The people who head the central banks of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia are usually regarded both in the West and in the expert circles of their countries as the most liberal or technocratic in the economic governance structures. They are all well-read, experienced and have contacts abroad. However, the institutional reality of Belarus, Russia and even Ukraine is that all three central banks remain heavily dependent on the presidential centres.

In the many economic analyses of the countries involved in the war on the borders of the European Union, little attention is paid to the role of the central banks of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. However, a look at their functioning allows us to gain not only a better understanding of the current economic policies of Kyiv, Minsk and Moscow but also an insight into the peculiarities of these countries' economic systems.

In September 2023 Azerbaijan regained control of Nagorno-Karabakh, prompting more than 100,000 Armenians who had been living in the territory to flee to Armenia. This development marks a significant change for the South Caucasus, and while it adds to existing tensions, it may also result in the long-term in a more stable region that is less dependent on Russia.

The South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia rarely make the headlines in western news sources. However, that changed in autumn 2023. On September 19th, Azerbaijan launched an unexpected 24-hour military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh that resulted in the region’s de facto government surrendering to Azerbaijan. Those who have followed the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh for decades know that the outcome of September’s military offensive has the potential to upend security in the South Caucasus.

The biggest drug case in Serbian contemporary history reveals a tangled web between the criminal narcotics industry and security services in the country. The case has truly become a representation of one corrupt regime divided into many centres of power, all fighting for their own interests.

On November 13th 2019, the head of the department for narcotics of the Belgrade police, Slobodan Milenković, and the chief of operations of the same unit, Dušan Mitič, were driving on the highway, when a black Audi with the cross markings of a Serbian Orthodox church, equipped with police lights, cut off their path. They decided to stop him, without knowing that this would be the beginning of their worst nightmare.

Recent geopolitical developments have resulted in renewed discussions on the enlargement of the European Union – including in the Western Balkans. Many factors will determine how these talks go in 2024 but some local actors may have significant input. Through its experience, Romania can be one of these actors and play a unique role in this process.

The new geopolitical context stemming from Russia’s ongoing brutal war on European soil has had profound effects on the geopolitical dynamics of the European Union’s enlargement. After many years of inertia and stagnation, enlargement seems to be back at the top of the EU agenda. The geopolitical decision made by the European Council in June 2022 to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status was followed by the (re-)opening of previously stagnating accession negotiations with the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania and various ex-Yugoslav states).

Despite having died over 17 years ago following his war crime tribunal in The Hague, Slobodan Milošević continues to make a mark in Serbian politics. Helping to understand his legacy and why it lives on should be the first step in overcoming the divisive politics of today. This will ultimately redirect Serbia back on the path to integration with the West.

The collapse of communist Yugoslavia was undoubtedly the biggest tragedy for the Balkans at the end of the 20th century. What had been agreed during and after that conflict still greatly affects Balkan politics to this day. Other than the changes in borders or alliances, many politicians and political parties rose to prominence during the war or afterwards because of it. The most familiar person to anyone both in the Balkans and in the West that made their claim to power during the Yugoslav Wars is the former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević.

Disinformation has become an effective weapon in Russia’s ongoing assault against Ukraine. However, there is currently little that can be done to prosecute those guilty of spreading such dangerous narratives. A new framework is needed in order to effectively challenge this key part of Moscow’s war.

The brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine, the full-scale stage of which began in February 2022, was both preceded and further accompanied by a rampant propaganda campaign that reached new heights of cynicism, bloodthirstiness and warmongering in just a matter of days. The propaganda machine spent immense resources on justifying Moscow’s heinous acts of aggression by employing a combination of manipulative and selective reporting on the hostilities in eastern Ukraine.

An interview with Jamala, Ukrainian singer, performer and 2016 winner of the Eurovision Song Contest. Interviewer: Anna Arkhypova

An interview with retired Ambassador Richard Miles, former US ambassador to Georgia. Interviewer: Vazha Tavberidze

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: Let’s begin with the Rose Revolution as you remember it. From your perspective, what exactly transpired 20 years ago?

RICHARD MILES: Well, it was a very interesting display of – I guess you have to say democracy – because what happened was what the majority of the population wanted. I wouldn't say that it was entirely legal, but I do not think it was exactly illegal either. In fact, the country adapted to the revolutionary changes and the opposition leaders fairly easily. I should point out almost from the start that not all of the opposition leaders were supporting the demonstrations and therefore the Rose Revolution.

Ukraine has the second-largest HIV epidemic in Europe after Russia. Those refugees who fled the full-scale invasion to Poland with HIV have been forced to seek treatment and adjust to different approaches to the disease. In the end, the experience can provide lessons on how to better help those afflicted with the disease.

When Anna Aryabinska fled from Kyiv in March 2022 with her ex-partner’s children, she had little idea that she would end up supporting not only his family, but many HIV-positive Ukrainians in Poland. Until Russia’s full-scale invasion, Aryabinska had been an activist for the Ukrainian organisation Positive Women, supporting women with HIV. Now she is one of a group of volunteers assisting fellow Ukrainian refugees to keep taking medication for HIV, as well as integrate into healthcare systems in European countries which have very different epidemic profiles and standards of treatment.

The new Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has promised a liberalization of the country’s abortion laws, which are some of the most restrictive on the European continent. His path is a sharp contrast to the previous government’s anti-abortion crackdown. Yet, even as he commits to the issue publicly, the campaign he took to get there reveals that reproductive freedom in Poland remains an issue many lawmakers use only instrumentally.

Hot water, running over a pregnant belly, under beige and purple shower tiles. An orange cat, crawling through the litter box. Only a couple months after abortion doula Wiktoria Szymczak moved to Kraków from Warsaw in 2023, she was helping a stranger end a pregnancy in her apartment bathroom. Earlier in the day, Szymczak had got a call from a client who needed more help than anticipated, who we will call Agata to protect her privacy. Previously, Szymczak had told her how to pursue one of the few legal methods left for obtaining an abortion within the country. It is still legal to go online and order abortion pills for yourself in the mail through a dealer based outside Poland (Szymczak recommends medical non-profits like “Women Help Women”). Agata went online and she bought the pills to end her pregnancy.

Once a Soviet-era uranium processing plant, the Silmet factory in Sillamäe, Estonia, is now Europe’s leading processor of rare earths. Silmet’s mother company, Toronto-headquartered Neo Preformance Materials, aims to establish the continent’s first manufacturer of high performance magnets for European consumers. These “permanent magnets” have the potential to make a huge impact in the European electric car and offshore wind-turbine industries, which up until now were exclusively dependent on supplies from an increasingly less reliable source – China.

It was during the COVID-19 pandemic, when China's borders temporarily closed, that something clicked in Raivo Vasnu’s mind. Silmet, the factory he heads in Sillamäe, Estonia is a former Soviet uranium-processing facility in Europe’s north-easternmost tip near the Russian border. It is also Europe’s largest processor of rare earths, a crucial category of elements necessary for a wide range of technologies, including electric cars and wind turbine technologies.

For years, minority groups in Poland have been feeling pressure both from the government and society at large. Now with a new governing coalition, there appears to be potential breathing room for many of Poland’s minorities. However, that does not mean that the road ahead is clear or easily navigable.

Poland is often described as a homogenous state – white, Catholic and ethnically Polish. The numbers, at face value, support this idea. This apparent homogeneity is reinforced by the media. Often as a throwaway line when describing Poland’s demographics, or, for more insidious motivations, by those on the far right. This characterization, however, grossly simplifies the story of Poland and its citizenry. Historically, both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Second Polish Republic were heterogeneous states comprising a number of peoples, religions and languages.