The story of violent clashes that broke out in Sibiu in Romania during late December 1989 is one that many have forgotten since the revolution and regime change. Tudor Giurgiu’s latest film Libertate revisits that turbulent event in Romania. The film not only acts as a reminder of the ruthless terror and chaos of the time but also as a chance for Romanians to reassess their own history.

When Nicolae Ceaușescu's brutal regime collapsed in Romania 34 years ago, Tudor Giurgiu was 18 years old, living in his home city of Cluj-Napoca, in central Transylvania. “For many days and weeks, the country was directionless,” the 51-year-old Romanian film director explains from central Sarajevo, Bosnia, where he is showcasing his latest film Libertate. “People were not talking normally, they were going nuts and there was a lot of shouting, paranoia, and violence.”

What makes Poles help Ukrainian refugees yet indifferent to the fate of migrants on the Belarusian border? Is this determined solely by the right-wing propaganda, which portrays the Ukrainians in good terms and those in Belarus in essentially bad ones?

The release of Agnieszka Holland’s film The Green Border (Zielona Granica), which depicts the human drama of people pushed across the Polish-Belarusian border and the helplessness of activists willing to help them – helplessness resulting from the specific political decisions of the Polish authorities – has been met with unprecedented heckling and brutal attacks in Poland. The outrage of the country’s highest-ranking politicians from the United Right coalition was clear.

Decolonisation in Eastern Europe is different from other, especially western, decolonisation experiences. There is no one algorithm that would determine in which way a society or country would pursue the process of decolonisation. In Ukraine’s case, but also that of the whole region of Eastern Europe, the initial stage of decolonisation showed a return to the alternative centre – the West.

“We will regain Odesa and everything will be back in place! Monuments will get removed and street names changed,” reads a comment on the website of Russia’s state-owned information agency Ria Novosti. It was placed under an article describing the removal of the Catharine the Great monument in Odesa. In a nutshell, these two sentences present the discourse that has developed in Eastern Europe around the topic of decolonisation.

The September-October 2023 Issue of New Eastern Europe is now available. Find out what's inside and how to get your copy.

As the Western Balkans mark two decades since the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, an atmosphere of reflection, rather than celebration, envelops the region. Amidst the initial hopes ignited by the summit's commitment to EU enlargement, the journey towards integration has been mired in complexities and frustrations. A deeper exploration into the underlying causes reveals a surprising factor at the heart of the delay – the state of public administration, an often-overlooked linchpin in the ambitious pursuit of EU integration.

In 2003, the historic Thessaloniki Summit marked a pivotal moment for Europe and its enduring commitment to enlargement and unity. At the heart of this gathering in the timeless Greek city was the visionary idea to bring the Western Balkans into the European family. The summit not only reaffirmed the EU's dedication to the enlargement process but also set into motion the integration pathways for countries emerging from a tumultuous past.

As September 2023 was approaching, the focus of western diplomacy once again gravitated toward the ongoing Kosovo-Serbia conflict, which appears to have no end in sight. Amid mounting tensions and the uncertain trajectory of the EU’s “Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue,” a comprehensive reassessment of mediation efforts becomes imperative to bring a definitive resolution to this enduring conflict.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stressed the importance of engaging the Western Balkans more closely. The strategy behind the West’s renewed interest was twofold: bring Kosovo and Serbia closer to a deal to normalise relations and simultaneously move Serbia away from the Russian orbit. Despite initial enthusiasm in early 2023, relations quickly soured once again. What will it take to overcome this impasse?

The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue which has been facilitated by the European Union since 2011 has faced challenges in normalising relations between the two countries. However, Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine injected a sense of urgency and provided a renewed impetus to address the dialogue. This led to a new diplomatic offensive that culminated in the finalisation of the second Brussels Agreement and its Implementation Annex in February and March 2023, respectively.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not significantly changed Belgrade’s foreign policy. Although Serbia is an EU candidate country, it has continued to exploit its ties with China and Russia to increase its bargaining position vis-à-vis the West and raise additional funds for development projects. Despite this ambivalent foreign policy, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić is still considered by many politicians in the EU and NATO as a very important partner in keeping stability in the region.

It seemed that a strong and unified western reaction to the Russian aggression against Ukraine would prevent Serbia from continuing its policy of balancing between East and West. Belgrade, aspiring (at least declaratively) to membership in the European Union, would subsequently be forced to decrease its cooperation with Russia. Yet Serbia’s leadership has been able to avoid introducing sanctions against Russia and keep its good relations with Moscow, while at the same time fostering an image among western politicians as a guarantor of stability in the region.

Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans is traditionally based on its soft power, the energy sector and its diplomatic support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo. The religious, cultural and historic relationship of Moscow with the Orthodox population in the region has been taken as a reason for Russia’s attractiveness. However, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its consequences, the strength of Russian influence in the region is being questioned.

It is commonly said that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has further exposed the fault lines between Moscow and the West in the Western Balkans and that Russia’s aggressive posture in the region is only set to grow as a consequence of the war. Is this concern legitimate or is the Kremlin’s influence in the Western Balkans going to diminish as a consequence of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine?

The continued power of nationalist ideas and narratives in Bosnia and Herzegovina has all but destroyed any social or political cohesion. Ethnic divisions have hindered the establishment of a unified political system and resulted in permanent political deadlock. Nationalist rhetoric continues to fuel political conflicts, further deepening resentments and prejudices.

More than three decades after the start of the Bosnian War, nationalists are once again threatening instability in the Western Balkans. Milorad Dodik, the pro-Russian Bosnian Serb strongman, recently stated that “We are considering in the most serious terms to bring a decision to declare independence and secede Republika Srpska, unless the property issue is solved.” Two decades of undermining state institutions, malign foreign influence and western appeasement have brought Bosnia and Herzegovina to its most serious crisis since the end of the war three decades ago.

The great influence that Balkan Jewry had on their co-religionists from Eastern Europe is one of the best examples of the close historical and cultural ties connecting both regions. It also shows how both of these groups were bound to the rest of the continent in a display of Europe’s multicultural heritage.

In June 2022, Ukraine and Moldova received EU candidate status and subsequently joined the ranks of the countries of the Western Balkans, which for 20 years have been the main area of EU enlargement policies. The Union justifies the accession of these states through reference to a common European historical and cultural legacy, of which both the Balkans and Eastern Europe are an integral part.

An interview with Gojko Božović, a Belgrade-based Serbian poet, literary critic and publisher. Interviewer: Nikodem Szczygłowski

NIKODEM SZCZYGŁOWSKI: It has been 30 years since the break-up of Yugoslavia. In an essay published in 2021 titled Yugoslavia. 30 Years, the Slovenian writer Drago Jančar compared the countries that once made up Yugoslavia to islands in an archipelago. The publishing house which you head is also called Arhipelag, which in English means archipelago. What is your mission and what kind of literature do you opt to publish?

GOJKO BOŽOVIĆ: The Arhipelag was founded in 2007. At that time the reality was very different from the one we live in today. It was before the global economic crisis, before the great wave of populism that swept the world and still has no intention of leaving it. At that time, there was much more democracy in Eastern European and Balkan states and societies, especially in Serbia.