The biggest drug case in Serbian contemporary history reveals a tangled web between the criminal narcotics industry and security services in the country. The case has truly become a representation of one corrupt regime divided into many centres of power, all fighting for their own interests.

On November 13th 2019, the head of the department for narcotics of the Belgrade police, Slobodan Milenković, and the chief of operations of the same unit, Dušan Mitič, were driving on the highway, when a black Audi with the cross markings of a Serbian Orthodox church, equipped with police lights, cut off their path. They decided to stop him, without knowing that this would be the beginning of their worst nightmare.

Despite having died over 17 years ago following his war crime tribunal in The Hague, Slobodan Milošević continues to make a mark in Serbian politics. Helping to understand his legacy and why it lives on should be the first step in overcoming the divisive politics of today. This will ultimately redirect Serbia back on the path to integration with the West.

The collapse of communist Yugoslavia was undoubtedly the biggest tragedy for the Balkans at the end of the 20th century. What had been agreed during and after that conflict still greatly affects Balkan politics to this day. Other than the changes in borders or alliances, many politicians and political parties rose to prominence during the war or afterwards because of it. The most familiar person to anyone both in the Balkans and in the West that made their claim to power during the Yugoslav Wars is the former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević.

The recent elections in Serbia were characterized by irregularities, surpassing previous instances of misconduct. This was even acknowledge by international observers. Yet, the opposition's post-election campaign has come to a halt, merely reiterating claims of theft without presenting specific actions or strategies to challenge the ruling party and address corruption within institutions.

At first glance, the formation of Montenegro’s new government appears to represent a victory for pro-western forces in the country. Despite this, the new coalition is ultimately propped up by groups with close links to both Serbia and Russia.

Western media often compares Serbia under Aleksandar Vučić to Putin’s Russia. While both states may often embrace authoritarian rhetoric, it is clear that Moscow is the only one to act on it at all times. This reality is especially important when considering Belgrade’s relations with the EU and NATO.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not significantly changed Belgrade’s foreign policy. Although Serbia is an EU candidate country, it has continued to exploit its ties with China and Russia to increase its bargaining position vis-à-vis the West and raise additional funds for development projects. Despite this ambivalent foreign policy, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić is still considered by many politicians in the EU and NATO as a very important partner in keeping stability in the region.

It seemed that a strong and unified western reaction to the Russian aggression against Ukraine would prevent Serbia from continuing its policy of balancing between East and West. Belgrade, aspiring (at least declaratively) to membership in the European Union, would subsequently be forced to decrease its cooperation with Russia. Yet Serbia’s leadership has been able to avoid introducing sanctions against Russia and keep its good relations with Moscow, while at the same time fostering an image among western politicians as a guarantor of stability in the region.

Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans is traditionally based on its soft power, the energy sector and its diplomatic support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo. The religious, cultural and historic relationship of Moscow with the Orthodox population in the region has been taken as a reason for Russia’s attractiveness. However, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its consequences, the strength of Russian influence in the region is being questioned.

It is commonly said that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has further exposed the fault lines between Moscow and the West in the Western Balkans and that Russia’s aggressive posture in the region is only set to grow as a consequence of the war. Is this concern legitimate or is the Kremlin’s influence in the Western Balkans going to diminish as a consequence of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine?

The ongoing policy of lies continues to suppress and erase the legacy of Yugoslav anti-fascism in Serbia at an ever-increasing pace.

After years of struggle, political corruption and non-compliance with obligations from both sides, the Franco-German proposal for Serbia and Kosovo came as some kind of relief for those who want to normalise relations. It can be seen as an ultimatum for the political elites, but also an opportunity for extremists on both sides to blame their opponents for “treason”.

On the evening of February 27th 2022, the day-long meeting in Brussels between Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, and the EU Special Representative for Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajčák, finally came to an end.

The EuroPride events in Belgrade and all the marches against it became a mirror for all the divisions in Serbian society: between democratic and authoritarian currents, between the European Union and Russia, and between the archetypal West and East. This renewed clash was driven not just by the ruling regime, but a level of Russian influence and Russophilia seen rarely in any other European country.

Among all the capitals of South-Eastern Europe, Belgrade received the honour of organising the first EuroPride outside the borders of the European Union. What should have been a peaceful week of equality, liberal values and tolerance in modern societies, turned into a nightmare of violence, incidents and clashes on the streets of Serbia’s capital. The anti-pride protest marches overwhelmed the streets, casting a shadow of imaginary tradition, clericalism and nationalism.

The last decade has seen Belgrade and Beijing become close economic partners. Whilst this cooperation has brought many benefits to the Balkan state, its one-sided dependence on Chinese investment may cause issues in the future.

Ongoing debate surrounding the United Kingdom’s relations with the Balkans has naturally been dominated by its withdrawal from the European Union. Despite this, a recent charm offensive in Serbia may prove to be a turning point for Britain’s wider ambitions in the area.