Analysis

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has exposed the nexus between repressive domestic rule and aggressive foreign policy. As long as Russia remains a dictatorship, it will pose an existential threat to the security order in Europe. It is, therefore, in the West's interest to see a permanent dismantling of the current model of government in Russia. Putin's departure from office will create a short-term window of opportunity for political change. Contrary to widespread fears, the end of this autocratic pseudo-stability may pave the way for sustainable peace in Europe.

The challenges facing us, not only in Germany and Europe, are immense. And we all know that we cannot master them alone, but only as the EU and NATO, that is the West in its entirety.

Numerous tensions, deepened by Russia’s war with Ukraine, high inflation and the energy crisis, generate our anxiety about the future of the European project. Especially as the proposals that are put forward may actually lead to a greater fragmentation and further “unsealing” of the European Union. This, in turn, can only impede its further development.

Georgia continues to struggle with issues surrounding its European integration. While the country’s own government remains unsure of its next move, the spectre of Russia and its authoritarian politics continues to loom large over Tbilisi.

A nuclear threat which induces the fear of even a possible attack can serve as the perfect bogeyman. Vladimir Putin knows this all too well. Thus, he uses it to generate hysteria among western societies. As of now, he is at least partially successful.

In the 1970s the Albanian communist regime started to massively construct anti-nuclear bomb shelters all around the country. In total, some 175,000 bunkers were built. Many were located on mountain slopes, others as concrete-covered underground passages. Their purpose was to protect Albania’s communist leaders, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, from the consequences of a nuclear attack. History shows, nonetheless, that none of them were ever used for their intended purpose, while half of them were not even used for drills.

North Macedonia may not be the first country that comes to mind when discussing Russian propaganda. Despite this, the small Balkan state continues to grapple with consistent efforts by the Kremlin to influence domestic politics. Such campaigns are ultimately designed to challenge the nation’s continued desire to further integrate with the West through EU membership.

Supporting democracy does not come cheap, but then again freedom is also costly. In Kherson, Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia the cost is in human lives. In Europe it is in the ever-rising electricity and utility bills. For North Macedonia, a small country in the middle of the Western Balkans, prices are not the only problem. The youngest member so far of NATO, for the past several months especially, has faced textbook hybrid attacks intended to create fear, panic and distrust in state institutions.

Budapest’s readiness to block military and financial aid to Kyiv, delay EU sanctions against Russia and its outspoken criticism thereof are creating serious repercussions for the EU’s image as a foreign policy actor vis-á-vis Russia. These issues further indicate deep divisions among member states and call into question European unity. They also reveal one of the EU’s most discussed weaknesses, namely, its inability to speak with one voice in foreign policy.

To the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, any measure is welcome to achieve his personal and inner circle’s objectives. While being a member of western institutions, such as the European Union and NATO, Orbán consistently seeks contact with autocrats from the East, particularly Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. This double-faced foreign policy benefits the Hungarian government in two ways: first, it helps to uphold its image as a credible actor on the world stage back home; and second, it ensures that Hungary continues receiving financial support and legitimation for its illiberal model of governance from outside of the EU.

Since February 24th 2022, Georgia’s economic ties and dependence regarding Russia have markedly increased, leading to heavy criticism of the Georgian Dream-led government about its lack of transparency around ties to Russian business interests. Most obvious among these concerns are those centred on the party’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire and former prime minister who made his fortune in Russia before entering Georgian politics.

Nearly one year on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a stroll through the streets of Tbilisi provides a visual reminder of both the ongoing conflict and the Georgian population’s prodigious support for the Ukrainian people. With billboards flashing blue and yellow and Ukrainian flags nearly matching their Georgian counterparts in representation, it is unsurprising that a March 2022 poll commissioned by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) showed that 98 per cent of Georgians support the Ukrainian people.

Soon after it became clear that Russia’s brutal aggression on Ukraine was nowhere near the rapid military campaign it had hoped to be, the international debate on the reconstruction of Ukraine started. Backtracking through the focal points of this debate gives us a clue as to where the primary financial and non-financial obstacles lie.

The current phase of Russia’s war against Ukraine started on February 24th 2022. Evidently, it marked a turning point in Europe’s history, whose consequences we will be seeing in the long years to come. As of January 2023, there are no clear signs suggesting how long the war will last. In fact, there is no end in sight. Nevertheless, alongside the ongoing negotiations on the armament of Ukraine and the next round of sanctions on Russia, there is also a process taking place around establishing the framework for future reconstruction efforts. There is no doubt that without a clear and effective institutional architecture, the recovery will become bogged down in a ton of risks and problems.

The war in Ukraine strengthened the de-Sovietisation process already taking place in Eastern Europe. It has pushed states to further remove the remnants of the Soviet past, including monuments, which are believed to have ideological symbolism and play a significant role in shaping collective identity.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s actions have been discussed not only as a brutal violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a neighbouring state, but also as a continuation of Russian imperial policy and a desire to rebuild the Soviet Union. Yet, amidst the war in Ukraine, Eastern Europe showed its powerful counter-desire to be freed from the Soviet past and Russian influence.

The geopolitical salience of the Russia–Ukraine War and the remoteness of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union or NATO call for intensification and modification of, and innovation in, current western approaches.