. One of the consequences of this situation, as our recent data show, is that young Czechs fear refugees at a level comparable to that recorded among young Greeks, and which is much higher than what is recorded among young Germans or Swedes. This is absurd considering the actual number of asylum seekers in the Czech Republic.

Does this mean that there is a potential for a large populist movement in the Czech Republic?

Let me answer it this way: while Czech politicians are indeed keen on using nationalist arguments in public debates, the general public has thus far been rather reluctant to accept this rhetoric. You mentioned Kotleba in Slovakia. For many Czechs his behaviour, notably the idea of uniforms modelled on the Hlinka Guard (the militia of the 1939-45 Nazi-sponsored Slovak State) and treating his followers as a kind of paramilitary organisation, is more comical than inspiring. Having said that, I also need to admit that we are witnessing a certain radicalisation of mainstream parties, such as the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the interior minister, Milan Chovanec, who presents himself in the media as an incarnation of harsh immigration policy. Similarly, we can point to Andrej Babiš and his party – ANO. Babiš is a Czech oligarch of Slovak origin who sometimes uses the refugee crisis to gain political support. Hence, the radicalisation of Czech attitudes is more visible within the system than inside the anti-establishment movements.

According to data presented by Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield the Czech society is among the least supportive of the European Union. In light of recent events, particularly Brexit, is there any talk of the Czech Republic leaving the EU?

Many Czechs took Brexit as a positive signal that one state can overcome the hegemony of Brussels and a sign that the EU is in a deep internal crisis. Needless to say, almost all debates in the Czech Republic that deal with European issues present the EU elite in a negative light. The elite are described as detached from reality, unable to solve serious problems, such as the Greek crisis or the massive migration from Syria and Northern Africa. At the same time, like other countries in the region, the Czech Republic remains a beneficiary of EU funds, which puts Czech politicians from the ruling parties and the opposition in an ambivalent position. Overall, I do not think the threat of the Czech Republic leaving the European Union or NATO in the near future is realistic – though an idea of organising a referendum for this matter was announced by President Miloš Zeman in mid-2016. Just to remind you, however, right now in our country politicians with clear anti-European views do not have enough political power to put such ideas to reality.  

Let’s come back to the origins of Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic. Could you point out what has caused it and what allows it to evolve, despite European resources, investments and openness of foreign labour markets?

In my opinion there was never great enthusiasm towards the EU in the Czech Republic.  Even those politicians in the 1990s who were directly involved in European integration expressed their concerns over the European Union also before accession – a symbol of that was definitely Václav Klaus. Many Czechs have this hidden fear of a western betrayal, just like Munich in 1938. Thus, psychologically speaking, it is difficult to build a sense of common European identity that would define Western European countries as “us” and not “them”.

The complexity of the Munich Agreement is undoubtedly one of the factors that has created a political narrative in the Czech Republic, and it does not refer solely to western countries but also, for instance, Poland. Obviously, we perceive Poles as partners, but the memory of Poland gaining Czech lands from the Munich Agreement penetrates our political discourse from time to time and is used a basis of distrust towards Poland as a partner.   

In Poland, as you know, there is now an increased focus on strengthening the Visegrad Group so it becomes a more powerful platform able to oppose the EU at its core. This is coupled by the relatively new Three Seas Initiative, which seemingly has a similar goal. What is the Czech position towards these ideas?

The Czechs are observing what is happening in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia with regards to building strong national states aimed at claiming full sovereignty and an anti-EU (or at least, Eurosceptical) position. Some would be happy to see this happen in the Czech Republic as well. Andrej Babiš, for instance, tries to play the role of a Czech Viktor Orbán. At the same time, none of these concepts of creating an alliance of Central and Eastern European countries is being treated seriously by party leaders or the public at large. The idea of strengthening the V4 group was quite popular in the 1990s, but today I do not see any obvious support among the Czech public for a strong bloc of countries of the region in opposition to the main actors of the EU, like Berlin or Paris. By the way, who is going to take leadership of this Three Seas Initiative and convince its partners to follow the path, which is visibly anti-German and anti-Brussels?

In Warsaw there is no doubt: Poland.

Poland …? Please do not take it personally, but no one is taking Poland seriously as a leader of the V4 group, let alone anything bigger. In the Czech Republic there is a grounded conviction that the V4 is a platform with no true leader. It is seen as a platform built on the value of partnership, not on the domination of one state against others. What is more, Czechs have always perceived their own state as the most developed country of the region, notably in terms of economics, which was a bit undermined when Slovakia adopted the euro. Poland used to be identified as an important European player (during the rule of the Civic Platform and Donald Tusk), however with PiS in power, this picture is now blurred. Many conservative policies that have been pushed through by the current Polish government, like the abortion ban proposal, seem rather obscure to the widely secular Czech public.

When talking about differences with regards to geopolitics between Poland and the Czech Republic, we cannot omit Russia. In Poland the public and the political elite are both highly Russophobic, while the picture in the Czech Republic is remarkably different…

Speaking about the political elite, I would not say that there is any unanimous view on Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Of course there are figures like Zeman and Klaus who represent the pro-Russian view, but there are also many other politicians holding the exact opposite view. And basically the same applies to the general public. Given the diversity of media, it is quite easy for everyone to find either a pro-Russian or anti-Russian interpretation of events and to keep one’s opinions untouched. What seems interesting to me, however, is that support for Putin (similar to attitudes against immigration) often goes hand-in-hand with some kind of anti-establishment or anti-elite sentiment. Many of those who favour Putin tend to perceive themselves as dissidents, even though they share their opinions with the previous two Czech presidents.

Is there now any vision that would be shared by all Czech politicians, regardless of party?  

 Definitely not. Since the romantic, and to some extent naïve, 1990s with the rule of Václav Havel, there has been a constant lack of any political vision or larger concept that would be shared by Czech leaders. Today, the only vision of the Czech elite in regards to the EU, even when they are criticizing Brussels, is not to change anything – to keep the status quo. Unfortunately, the Czech public is not very interested in international affairs. This is noticeable also in the coverage of international politics by mainstream media. The situation of poor and limited media coverage explains why it is quite easy for politicians to play on people’s emotions – such as the refugee crisis. As I already mentioned, low interest in international affairs and distrust in international partners are, to some extent, rooted in Czech historical complexes. I already mentioned the 1938 Munich Agreement, but there are other examples as well, such as the 1620 Battle of White Mountain. Regardless of what was the actual historical role of this battle, the prevailing interpretation among Czechs is that the dream of a Bohemian revolt was brutally crushed by the Habsburg armies. Such narratives remind Czechs that it is not worthy to be dedicated to any bigger idea or political project. It is better to sit quietly and not tease the real leaders of the world.

Jan Šerek is a social psychologist and political scientist. He is a post-doc researcher at the Institute for Research on Children, Youth and Family of Masaryk University in Brno.  

Tomasz Lachowski is a lawyer and journalist. He has a PhD in international law from the University of Łódź and is the editor in chief of online magazine Obserwator Międzynarodowy.

Central Europe, Czech Republic, Jan Šerek, Poland, populism