Since the beginning of the Russian operation in Crimea in 2014, which led to an illegal and illegitimate annexation of the peninsula, hybrid warfare became a buzzword used in all transatlantic security policy circles. For many in the West, the Crimea operation came as a surprise and the term “hybrid warfare” was meant to intellectually embrace this shock. Yet, many experts claim that there is nothing new in the current model of hybrid warfare as it is based on hybrid wars conducted in Vietnam, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, to name a few. In fact, hybrid warfare can be more easily characterised than defined. But is it really – to use the famous expression by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld – a known unknown?

Since 2014 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has increasingly been focusing on the threat posed by Vladimir Putin. In response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and ongoing violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Donbas region, the Alliance is deploying four new battalions to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. On June 17th, NATO concluded one of its largest military exercises to date, the 10-day Anakonda 2016 involving some 31,000 Alliance troops in Poland. Meanwhile, the NATO-Russia Council has been largely moribund except for one meeting this spring that produced very little.  

As the Warsaw NATO Summit approaches, the contested notion of Georgia’s membership in NATO does not seem to be receiving much support. However, within the context of current debates on the future of the alliance, it is crucial to discuss how the case of Georgia impacts the alliance, the European integration, as well as the question of who we are and what we represent.